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David Urquhart was one of the most vooiferous and. despised radicals 
of mid-Viotorian Bngla.nd. For two deoades before the Crimean ',"lar he had 
been a leading advocate in F~gland of taking a favorable attitude toward 
Turkey, and a persiatent advooate of o~sing the ever-inoreasing menaoe 
of RUBsia to that ocuntr.r. Urquhart, little written about in modern his-
tor" or briefly dismis.ed as a monomaniac or fanatio, Was gifted with rare 
enthusiasm and per.iat.nee. He wae a prominent E.nglisb personality, the 
leader of a vooiferous minori ty, and oertainly one of the few oontem»Orary 
1 English experts on the Near East. The publication in the thirties of two 
of his most int'luential works t 'rMUW.AWl!!r Rifmuroe,2 and ~ 3pipt RZ.. 
iJh! lAJU. 3 gave him a reputa.tion as an autbor! ty on tbe Near F.a.st.And the 
former was later to become 9. source for Karl Marx· s wr! tin:?,!! on the Eastern 
Not only did Urquha.rt Bee Turkey in a. favorable light and ElIBsian 91»-
pansion a8 a menaoe to Europe a.nd Western Civilization, but he a100 deepieec 
free trade, industrialiSDl, the Whigs, the Church of England, and above all 
lOertrude Robinson, D.l1d[r~1£l (Oxford, 1920), pp. 44-47. 
2Dav1d Urquhart, ll!mR lW4 hI nlIPR£9!1 (Lcmdon, 1831). 
3Da,Vid Urquhart, lh.t SliV.t.9l...a.]Y!, 2 vols. (London, 1838). 
1 
Lord Pa,lmerston. For him, Palmerston was nothin~ more than a. hired arrent 
of the Czar, helping to bring a.bout the 0011aps8 of the moral order in 
I'}urope in the Czar's interest. 4 !~ot even Palmerston's attitude during the 
Crimean ;'jar ohanged his mind. Tbe Crimean oampaign, Urquhart thought, was 
deliberately sabotaged in an attempt to p:re ... ent the Turks trom defeating 
the Russiana.5 Lord Palmeraton had for a long time alao been interfering 
2 
1n the internal affaire of other oountries. Suoh actions were contrar.y to 
the law of nations, a principle whlohUrquhart found inoreasingly violated 
in the nineteenth oentur.v. Interestingly enough, he became assooiated with 
Karl Marx in hi. oppoeition to Palmers ton and the gavernment'. polioi •• in 
the Crimean. War, and Urquhart'. influenoe ie unmi.takabl. 1n Man'. wr1 t-
6 inga on Palm.raton and the 1&8".rn Queation. Not only did Urquhart pI", 
an important rele in arousing the English publio ap:a:!rlst Russia through 
many speeches, newspaper artioles, ~mphlete, and beoks, but he indirectly 
influenced publio opinion throu~ other writers and speakers Who acoepted 
his prinoiples and faots either in whole or :In part. His vi.&..,8 were read 
directly or indirectly on the continent and even as far away as the United 
States, through the perl or Karl i&arx in 1ll! 1!.a.!.2m 'rribun,.7 
4Isa1a.h Berlin, lfJu:l!la (London, 1948), P. 189. 
5.jW. , p. 190. 
6 E .. n. Carr, !t.tl!Au (London, 1934), pp. lal-127. 
7 Charles A. Dana. the foreign e41 tor of 1h.t lrtlmne, had asked Marx 
to wr1 t. aome artioles on the Eastern Qu •• tion. lJa TrJ.bup.I at the ti.e 
was eomewhat radical, being founded by a group of Amerioan followers of 
Fourier. The paper had a circulation of' two hundred tbOU8&"ld oopi •• , 
probably the greatest of any newspaper 1n the world. 
3 
Despite e. ofl'ntu17 of historiographT on the Crimean War there st111 18 
muoh oon1;,1'o"e1'8)" concerning the origins and conduot of the war.8 Urquhart '. 
ideas on these S'Ub~ect. are of 1mport&n08 not only becauGe they give us a. 
better understa'1ding of the radical opposi tlon to the government's of Lord 
Aosrdeen and Lo!"d Palmereton, but also because they give us another intet-
pretat10n of the events. His opinions reveal another framework in whioh to 
judge the war. Meat historians have not ccnsidered this framework. or for 
that matter his views, as respectable or supportable. On the other hand the 
prinoiples on whioh he believed sooiety should be founded. remind us of 
ideals more widely held in former ages. For him Justice and law were e .... 
tremeJ¥ iIlportant, and the evils of his day he largely attributed to their 
violation. And when he spoke of diplomacy and public opin1on people must 
have shuddered to hear their popularly held conoeptions b.sieged by the 
power of his keen intellect. 
~ust prior to the Crimean War publio opinion great17 reflected hi. 
views. In 1851 he published a p_phlet, The Ul,!tll'Z .Rt.!U l>ama,bl,9 fol-
lowed in 1853 by a book, .!Ill P19G:II'.2!. RY'li, J.n.iU.::!u1. l~Rrtb, ..awl 
SoSlb. lO Besides constantly writing tor periodioals and newspapere, he 
greeted the outbreak. of' the war with the pamphlet, 1h! '.va;: s!. IG9rlD9f_ 
8 Brison D. Gooch, "A Ceutu17 ot Historiography on the Crimea.n ':I;la r, U 
.!!!!' JJXI! (October, l-;~'), .13-'58. 
9Da,vid Urquhart, ~ M~lt~n'Z s!. .l!\J. Danube (London, 1851). 
10 Da.vid Urquhart, 1h.! Ptegreg§ .£t NH§'~i ..in ~ West. t1orth, J.W.i1 South 
(London, 1953). 
4 
11 Collusion. The 1a.... tha.t were stirring English public opinion into •• 
pi t_ent on the S::~8t.rn Question and oonditioned them for their reception of 
ithe new. of the ma •• flOra at Sinope were good evidenoe of the efficacy of his 
12 
article •• 
t1rqubart was alao influentia.! in developing among ~fI}ngli.h workingmen a 
large number of inve.tigating oommittees of foreign affairs. In underatani-
inS' the vi .... of Dand Urquhart and his coterie we will get It. cl.arer con-
~eption of the ideas of. these opposition ~UPB Who, with Cobden and Bright, 
~el'e til(') VOCiferous in d.Emouncing the purpose and oonduot of the Crimean Wa.t'. 
And e'YWI. though Urquhart's explanations ms;r nnt be true in the final anal,.... 
ef the oontemporary En~lish BOone. 
It wl11 then be the ~lrpose o~ this paper to stud~ the views of DaVid 
Urquhart oonoerni,"lg England's forei~ pn110y during, and her oonduot of the 
Crimean War. Even though hie extensive activ! Ues and wr! tinge a.nd. the 
groups he inapired were not very' suoceesf'ul in undemj,ning the populari 117 of 
PalJaerston in ~gl&n4 among the respeotable olaEuMs, or in oonvincing the 
English ;people of the corruption of England or her collusion with Russia fen: 
the destruotion of T.lrkeJ't the7 certain17 were as unique and a. aignif'loant 
aa th87 were vociferous. 
Two books directly and iruUl'ect17 conoerned with UrqUhart are Gertmde 
llD•vid Urquh.art, .!ht WIT!2l. ,Im9tanC! and CQ~l;11119nt ltD Prsntp,_ 
Resul t. (London, 1854. 
12B• Kingsley Ma.rtin, 1b.! T;lWJllD st. ~ Pe6miitstoP (London, 1942), 
p. 189. 
5 
llobin.on '. Dand UrqUhW. 13 ani Maria. C. Bishop' n . .:.,fY'J,c il~ sG.!D.a. UrgHSN':t-14 
Neither of theft treat uten.ivaly, or for that matter adequately, "his views 
IOn EngliSh polloy, Palmerston, arId Russia cturing the Crimean War. Robin-
sen's work is ma.1nq Gonc.rned wi th a genere.l &lls.lysis ot his views through-
out lite, the event. of h~. earlier life, the formation and direction of the 
foreian affair. cOWIi tt •••• and hi. interest in the Vatioan Oounoil. Biahop, 
on the otber hand, gives U8 IIOme 010.8 and a;rarpathetlo g11mp.e. of Mr •• 
UJ>quhart's h1lsna.."ld, and a good aurve;r of their actione du.ring the war. No 
authon tativ. biography haa been published on David Urquhart. However, the 
information (!ontatned in Robinson and Bishop and other souroes does give us 
a decent aooount of his act10ns &lring the period of the war. 
Urquha.rt, as Robinson points o'U.t, fits into a school of historical in-
terpretation diametricall,. opposed to the tradi tiona! !,nlSlish one. There 
still a.r~ tfro diametrioally opposed views oonoerning the period of the Co&-
gressea, the period of reaction following the Congress of Vienna. English 
wri tel'S have oommonq acoepted Metternioh aa the soul of a aystem of Hac-
tion. The rival theo17 aakes Russia the inaugurator and motivator of lnt ..... 
ventlon in order that ahe might oreate dlstrust and oonfliot aaong the 
We.tern nations and profit by the ensuing oonfusion. The writers of the 
latter school are prepared to prove th,.t Russian agents helped foment the 
revolutions in Sp&1n and Italy. Sorel, one of this sohool's more prominent 
exponents, S'k&t88 that the 1dealistioi,lexander wu both the hidden god of 
130ertrude Robinson, Divi\d Urg111UU;:$ (Oxford, 1900). 
l~a C. Btshop, ~emo1r JJ.:! 1fr!h UrguPltt (I.ondcm, 1897). 
the revolutionaries and the pub110god of the conse:t"Va.tlves. This is essen-
tially what nand l.frqubart said ot Russian po1iey throughout his 11fe.15 
But even after a hundred years of research on the policies and diplo-
lD3O)" of Russilll.t l!1ngland, and Franae the origins of the Crim.an War are not 
yet fully olear. Certainly that tangled web of dip1otaatio events whioh pre-
ceded 1 t has not been entirely unravelled. Gavin:8. Henderson aummed it up 
and. explained -8:9' this viper t s tangle bY' atatlng that "The Crimean War was 
the reen1 t of diplc:mllltic d.rift and ministerial inoompetence. ,,16 As '8. 
K.ingaley Martin deecribe. the drift toward war the 3Ot'1&1 villain appeal"S 
to be publio opinion. 17 For roughly two decades atter the Treat,. of U'nkiar 
Skelle8si of 1833, a flood. of anti-Russian 11tern~\re--partially, it not 
mainly, inspired l'y n~w1.d Urquhart a.nd tol"d Ponsonby-had been steadily 
18 
mounting until it oarried, as Aberdeen described. it, a. drifting cabinet 
into the war.19 Henderson is oonvinced. that the events a.nd 1"$Bt21t8 of the 
war were more shrewdly and impartially anal;r-zed by con'tempora.ries than by 
later hifltoria.nejO Such a maxim, then, makes the views of Urquhart of' pri-
ma.r.r importanoe. A1 though Henderson dces an e:x:oellent job of analysing the 
diplomac7 and character of leading figure. during the war in his Cmun 
15Jlobin80n, PP. 5-7. 
U ( Gavin B. Henderson, CSIIAn!al Dt»12112% Glasgow, 1947), p. 199. 
17Martin, pp. 215-224. 
18 
J. H. Gleason, .!hi GaUIIl' .st RUIGp\lobla JJl QUit t1;t\$ii\n (Cam-
bridge, Ma ••• , 1950), pp. 25-2 6. . 
19 Martin, p. 217. 
2OHenaeraon, p. 243. 
1 
i!s Dj.p12JIHWZ. he de ... not mention Urquhar't. On the other hand he does not 
take sueh a fawrable vi_ of' Lord Palmeraton a8 doea Seton-Watson and 
TelDpe:r.1ey. He thol'Cllghly analy ••• Palmeraton t 8 oharSDter, oalling him 
little 1e88 than a tanatic in hi. attempts to enhanoe Britain's PrGstlge.2l 
If Urquhart oan be 8Oou •• d of being addicted to Russophobia. perhaps Palmel'-
stan, his arch Emfll37t oan be accused of Anglophobia. 
In d18CufH'in~ oommentaries on the views of' DaVid 'Urquhart, there is a 
strong temptation to include material not directly concerned with the sub-
jeot under sorutiny. This would lead to a. discussion a.s exterud ve as is 
Brison D. Gooch's article, "A. Century of Historiography on the CrtmeM 
Wa1".,,22 It i8 interesting to note that the olosot he ever comes to DaVid 
UrqUhart (and Urquhart had decided Views on all phaGeS of the war) is in 
hi. d1aou •• ion of the views of Karl Man and Vernon L. Pu:ryear. \\farx, he 
atate., viewed the Criaean War &8 an att_pt on the part of Ruseia to r ... 
atrict English COIID.rota! ooapetltion in the lV-ear But. "In hi. 4q, Man 
waa "f'1rtually Alone," Qoocb tells us, and "No TOioe added doeUllanted auppeJr' 
to hie anal,.m.s, n until Vernon L. Pu17eal' published in 1931 the firat docu-
m.ntfld proof in hi. book, }\uclan4, Rugia, .aw!.!W! .~:ttS:), 9tlft!t1e.rt, 184!: 
22. 23 Suoh a atat_ent ignores the wri tin .. ot Urquhart in general, and. 
eapecially his book-length work whicb preceded the war, jla Prom".Sl.! 
lffilli •• .1!l..t!:w~, t1Q£:lh, ..m1!1 sO!,lth. 
a k ¥J 
211.1?J.!l. J p. a") 3. 
22,...~I")Ch, pp. 33-58 .. 
23.!.i.U., p. 49. 
8 
sider controveraial, in addition to the above mentioned book has made a 
~ompTehensive analysis of +.he relation ot economics to diplomacy in his 
lnterr.a.tional iegAA!!igl.lWl Dijl19l119Y ill jU 1!ut mlt.24 'i'he fo:rmer, whioh 
inoludes Ii. lengthy tl'4Hltment of the diplomacy of the Crimean ~a.r, gives 
li t.tle 1nfonnation on tJrquha.rt· 8 views of the war. The latter treats quite 
~el1 his Infhu.!!'ooe and activi Ues in the thirties, &..I'\d is exeuBahle for lack 
book. 
Paul ;"1. Bla<:kstook and 'Bert 1". Ho eeli ts in their oommendable 1'eIlUl"reo-
tion of Marx's writings on the Eastern Question whioh aooording to them are 
praotieally unavailable, have in their beok 11w &!.ul~an .!nao,.12 EUl"S!R,25 
g1 ven quite a fair appraisal of the importance of the wr! tings of Karl Marx 
em the .. tern Question. Marx was ahownto f1 t the description of the group 
that Gavin B. Hel'.uieraon d.escribed 808 dependable observars who "gave 'V8J!T 
aatisf'actory ja4£pents on the oau ••• of the war and the :respective re8pons1-
bili Ues of the states conoerned ... 26 Although 1 t is true that Man :Neoga 
nifled the vi tal U$C88Si ty for modern refol"lls in 'lilrkey. he did not 'adopt the 
extreme pro-Turkish posi ti<)n ofauoh "propagandists" aa David Urquhart. 27 
24Gooo'h refers to A. J. P. Taylor who found these ideas "]lovel, it un-
t"eliable," and E.!.. Woodward who thought them "interesting materia.l, thou~ 
ltbe oonclusions d.ra.wn are often oontl"'OvGrsial. tt p .. 511 Vernon L. Pur.yEu~.rt 
ntomatinna.l !9911RWCS ~ Piplameex.in.iU]ur F.a@t (Stanford. 1935). 
25Paul w. Blackstock and. Bert F. Hoe4.tli tz, ..!hi FflHu3irw "'IUfige J2 ~U'0R' 
Glencoe, 1952)" 
26Henderson, p. 243. 
27Blackstook and HORelitz, p. 262. 
Howevel', the a.ut.hors f&11 to see tha.t many of the other viewa of Marx on 
Pa.L~erston and the ~aetern Question express the views that David Urquhart 
held .:and ,rropacrated. '!ven though Marx ridiollled him a.t certain times thi.t\I 
dces not give a. oomprehendve pioture of the nature of' their relatione, let 
alone "«ants in.debtedness to him. 
Somewhat permissively and eert,3inly apologetica.lly Seton-Watson an .... 
lyzee 'Jrquhart' s post tio1'l. on. the mid-Victorian inter~la.tlonal eoene. !3ri,aiu 
I.in E.Pt2TC' oontains sever&! pages informing the reader of the influence of 
28 Urquhart. In doing 80 Seton-Watson apologizes, asking for the reader'. 
indulgence in di8c~8.ing What some might not consider aerioue hletor,y. but 
which to him .... ed "of som. valu., as revealing the levity with whioh un-
prov.d chargee could b. bandl.4 about in the Viotorian era, d •• pi t. our 
strict law of 11'0.1."29 Concerning Urquhart'. oharges that Pallterston had 
been bribed in 1825 s.ton-watson atat.a tbat "It ..... alao.t inoredibl. 
that 8. man of' l'1rql.lhart' If high character, lmcwl~, and experienoe should. 
have believed. tr.leh rubbish' 1 t oer1tain17 helps to explain why he _4. nc 
lIlark in polities, despite bis remarkable &Ohlevesant in rousing the 1nt.1'O.~ 
or work1ngoo-ela.se 01110. 1'1'1 fertli gn pol icy' ... 30 It seems that 3e"ton-Watllon 
aceel'tfJ the allegations that Urquhart'. opi't'1ione and attitudes were not 
founded en facts, and that his attacks On Lord Palmerston were really the 
• 
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~n1te8tation. of a teud whIch began in the thirties over acme Ru •• ian docu-
ment. printed in Urquhart·. !9rtf91~, the Vixen affair,31 and f1n&117 hie 
removal troa the .. baaa" in Conetantinople.12 Urquha~, however, aen1 •• 
that this oppoeition was due to h1e 41aappo1ntlt.,t in being 41_1 ... 4 t1"Ml 
the foreign e.rwios.]) The contributions of Seton-Wateoft to our general 
knowledge of Urquhart are -.ll, he mak •• no oontribution cOl'lOern1n« Urqu-
hart during the C r1-.,. War. 
Dand Urquhart·. Vi ... ot hlstol';.V' was quite int.r •• tln~n 1 t certaill17 
.... some l1ght Oft wh,y he wa..a unauapiciou. of ,",1 t8r8 Who .. no wrong in 
England's action.. Hi8t~ries compoeed .specially for sohonls, and the 
'!!leJlC)1rs ot .t.t ... n h8 be11.11e4 to be quit. perverted. Lie., h. thought, 
were more the rule than the exception 1n th ••• composition.. School bocks 
were not supposed to olasb with national •• If-love. The editor. of memoirs 
of course had to •• 1nta1n the oredit ot a grandfather, a tather, or a 
brotller. In tile •• IDUlt1f'ar1ou.a wqs new generat10n. inherited the "il11b.oil-
1t7 and perversion" of the old, and children were enoouraged to oontinu. 
the errors of their father •• )4 Thi. ,Nba'bly wae quit. true in mid-
311n 18)6 a London .erchant named Bell fitted out the sloop, Vixen, 
wi th a oarp fit .. 1 t _A ran the lu.sian ..,lookacl. to the ooast 0'1 Cirea_ia. 
Th. au •• lan. alleged that the ...... 1 contain.d gunpowA.r .s •• 11 •• aale, 
ana oeJd'll1Oakd hn. It wa_ allea;14 that tfJtquha1"t an .. PonllOnbT enoourage4 
Bell and Wiehe4 to .broil the In~llah .",.maent 1n the _tter. 
320• I. Bolaov.r, "David Urquhart and the E.stern Que.tion, 18))-1837' 
A Stuq ln Pu'bl10i V and 'lpl-..o7." i~N .sl. -gdlD ,Iil:bl£t. VItI (»e-
c_ber. 19)6), 444-467, C. K. Web.ter,\!quha.rt, Pon.onb7. and Palm.raton, t1 
~. LXII (lul" 1947), 327-351, Ol,aeon, 01D.,1 •• 
33Davtd Ul'iluha:rt, ItR_iniac.noe. of Willin IV," !?iilo.Us R,nn 
(London, IS?,). 
141)avt4 UJ'4,uhart, lU!.mu:..!IEI.at..at 'renoD Rm1utl9Jl (London, 
1874), p. 41. 
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Victorian !lngland. &net oertainly 4448 ",eight to S. Macoob7-. cUotum that the 
eerioue etudents of hiator" had of neo ••• ity to de1Y. well past the ".tan~ 
ard hi.tory" written fol" their oon.umpUon.3' Scunding lauoh like 'r1rquhart 
Vaeoob,. 'W'al"na that the "standard bistory" "&8 too otten contine. in ita 
sou:rc •• ta..Til :r~UI edl torio.l oftice and Downin.g 3treet. Suoh hi.tori •• 
are no more than a aere "ti2A.99DXIQU •• "l6 Realizing thie, it 1a quite 
surprising that in hi. e:nellent stua,-, Engll. !a41S!ll.h1lt ~§5l:&5, he add. 
little to our knowledge of Urquhart'. views and aotions oonoerning and dur-
in~ the Crimean War. 
So Urquhart was to a great degree re8po.,.1b1e for the knowledge that 
many Eng11ahlllen had of the lear la8t.37 1>18rae1i hiltaelt owed te him all hie 
knowledge on the subject. At one Uu he had been instructea d&117 by 
f1rtuhart. D1araeli waa one of the fflll Ul"S who accused the govena .. t ot 
"oonnl'f'anOe. ,,38 l'urthel'lllOre, the vi_ be UP" •• " or hititory w •• ra'ther 
.iailar to that of Urquhart. Be onee wrote about the "standul111.to17" of 
hi. 4.,. .. being that in which "Oerurra117 .peaking all the great eYent. haTt 
'been dt.tort.d, _at or the 1apol"tant oau ... oonoealea, 80M or the prl!lOl-
ple oharactera never appear. and all Who figure are 80 Mieunhntoo4 and 
aianpreetmted that the re8Ult 1s til ooraplete-.;retiflcat1on.,,39 t1:rquhart UJ 
I d "I 
358• Vaoooby. ¥Pello &4191\i., \8'U=168;.> (London. 1938). lIt 7 .. 
3t).liJj. 
3710b1n80J'l, Pp. 44--47, !tol.o .... rt PP. 444-457. 
38alehOP, PP. 128-129. 
3's. Maooob7' p. 7. 
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certainly- be seen a. one of thoae prinoipal oharacters who •• 140m appear, 
and Lord Palmers ton .a one of these who appear, but are misunderstood. 
Professor ilarold Temperley in his detailed and scholar17 work, E;cliR4 
iJm4 Jh.! l!.t.II .!Hi' JllI Crim,a. describes David Urquhart as one of those 
protessional ag.I. tater. who was "strange, brilliant and restless •••• " and 
who "had spread the d.octrine tbat Russia was an a:ble, treacheroua, oorrupt, 
aabi ti ou a, anet extrMrdinar1ly dangerous power. • • • ,,40 The Dri Usb public 
atter all liked 8eneatlon8 and oertainly enjoyed dramatio epi8Ode. replete 
with villains and hero e.. So Taaperle7 explains .. ., tl.ir acoaptance of 
Urquhart'_ 14ea_ on iu_Ida &II a "diplomatio fable" With au.sia &s the wolf'. 
and 'i'urke;r a. the I_b. 41 Lord Palmsraton i_ not tcmnd to ba a Il&n of 
prinoiple and .. atem, nor a traitor &8 U1'\1.uhlU"'t .. him, but onl¥ a "nperb 
opportunl_t."42 GenerallJ, Lord Pala.raton gete off rather .all under the 
pan of Teraperley, anet David Urquhart rather poor17.43 In any evant, T __ ¥)U"'I 
187 aleo end.. hi. book With the baginnin.g of the war, and therefora doe. noi 
oovar the period with which this paper i8 oonoerned. 
The treatment ot Urquhart at the handa ot this respected 1ng1i.h hie. 
4°Harold TEftperley, !n&lWld.IDS th, N'"l'.!ul l !llI Crimi. (London, 
1936), p. 18. 
4lllii. 
42 ~., p. 60. 
43Temper1ey states that "All that oan be said in derence (If Urquhart 
(and a SOOd d.al more than I oan personally endorse) is in Puryea.r, Ennol,l.l,cL 
Ru.sia and the Stre.iu QJ,.leatlon, ohapter II. Urquhart's IIOlIIt elaborate 4 .... 
ren •• anel. arra1gmaeli to of Palmer.ton i. in .. privately printed work, .!lu! 
... ~ AttAla J4. Grut BrisAig.u A"'nlI1,"4 ~.!s.d Pal.rllon, (l841}." T_perley teel. certain that Urquhart is the author. p. 409. 
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torian 1Il8lt •• 1 t quit. evident that l101'e _st be kn.own about hie method. of 
speaking and wri til\Bt what he said., and how and 'Why he impres.ed people the 
~~ he dld. Urquhart for a long tlme before the war had aroueed a ~arm of 
offi01al and unofficial enelliett_ :a. offended !U.111' people by telling them 
what t.hey did not like to hear or want to believe. It was therefore 1nevit-
able that 80me would seek relief in oalling hlm an eooentrio, and insinuate 
that he euft'eHd fro. delusions_ 44 If hie allegatlon. were true, in whole 
or in part, 1 t octainly would have been in the inter •• t of tho.e accu •• d t4.l 
•• ek to diaor¥! t lWI. !llhat ade utters wone was that in t1".Ying to 1 ... 
pr ••• people he would .xa«serat. what wa ..... nt1ally a fact. 45 Hia wnth 
against the crim •• of' un~st and illegal wartue did not s.rioueq JIlOva 11081 
ot hi_ oount17 •• n.46 Man7 t1 ... it ~ .... that hi_ 'b.llet in the power of 
.,.. 
sen to b. right 1Ia4e hill intolerant of wrong, ant ang.!'l at the doer.41 
Soa.t1Jles he purpoH1y acted a. though he wu tierce17 ~ at a pereon in 
or4er to provoke antagen1.- 80 that indifferenoe would be ahatt.re4.48 At 
other t1M. he would speak in paradoxes to arou •• tnteHst.49 Urquhart 
8ai4, "The" 1. no &ri I have ~&Ct1.ed 80 a.siduously •• the faoulty of 
44B1ehoP, PP. 47-48. 
45l..1:dJ. J P. 129. 
46~., PP. 129-131. 
47 lob in eont PP. 172-173. 
48 llzU. t P. II:; t 13lshop, pp. 40-41. 
"BishoP, p. 133. 
making men. hate me. '!'hat removes apathy. You oan Ret them into speech. "50 
JIowever, Robinson bel1eve8 that at timea he was na.turally passionate and 
intolerant. and destructive of all that opposed him. This may bave been 
brouRht about by the intenSE! pain he sutfered more than occasionally. for 
whioh he round relief only in his Turkish bath. On the other hand he was 
alllO able to act wi til gentleness, patience, and. self-reetraint.51 Be had 
good. rea.son to act the wIllY he tidt because he believll!td that the age in Wb.1ot 
he lived. was corrupt. not on17 ""as 1 te speech insincere, but i te reaeoft Wat 
perverted. 07 self-love. Urquhart attespte4 to lift a man out of hie age, 
his in.sinceri tJ". 8.1'1.4 his .. If-lov.. Ke would ahem a man that he 414 not 
poss.se real kncwle4g.t but was blin4lJ' following public opinion. Be would 
also ahow hi. that hi. theorie. were ba •• a. on falHhood, that auft~ .. u 
but a mirage, and that the road to the pr01l1 •• d la.nc1 was up the roolq path. 
of self-dime!plin. and knowledge.52 
'9. Klngslq ~t1nln .!i.I Tr1uma .Jt.!:ad Pt111IDl29~B g1 ves ev14enoe 
of' an outstanding piece of l'e .. a.:rch whioh has profoundly enli~ten.4 tiS 01'l 
the relation ot publjo opinion to Fmgll.h polleT. He conolude. that the 
English entranee int.o the Crimean War was mail'll,. due to the influenoe of 
public opinion.. Urquhart Dlade significant oontributions to that public tm-
cltement whIch orescendo.a. atter Sinope into England's entrance into the 
50RobinsOftt p. 133. 
51ibiA., PP. 175-176. 
5~., PP. 127. 129. 
53.&. K:tngsl~ Martin, 1AI T'i.s JJ.l.l£d PNilmion (Lon40n, ]924). 
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!war. If' this be tru.., then the p!'Oper and ext~m81 Vet understanding ot Urqu-
hart's view. becomes quite important, the)" lIU8t not be relegated to the 
fringes of h1st017, even though most historians would disagree with his in-
terpretation ot the war and of the per8Cna.11t1ea involved. Martin, more 
than an)" other author, properly disouseee the Views of Urquhart on the eve 
of the war.54 But this book ends at the beginning of the war, and certain13 
does not tocus ita attention on Urquhart's opinions and influence. 
On. 40 •• not pt a olear pia turo of Dav14 vrquhart during the Cri ... 
War unl ... h. is ... n in the context of the rampant radioalism and woit.,..... 
ous public opinion that eo stirred F.illgland at tb,is t1... A. J. P. Tqlor 
plao.. hi. 1n this .etting in h1s short histor" ot Engiiah radioal1.. en-
ti'Ued, lU !J:JIll" !M.a.55 Hi. tJ'eataent i8 brier, ooncis., not Z'.a11y 
d'1"OgatoZ7, but a44ing nothing new nor real17 ort 1010al17 worthwhil.. UntU-
hart 'Was the 1.&41'Og ad:'9ooa1oe of taking a ta'fOrable att1 tude toward. Tu.rk., 
and "the strangest dissenter of the nlneteenth cerrtttr" • .,56 Thou~ UJ'quhart 
was a radioal, '1:'",101' do •• not think that h. start(td that way. Others a ... IJ1,""DU..... 
ently started with general radical prinCiples and extended the. to foreign 
affairs. :But UrqUhart, 80 T",lor would have 1 t, devi •• d & foreign pollcy o~ 
his own and later found that only radicals supported it. 57 Tqlor Dm.8t haVE 
used his imagination a little too much in this description of Urquhart's 
54~., PP. 53, 146-147, 151, 185, 189, 194. 
55A• J. P. Tqlol', 1Jl.I,T.D;y.ble !MaD (London. 1957). 
56l.,W., p. 46. 
57l.ll,ij. 
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mental prooe.ees. It is an oversimplifioationl it Beams tbat he developed 
his views from prioo1ple. of la'v, tiL deep understanding of eooie'1', and an 
intimate assooiation with Turkish life, and the manifestations of Russian 
diplomacy in. the l~e&r Ea.st. It is true by 1653 that mainly the radicals 
accepted his vi~ but then he had alreaAT become oonvinced in the late 
thirties and early f01"t1e8 tha.t the future of Enffland 1" with the oppre ... d 
working man.58 Be took re8ponBlb11i~ for having diverted the Chartist 
leaders from v1014mt r8'9'Olu'Uol1, and therefore ohecked the IDOveaent which he 
thought was being intluenced b1' foreign &gents. 59 
David Urquhart .pent _oll of his lif. r.indtng hi- countr,sen that 
au.aia ... gratuallJ und.:raininlJ the lapl ancl moral order of Europe. Th ... 
obael"'¥'atlona retlecte' .. conception of hlato17 that .... incredible to 
ImOst of hia ocmt_porane.. A -30r1ty of th_ .. M .• ooneept of Ru •• ta .. 
the -.nit .. tation. of a di.torted 8in4. Urquhart perceived the .tfect. of 
the 'eliberate 1Ieperial pollcT ot Ru.sia where moat re.peotable E!lgll8llaen 
thought th.., ssw the .anit •• tationa of popular 1ft8U~tion.f of nationall .. 
or of me" ohance. H. 8U1 hea1a a8 a gig_tic oountJ7 that was essentially 
weak, but through the intelligence of her lIint.te:ra, the rejeotion of eacru-
ple, and the uee of diplomacy, revolution, and war, Rhe had been able to 
6:) 
follow a policT of uninterrupted conquest .a d.ei~at.d by Peter the Or.at. 
ais knowledge of the politioal testament of Pete~ the Great further strength 
5SRoblnaon, p. 82. 
59~.t pp. 84-89. 
60.!.ll1A., p. 2. 
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enad. hia vi" that &n •• ia was dedioated to a m1.81en'} of imperial expansion. 
Even though that te.t.ent is !BOat prebab17 a forg817 intende4 to bias .ro-
(,1 pearl opinion apinet lueeia, the fact remain. that most f4 what it atated 
had been and wae being- acoOtDpliahe' in the .,... of l>avi.tt Urquhart. 62 
In hie thinking U~uhart olo •• lf a .... iat~ prinoiple and fact. He 
felt that Auring his 11tetime great moral iaaue •• ere at stake. au •• ia was 
att"ptlng to ezolu4e international aftaire from the doaaiu of moral law. 
Before this 0010 .... of the north bee ... important On the international 
eo._, other cOl.udri •• and sov.relps h.a acte4 unJuat17, but Rue.ta ha4 
acted b7 the prino1ple ot 1nt1uet1oe. To atta1n 1". en4. Ru"ia work .. b.,. 
hin4 the _ene. 1ntlue_1nl' in4i'ri4ua1 etat ... n and. n_apapeHt anA toaent-
1ng Z'eVOlution.. JIarq- ti ... 1. t !la4 aa4e ... of .. n and. llO .... nt. intention-
all1 oppoM4 to it. But the deterul ... ot the PJ'inoiple .t 3tlBtioe in publl0 
polic:r were he81 tant becau •• of uncertain al.at and in.fteeti .... beoan .. th.,. 
did not und.eratanA the nature of national ~.t1ce. 'PurtheJ.'B)re. th-.r used. 
as 41d flOat other Era/JUehdlen, hoh phra .. s .e d_ocrat1c gove1'ftlM1'l't, 1111'11 .... 
tertal reapcnalbil1t7 an4 national1t,v without understanding th ... 6) Thi. 
led. Ul"Cluhart to oenoln4. that the oppoa1 tion tbat Ing1and had given to 
61LaUl'$ue Lookhart, "The t lolitioal T •• tament' of Pat or the Ore.t, 't 
~, XIV (19)6). 
62S11\oe the t188 of p.ter the Great. Iu •• ia had acquired Eatonia, 
Ingria. Livonia, St. 'star_burg, aevel, Cronstadt, part of Poland. the Sea 
of .Asott, part ot 'furkey, Oldenburg, the O1'1lle., Od~s.at Courland, Georgia, 
h(1n~liaf part ot leHia. the Ca.pian S.... and the fortr .... of laaail, 
Anapa, .aretia, ami Pote on the ... tern. oout of the 111ack Sea. 
6) Robin80I1, Pf. a-l. 
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Russian pretensions wa.. moet i.neffeotual. 
A.lthough every European state was threatened, Russia'. main viotim in 
the nineteenth oGnttl1'7 was the Turkish empire. i4~en in oontrol of this 
strategioally s1 tuatea empire he tel t that Russi& could oontrol Southeaaterr 
furope and the :!fear :mut, approaoh the West through the Med1 terranean, and 
th~aten England t 8 In41an .plre. Oppose4 to iustJia'. plana were the Tu*81 
a people with great mil1tar,r characteristios and a sen •• of righteouan ... ir 
publio aoUcn. U:rquhart W&S sure that the West had forgotten about the ~ 
laticn between religion a.nd poll tios, but the Tum. had not. Ue aaw '1'u"key 
ae an able opponent to the qat_tic injustice of' Ru.sia, an opponent Who, 
if lett to hereelf would have been able to stave ott any Ru.sian attack or 
att_pt. at whYereion. 'But '!\n.'kel' ..,.&. not being left to her.elt. Too 
lIlallT power. were lnter:f'enn« with her government, SOCiety, and mil! ta17 
forces. Oould:1 t not be that throu.gb diplomacy Ruesia was securing the 
help ot the power. in au)ver't:1ng Turkish etrength?· Urquhart constantly 
maintained that the Western Powers had f~uentl7 helped Russia in this w&1 
while making overtures of friendship to 'l'nrke7.64 
Russia was inherently weakt of this Urquhart waa oonvinoed. In the 
~leso-Turki.h War of 1828-29. Ruesta maneuvered heraelf into a position to 
attack Tttrke,. b:r gettinfot the auppoaed allies of Turke7, England and Pranoe. 
to 3011'1 her in destroying the Turkish fl.et at Navarino. England and 'ranc4 
had not even bothered to declare war. Even with this advantage the Russ1an 
forc •• under Dlebitch might have been deleated had not the Sultan been 
19 
pe~.laded '01 his mln1sters and the repre.entatives of England and France to 
~ign, in a panic, the Peace of AdriL~opl.. It the Sultan bad waited, ».1-
Ioitch's &rIq' would inevitably have been d •• trole4. Slmilarq, in 18)0 the 
Poliah armle. wen able to wI thatan! the Car'. al'lll.s for ten months. In 
ract, a Turk1ah victor" the lear bet ore might haTe meant the eaanoipat1on 
of Poland. 65 :But the danger fro8 'Ruafda wae not deer.asing, 1 t wae becoming 
more aerlou.1)r .enacing. Urquhart ftW R.n.aia· a atate.en n.e the r1.e of' 
Mehemet Ali in Egypt to aecure in 1833 what waa equal to a protector-
ate of Turkey. \!;inen the W •• tern Powers grn hoatile to what they h,W hap-' 
pening, Ru •• ia, through d.ipl01llaCY, Stm.ght in 1840 to break up with the help 
of Lord Palmeraton the Anglo-French mntente of 1830. This erisis pas.ed 
without war between England and France. Mehemet Ali wae then mad. an 
her.di ta17 Paeha of Egypt throuRb the help of the W.etern PowaH. The ..... 
tablishment of a qnaety in Egypt .as a atep toward the perma."lent 10 •• of 
that eapire, and .eriouely weak.ned the Turkish EnaPire.66 
By the .i4dle of the nineteenth oentur.J the relatione between Ru •• ia 
and England had been alaoat pel'!llat1ently amioable for three hundred yeare. 
England had b.en at war and peace with other oountrle. throughout tho.e 
centurie., but wi th Rue.ia, which wu her arch enetlQ', England. h&4 never 
real17 been at war. It therefore .... ed to Urquhart that RUBeia had been 
helped in one • ., or another, either intentionally or unintentionally b.f 
65I'h'u., ft ~ P.7. 
66'1"'4"... lAll ~ • pp • ..,.. .• 
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~g11.h polioi ••• 67 Lord Ponaonbl. Who .... Urquhart'. snperior while MOre-
~&r1 at Oonstantinople. briefly ~4 up 1n 1854 England'. role in Ruse1.'_ 
t;ggnr.ndi_.ent durin« the nineteenth centur.y 1n a .ort work ent! tle4 .!iQ.U. 
Pnnl ."- t. T'ltMUS.68 !.orll Pon80nby in the thirUe. hact al.read7 Wf)sed 
bloa.l3t with ff'rqll'tua.rt. Around 18-'4 1t ••• _ both hat! a...,.loped fixed .,.1..". 
bn the ?.a.8tern Queat1on.. Together the7 launched a pre ... oampaiffl'l which Wall 
favorable to 'rurkey and. lL~1n.t ?fu •• ia.. PO!1eo~b,. ",en oOJ"T'4Ctef ana. au'btll-
. 6 
dised Urquhart t II famous pamphlei;, ,~!ltlliJ~t "l!lng,. J,'PGA. _ TartR, 9 
and informea him or event. at the Porta while Urquhart was in In.gland..70 
!1evfttthele •• t !Jrtuhart was &'fIaH tha:t !eJlgl1"h ainiatera hal hel,ed Ru •• ia 
to espand te the we.t a.nd south. In 4!fJCu •• ing Bu •• la t •• %parution to the 
south he oonfinea ~\ ••• 1t to oommercial expansion in the ottoman !ap1re, 
the l!:uxlnet the Oa.plan, L'1d the Catlca.a. ae exhibited 1n hi, beok. b!JJI-
Ire •• Jit. !u"l. In ..1hI.!u.;it l12it\Qt _ !lullb the ate,. ""'lob. Rupia h&4 
SIlec •• aivel,. _cte in stoppin« up the .atel'-Wq' an4. euppreaatng the pro4uo-
tlon or the ad301ning countrie.. n. k:nowl~ of' the.e ccnmtri •• ... 
d.r1'9'M troll vistting tll_ and working an4 talktn&, with the ... tnyol .... ,. 
In hl. obael"f'atlons he .... a practical connection between the w.lfare ot 
kl1'1g4oaa and the ObMl'T&nce ot the _ral 1.... Thi. oonneot1on alone ""d 
67t1rqnhart, !X9£lu, 'P. lXT. 
68r.. Tucker, !lwW*. Pgl'1i'el~ ~!!hn'!tl (London, 185S). 
69ll&vid Urquhart, !ns:lltldt ".DJlI.t, !!lIm, .ID4 hmu (Lon91'l, l8:W). 
7°0. 8. BolllOnr, "Lord Pon_nb,. and the Eastern Question, 1833-l9t" 
~, XIII (1934). 106. 
pel"llUl.nent. ).fen nd.pt change and 80 would the oircurratancea of -their ac-
tions, but the poaitlon of 8. nation with rererenoe to others waa fixed by 
its acta; theee acta would alao detenaine its character. Urquhart knew 
21 
that he was dealing with histor,y in the making, and describes hie position 
in society as the ohorus 0'1" a Greek stage which annOllnoes the actors and 
foretells the events, but laments in 'Y8.in. 71 
Urquhart f'irat became aware of Ruseia' e secret intereets and aubvex-
sive work after he had arrived at Oonstantinople from Oreece, just in tim. 
to be present at a celebration in commemoration of the Peaoe of Adrianople. 
Ha.ving been sin.gled out by a Russian d.iplomat who had l'fl'lCently been on a 
missiC'n to' Greece, he was p,i ven 80me information conoern:lnrr liu8so-Q.reek re-
lations. Being perplexed, he asked one of the P~lasian secretaries of 
legation the meaning ot the comments he had heard, and if RU8sia had any 
object in injuring Oreeoe. He was told that Russia had fomented the Span-
. 72 
ish revolt, L~d that this was an example of her work ever~~here. 
The close oonnection of Russia with the Greek revolt is of primar,y 
importance in David Urquhart' '" life. Not only did it oonvince him of the 
ignorance that prevailed in the West about mastem affairs, but presented 
him with his first great lesBon in the power of diplomacy. Fighting with 
the Greeks, he ODe to know their hatred for Russia. While 1iv1ng wi th the 
Turks he realized that they had great military abilities. ~.ginning an 
inquiry into the diplo.~LiC ~ethods of Russia atter the de.truction of the 
n:l.lrkleh fleet at!aT&l"ino and the peace of Aarianople, he wall ai4ea by the 
racta rev.aled in 41»loeatlc documents found in Warsaw during the Polish 
~(!.t'b.ll1on of 18)0. The •• secret despatch •• were sent to 1i".ngland, reoeived 
"'''ttl etu41ed. 1>7 Urquhart, and printea 1.n the 'Portt2~12 wi th, as Urquhart 
plalmed, the consent of the ~ngli.h government. To the oasual reader, the 
ltespa:toh •• cUd not oontain great revelations.1) Oertain p11:1"&8 •• ",.re, ho .... 
ever, signifioant to a person like Urquhart, who was oonsoioua of the fact. 
pertinent to the despatohe.. Nev.rthe1esa, the7 oonfirmed his ~ldgment. on 
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Rusela'. diplomatic _thode a180 arou •• d hie su.pio1tn'uJ. POZBO eli 
'!Jorge had for SOli. t1 •• b.en one or the abl •• t of Ru •• 1an fOl"ei,gn repre.ent-
fa, t1 v •• , and, .trange &8 it IIUI1' .... , 'Was •• 1"iousl1 nominat.d at one time 
for the position of 'ranoh .inister ot war. In London Counte.s Lievan, the 
wife of the Rue.ian usbanader. wae at c11ff.rent t1 •• s quite inttmate with 
the Duke ot We111nC"On, Lor. OH7, lori ?a.lJHl"ston, and othft" pro.tnent .en. 
Th. Lt .... l'l. ",.re linke. wi~h the oluPtge 1n tb..Briti.h ,01107 of illOlatin 
oonoenitlff the Gre.k que.tioD. e ... ntln~ on the failure of th. Ruasian 
tOTOe. to d.ereat tb.e Turks In the winte of 1828 ahe WMte to her brother' 
"Defeat the TurD, tor love ot Go4: lurope i. growing innbol'tinate eince 
it thinks we oannot 40 ... "15 
7~e '9EStqlt9 was a short-lina period10a1 4eYOta. to tiplollati.o at-
fairs publ1shed by Urquhart and his friends. It was first pu.olished in 1835 
and di80ontlnue4 in 18)6 when Urquha?t went to the East, but was revived 
froID 184) to 1845. 
74noblneon. p. 8. 
15~., ,p. 10-11. 
2) 
Urquhart went 110 tar /I.e to believe that whoever held the key to the 
jseCret of .atlssian power, could not onq 4.a'tl"07 her, but &180 .ploy her. 
mis aecret did not lie only in the k."1owletga of historioal and statistioal 
~~tail.. It involved 'the study of the tHana by whioh Rusaia oonquered and 
"x-tended. her influence in each provl'.lce or oount1"7 over which abe held fIfI83. 
Possession of tb1. knowledge would. have enabled governments to understand. 
b.ow Ru.sia oould be counteracted. Suoh knowledge was diffioul t to acquire, 
beca.use ot the s.lt-love of e ... el'7 minister, people. and soveHign. and b7 
their cwn miaconduot whlch frustrated their perception cf the truth. Sir 
!lames Graham appropriat.ly .xpr •••• d the thinking of .ve:q l!luropean who waa 
tasked to investigate hi. colleague.. Jtyo'll wiah .e to examine a oase wherein 
I am to find that I have been a dupe all IQ" life, and this 1. the flOat fa-
!t'ourabl. ocnatruotion to be put. I will not do 1t.»76 
Urquhart telt that England had been di.eipatlng ita.lf ainoe 1827 b7 
conatantl1 intervening in the affairs of other oountriee. lOst people 
thought that it wae England- t • popular oon.8tltution, and the presenoe of pre-
eMinent •• n in po8it10n. ot leaderahip that pre •• n8ct En«land &1'lc1 _de her 
great. To Urq,uhart, ho ...... r, th ....... re on17 111u.10n8. In bi. mind the 
ao1;ion8 of the so-called great .en did not 'bear out the expectat10na of the 
English people. Sinoe the deatb of the ~lke of Wellln,ton, Engllahmen had 
n.ot "en an)" IIlan of extraordina17 abiUt,.- in tbe po at tion of foreign min1e-
ter. The other llIliniater8, no matter how l!:'1"eat, c0111d not exerci.e inde1M'n&-
ent ~%dgment and act10n in foreign matters. n •• id •• , their day8 were laden 
76 !at Pre •• , lun. 6 t 1860. p. 55. 
wi th too lIlan1' other oares to pemi t of laborious investigations into a world 
tbat was be;rond the sphere of a debate 01" division in the Houee ot COlUlOns. 
A large portion of English affairs had then been relegated by oommon consani 
to medioore men. Lord Palmers ion, he thought, was one of theae medioore mer 
who had risen to power with the help of Ru.aia. He more than any other m~ 
ister waa guilty of oollusion with Bussia, a fact apparent in most of hia 
actions and certa1nl~ in the way that he brought on the Affghan War and 
later engineered the Crimean War. On the other hand Urquhart 8aw Ruaaiat 
England' a opponent, a. a oountry that trained an.el disciplined ita lead.ers. 
lIe thought that the7 were intelleotual17 wperior, ha.d a sy-st_ ot opera-
tion, and pemaneDC7 of purpo .. , and. had a .en •• of confidence in th ... 
•• lv •• , and contempt tor the rest of mankind. This oontrast plac •• in re-
lief Urquhart t II vi .. s on the relatiTs poai tion ot ingland and au •• ia on the 
eve ot the C rillean War. 77 
CHA.PTER II 
Urqllhart believed that Russia'. eOlllBDereial policy was on. of the 
moat important phaees of bel" diplomacy. Her auecess in carrying out this 
policy was 1n hie opinion oontributing to the fulfillment of her plan to 
dominate Europe. .11 though oO'llllH!'Oe was one of the lDOst important elementa 
of diplomacy, :1 t oertain1y could not be practiced or understood by i tselt. 
It was intricately involved in every other element. Runia had long been 
l!IUocetlstul in advancing her ends, because ahe posee.eed the tlknowledge and 
talents" to do 80. Inglish .erehants on the other hand really ltnew veJ7 
11 ttl. about the nature ot lntemaUonal trade. Thia made Rusaia' a proft'> 
re .. euler. Her pheno.ena! develotaent was aU the IIOre .stouncling, b .. 
oause ahe had macte her .. lf into a cOl8NJ'Oial nation while hand1oappe4 "'7 a 
dearth of oo .. %'Oi&1 retlOu1'O.s. What waa ".-poneible tor her rapid growth 
in ooalercla1 importanoe "aa, aa Urquhart thought, her "0 apac! 't7 for .......... ~ 
lIent. ttl 
Turkish tim. ha4 oontinuall,. increaaed in the tortia. due to saini ..... 
trative ohanges in England and Turkey, sucb as the abrogation of the Corn 
Laws, and the freedom of export of Turkish grain from ~lda.v1a and Wa.lla.-
chia. 2 The effect. of the first were stated 1n the Bankert. Circular of 
J'anuar;y 1854 in the .. words' ":1i1'1oe we haYe opened our perta for the tree 
importation ot foreign grains, our trade wi th :Russia has gradually declined, 
but from the same period tha.t of Turkey haa gradually inoreased, and while 
the tormer has diminished nearly fifty percent, the latter has risen to the 
ssme extent. ,,3 Tni. directly affected the prosperity of the Russian la.nd-
lords Who were mainly dependent en En~land for sale of wheat and other 
products. They also .trongly influenced the aotions of the gevernrnent. 4 
'Ibe .tfect. of' the second were seen in the competition that appea.red after 
the treaty of Adrianop1e had freed MoldaVia and {v'allachia from a oompu1so17 
fixed-price Cl\Y.tem favorable to the Turks. By 1840 the Prinoipal! tie. were 
exporting wheat on Au.trian and Dri tie carriers to nations that previously 
had purchased Ruuian grain u.clusiTely. By- 1851 the export. of' grain from 
Ii Moldavia and Wallaohia had equalled the export of that product from .au •• ia • ..J 
tl'be decline of Rue8ia·. export. by 50 I"'r cent betw.en the 78&rS 1843 and 
1853 waa 8een by Urquhart as quite an 1Itportant faotor whioh affected the 
oondition and J!l"OlDpted the 1IOY'.ent" of Ruseia. Ru •• ia had to do something 
to eave herselfl not cn17 did the income of the landlords decrease, but 
tha t of the ~vernment also, due to the 15 per cent tax on exports.6 There-
~ PW,i!J August 2:;, 1855, supplement, p .. 2. 
3Ibid. 
4131"i8On D. Gooch, .tA Century of HistorioE;!'aphy on the Crtmean':ar," 
AJ1R, LXII (Oc tober, 195(,) t 50.. (c i tes Puryear's Str?!ri is .9a-1est!SZ!l, PI'. 7(-
138.) 
5l:!Wt. 
6 Fr!! ~rll" August 25, 1855. eupplement, P. 2. 
frOH, beca.use of the decline in Russian trade and the oonsequent inorease in 
the trade of the :Principalities the emperor of Russia decided to lnva.de 
those prov1noe~. 
This extEtl'llld.ve growth of the gra.in trade between En~1and a.nd the Prin-
oipali ties W'.8 not, however, oharacteristic of the rest of Turkey. 7 The 
other Turkish provinces in "Europe, Asia, and Afrioa were able to produoe 
tour tiMs the a-nount of grain as the Prinoipalities, but they WeI" re-
strioted by the Anglo-~lrki.h commercial treaty of 1841 which imposed a 
prohibi tory duty on Ttllitish exports.8 The differenoe between the Principal..-
i tie. and the .. provine •• was that the duty we.a not applied on the Danube, 
becauSe Austria would not sub.it to it.9 In 1851 the Porte in re:f'ol'lling the 
$Yates of taxation had reorganised the collection of int.rnal tax •• , and 
Urquhart olatmed that 1n the beginning of 1853 he ureoeived a pre •• ing invi ... 
tation to SO to Constantinople for the purpoe. of obtaining the abrogation 
of the export duty Whioh had been restrioting Turkish commeroe. Ru.sia was 
fully aware of these plans, he ooncluded and recognized their effect on her 
export trade when Prince Venaohikott's note was preaented.iO 
I t was eYident to Urquhart that by stopping the export of ~a.in from 
the Principal! ties, Enl':land was being l'lHlt,de depend.ent On Ruseia. She would 
7 David Urquhart. Prn"ftI8 .2! Rus,l!, ill t.he j'Lost, north, JWS South, 
2nd ed. (London, 1853), p. xli. 
8 iJrquhart, Limala!icm. pp. 14-15. 
9 ~., p. 12. 
10 Fr,. PrlU, AUgtlBt 25, 1855, supplement, p. 2. 
then have a llIonopoq over 'P,ngland's grain. supplY'. '7h10 dependenee would be-
come more serious 8.8 England. beoame increasingly dependent on foreign sup-
plies. Poland was t.he groat supplier of Europe, but was already under 
11 Russian control, largely thl'oup:h Palmerson ta negative attitude. It wa.s 
Urquhart f s opinion that Russia now had her eye on the Danube, and in 1853 
threatened the vOr.f existence of England and Turkey. 
The 'basin of the Danube produoed the same articles as Russia. Ships 
were EUlu!IIential for the traneport of theee raw materials and the heavy pro-
duee. The Danube wu the onl;r means of water comnmnication and the on1;1 'VIf8'q 
by which the metallio ore., rookaalt, timber, hide., wool, tallow, sheep, 
goataldnflt grain and hemp oould get to England. neside., the Principali .... 
ties were even attempting to rival Egrpt in the produotion ot ootton.12 For 
Bngland it was extr.ely important to have numeroua source. tor the ... raw 
material., ItO that the 108. of' one 8Ouroe would not jeopardise her 1ndu .... 
tries. C'onaequentl1', eve1.7 ton of goods exported from the Danube wu a ton 
lea8 exported from Odessa or St. Petersburg. The oompetition whioh ~esulted 
also affected the price of goods and reduoed. Russia's income. A. reduction 
of one shilling on the owt. of tallow or the quarter of grain was enough t~ 
net Russia the less of from'" 50,000 to .. 100,000. Urquhart merely states 
that a document published at an earlier date at Odessa by the authorlty of 
Count 'Woronsow oonolusively proves these points.I.3 
llUrqUhart, Ljmitat!~n, p. 12. 
12Ul'quh&rt, Progress, ~p. 300-301. 
13 Ibid., p. 301. 
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The na.vi~t1()n of the Danube river till 1853 had. been interrupted, 
. . 
Urquhart thought, in three ways' by the interference of Russia with the 
internal regulatiol"ul of the Turkish provinces of the Danube, by the obstruo-
tion of the river itself, a.nd by direct interference of the Russian govern-
ment t s eno.ctments. The first was based on rights wh.ich RUBsia mistakenly 
derived from the treaty of Adrianopl., a treaty, however, whioh bound Russie 
wi th England and Franoe not to seek, and not to acquire any privileges, 
poseeasions, or a4vantages or any kind in Turkey. In the second Russi& ob-
tained oontrol of the Delta at the mouth of the Danube through the treat;r 
of Adrianopl., but she did not fultill her obligations in this regard and 
allowed sand to aooumulat. which blocked the river. Third was the ukase of 
Februar,y,18}6 whioh oomma.n4ed all v •• sols tra41ng on the Danube to go to 
the port of \,)dust\t one hundred and fift;, mile. _fq in Rue.ian terr1tol7, 
to pertorm quarantine. Thill' he realized, was an obvious violation of the 
law of nationa whioh had rou.ed mngli8b indignation. Numerous pet! tiona 
were presented to the Bouse of' Commons on the subject and a motion was made 
by Patrick Stewart e~uivalent to pledging the government to resist aggres-
sion. Th. ~Ternment. however, secured the withdrawl of the motion by 
neola-ring itself ready to 00 wha.t it thought necessary. Nothing was done 
G.."ld the whole thing was soon fOl'rrotten. ~e ukase rema.ined in foroe. The 
Hussian consulate charged as much as '" 80 for vessels of one hundred and 
fifty tons lea.ving Liverpool and London for the Da.n1.~be and d.esirlng to paas 
without undergoing the quara.ntine at Odessa.. Charges were increa.sed to 
diminish the elze of the ships, the difficulties of navigation were in-
creased, even insurance became more oostly. Urquhart thought that 1 t shoul( 
)0 
have been obvious ta MY intelligent a.nd int:ereftted obse!'Ver that 'Frngland 
was becoming en.tire17 depend.ent on the illegal acts of Russia. whioh actll .... 
14 
ally were d.1reot.ed against 'F:l1t;land. and not a.gainst '11,urke".f. 
There wa.s no a.ttempt by the English ~ve:rnment to resist these en-
oroachme1"l ts of Russia.. On the contrary the English ~vernment took the 
pos1 t10n o.f Russia. in enforoing the submission of 'Jlurkey and Austria to the 
interference resulting 'from the ukase. The vice-consulate at the mouth of 
the Danube was removed from its dependenoe on the Ottoma.1'1 government, and 
by moving it to Odesso. was made dependent on the Russian government.15 
When the Russian troops invaded the Principalities 11'1 1853, they not 
only cut off the grain supply, but ate the grain intended for export to 
England. The •• actions simply ruined the grain trade 1n these provinces. 
The oenter of trade then moved to Odessa where, Urq,uhart notes, the streets 
16 had praotloally bee~'l deserted the dtq before. In thi8 wEq RUBsia depriVe( 
the English peepl. of grain except through her sufferanoe, and mad.. oe1"tatn 
that they pat.d a. high prioe for i t.17 mvary step, he tel t, had been com-
plated. The production and the productive power of the Principalities were 
In July of. 1853 Russia had ostensibly entered t.he PrinCipalities to 
14Urquhart, L~mitation, pp. 5-7. See a1eo t.he r.cvernment'a ~lbliBhed 
:Blue Beok, Cgi£it~i:esmsl2!3ee.in BertraDee.1£ jla ~ravh~tio.n s!! jJl! Dqnube. 
15 Ibid., Pp. 5-6. 
16Ibid., PP. 12-13. 
17.!hM. 
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secure the demalms of Prince btenshikov for the equali t;r of treatment for 
il)reek and Latin Ohristians, and to secure a virtual Russian protectorate of 
~ll Orthodox Christians. This stemmed from the generally acoepted allega-
tion that the Christian subject. of the Porte were persecuted, a.nd from thEt 
antagonism betvreen the Latin and Orthodox chu.rches. ~Jrquhart \'J33 oonvinced. 
that the Christian subjects ot the Porte, contrar.1 to popular belief, did 
not wish to be flprotected" by the Czar. In faot, most of these Christians 
numbered as h1~ a8 twel~e or thirteen million subjects. Th~le people actu-
ally were bitterly persecuted for not oonforming to the Russia.n Chul"Oh a:f'1;er 
18 ita break with Constantinople. '1'11831' even oalled the Czar ttAntiohri.t." 
The IDOvementa to independence by the Malo-Russians \wno numbered about ten 
_111ion Urquhart attributed to this .chism and persecution. In tact, it 
Ru.s.ia had been free to extend her hegeoumy to the Ionian Sea, she would 
~ve been involved in a religious war with about twen~ million people. The 
Phriatiana ot rruli'te7 actual17 called upon the Turks for the proteoticn ot 
their fa! th, and they teared Rus.ian polt tloal oontrol.l9 
If' thie was the true relation between the Ohristiane or Turkey and 
Russia, then Russian intentltnu!!l in a joint intervention of the Powers be-
oomes evident. l!'h.re had to be 80me other reasons for her intervention in 
invi ted her to irl'tel"V'ene in their beh.'!\lf'. In 182C the Greeks had dec llal'ed. 
18Urquhart, ,1.£2"es" p. x. 
19lhiS., PP. xi-xii. 
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'Phe Western Powers, being utterly terrified, se:rambled 1'.0 yield Russia thai: 
20 
support with the pretext of :re~tra.in1ng her. Therefore, by calling' Turlt~ 
a "sick man, ft tt'Usllltia aoUWtt to esta.blish her Auprema.oy ever the Orienial 
down the author! ty of the SuI tan. Russia.n intervention ha.d alw83s been the 
grea.test danger, and Europe coopera.ted with its effectiveness by a.lways 
21 
sanctioning it. 
Tha.t the Chri.tlana of Turkey were Greek. and united against ::lusaulme.n 
rule Urquhart saw u another one of t~se illusions entertainfJd by tIOst 
-Europeans. Actually, the Greeks amounted to little more than one aillion 
out of thirteen million Christians in Turkey. Half of the Greeke were no-
macUo, and. well d1apereed throughout the cities o.f the ottoman Qap1re. The 
Turk. liked them, and even made one of them ambassador to London. On the 
other hand most other :races hated them. A u11no1"1t,., the Greeks 1n European 
Turkey, had only that 1mportenee given to them by the Turlts. One-third of 
the Mussnlmans were "allied. in blood to the Rusaiaf'ItJ." And, Urquhart goes 0.11 
t.o ~~ that even three-fourths of the Christians south of the Damll'HlI were 
related to the Tu::t"ks by blood. 22 All (If these popnl9,t.ione a.eoepted the 
Turks as their l'lIl%.siers. In faet, none would, aocept the t'm:prsmaey of a.ny 
20 ~., p. x1i. 
2l,lW. 
22..!W., p. xiii. Urquhart gave no proof fer his statement conoerning 
the blood relationship. 
other people. And Be he conolud.ed that :if the Turks did not erlst they 
w(lHld of neoese1tl have to be inv8nted (aft others later were to think of' 
iAustria). It Turkel did not exist. the vaQUUJI would create chaos and the 
:lear East soon would come und,er the domination of' :;mesh .• 23 
Statements from the Greek presll confirmed Urquhart's views regarding 
the Greek and Russian Churohes. Their ttSmyrna organ" warned Russia not to 
indulge in illUSions. The norgan of Helleniamn explained that the C.ar's 
(1)jeot in extorting the protectorate of the Oriental Church was to convert 
33 
1 t irrto an inatruaent of' hi.s PanslaVic eh.e.. It further d.enied that the 
protection which the Powers gave to the SuI tan was, as the journals of 
Ruseia pretended, tb. proteotion of ~hammedan1_ against Christianity. It 
~u rl.othing l •• s than the detens. of the poli tioal inheri tanoe ot the 
nellenes against Russian incorporation, in whloh "eve17 Reller'lio spirit 
~8h.d them auccee8."24 
In reality the native ~lrkS were the oppressed people of Turkey. They 
exclusi veIl bere the burd.en of consoription. a.nd were therefore the 800ially 
d.epres.ed. Wealth and. induatr.r were oonsfllquentl;y entirely hampered to the 
advantage of the Christiana who were rapid1,- inoreasing in rmmbere, in 
wealth, and in territorial possessions. He thought it therefore quite 
a.bsurd for the allies during the war to extort from the Su.l ta;..'1 the "privi-
legen for Christiane to serve in the ~, and to own property whioh alreadT 
34 
wa.s chiefly in their hands. 25 
In 1867 a signifioant episode of the Crimean War was brought to lir.:;tt 
whioh showed. that -the Christian subjects of the Porte were not t(')o dissatis-
fied with their rulers. In the autumn of 1853 all the militar:,y foroes of 
8ta1l10118d 1n Thessal7 and l!.'pirus, because of their tranquilli t,.. But endt-
denly thirty to forty thousand Greeks invaded thls 'I'Ul"killh terri tory. \~n 
they could not inducs, the,. forced the Christian population to join thea. 
The Turkish villagers who did not have ti_ to retreat into the towns were 
IIl&ssaored, whether thEQr were lIlen, WOIaen or ohildren. However, not one of 
the towns was taken by the Greeks. ~lhen intelligence reached Constantinople 
Fuad ~tf.nd1 was sent as CCIiIDisslone:r-Oeneral with three ste.era and. three 
battalions. With the belp ot people who came fram ever,rwhere exPressing 
their loyal V and devotion, and even wi th the ChristIa.ns torming volunteer 
bands, the oountry was soon oleared of a gl"eatly superior invading force in 
approximately six weeks. 26 
In 1853 Urquhart feared the oontinual \_~ie8tertl interferenoe which lout: 
had been weakening the legal structure of Turkey. He envisioned the end of 
Jl'.lrkish IPJUb.iasi veness, and the oontentment of the Christiane. He "believed. 
that English troops ~'ould. soon have to put down insurrections allover or'll'-
key and that Russia would then oome to support the Christia.ns 1ll'H.i. Mussul-
25Dav1d Urquhart, Cb£~ltiMiU' F!ruJ,'t1cis..ii.lli :llloRd (London, IS55). 
Pl'. 14-15. 
26D1D6QP1'U9 Rlview, July 3, 1861, pp. 109-110. 
35 
man~ against the Englleh. 27 
En~land ha.d. long interi"erod in 'l'urkey- wi t11 il'1:tontions o.f reformin,g ito 
government. Although Stratford Canning bad been hopeful fortb. ~re.dual 
reform of the rr'u1:'kisb :Empire, i:n 1852 he left Constant.inople believing that 
the dissolution of' the Empire wa.s not tar Off. 28 Urquhart, however, did not 
share this opinion that the Empire was irremedia.hly CO:rl'Upt and would even-
tuallY' naturally dissolve. He was firmly oonvinced that no Englishman wa,s 
able to know the tl'Uth about the strength or weakness of Turke,. until he 
had comprehended. England's relations to her.29 Moat Engliabmen bell....-.d 
that Turk.,-'. erlatenoe depende4 upon the violent means empl07ea 07 the 
British government to pre •• rve it. Eng118haen interpreted in this manner 
suoh event. as the attempt to bombard Constantinople in 1807, the depri va.-
tion of nesaarabla 07 the Treaty ot Buoharest in 1812. the destruotion of 
the Turkish fleet at iiavarlno i,n 1827, the permiesion gl'anted to Russia in 
1829 to reawee belligerent rights in the Medi terra..1']ea.n which. she had r .... 
nounced, and the occupation ot Constantinople in 1833.30 So it appeared to 
Urquhart that England had employed violenoe for some time &fl'8.inst Turkey .. 
I, refusing to fall and be shattered b.1 the Violent aots of England and the 
rest of Europe, Turkey aotually displ~.d great strength, tenacity, and 
27Urquhart, .cQ;d§t~'nitlt p. 15. 
28El • L. i'lo(uivlard, ''ll&!.Au J1i. ¥1,oIlB (Oxford, 1954), p. 243. 
29!l11 FE.ilt June 1, 1864. p. 52. 
30~. 
36 
Russia was so ooneoious of her cwn vulnerability in the Black ~ea that 
she felt compelled oontinually to take measures for her own protec tion. The 
year 1827 had sean her combine wi tb l1in~land and France to destroy the Turk-
ish fleet I!.tN'ave.r1no. Feeling saf'e then, ahe went to war with Turkey. 
In obtainint~ the I}.'reaty of Unk1ar Skeleaai she further protected herself 
from England's and FrtL~e's naval power by getting all foreign ehips of war 
31 excluded from the Black Sea. 
Urquhart ell'eady demonstrated in 1834 in Turlw;l JmS...!.1! Rel£Yl9!1 that 
most of the ocmaon 14eas on the subject of Turkey were false. Russia had 
been able to act upon the deoisione of m~ government. through her unduly 
great influence in the pre.. In this way .he was able to urge the d •• true-
tion of TurkeY" and then even protect those government. from popular indig-
nation.32 Russia therefore used the pre •• to miainform Western nations of 
Although many ob.ervers thought that the Turkish militar,r organization 
was teo weak to win a war without aid from the Powers, Urq.uhart was thoJ:!ioo' 
ough1y conv1noecl that the l)1urkish mill ta:ry organiEe.tif!n, if left a.lone a.nd 
not interfered with by the supposed frienda of 1i.l.rkey, was excellent. 33 Its 
34 econoaical looal organization was the source of its excellent and a180 
3l.!21i. 
32Ibaa• 
33See Urquha.rt's artioles evaluating the milital""J strength of' Turkey, 
wri tten 111 1852 al'ld reprinted. in ..!h.t Diplomat,1c Ilme from September 4, 
1867 to J'anua.r.Y 6, 1869. 
34Urqtthart, .!]:ogress, p. xl. 
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the source of i 'fis superiori t;:r in any enp;agement wit'!'! the Russians. If'urthe:r-
more, the ROldiam of the 'l'urldsh army were not as passively obedient a.s 
were the RussiM. Tlle Turkish army was disciplined, a.s was the Russian 
army, but it also had judgment, valour, and pa:triotism--eharacteristics no1~ 
, 
3-
universally found in the Russian arm;r.' Furthel'lDOre, the Tul.'ke were irre-
sistlble in an attack, not to be held dawn with impunity, and oertainly 
arntf'ieient tel" the protection of Europe against Russia, if only she were 
lett alene. 36 
In l8~n the Turk. under ama amounted to nearly tour hundred thousand 
men, one hundred thousand more were in the proce.s of being aBs_bled. 
Nearly two hundred and fifty thousand were regularsJ the rest WGre volun-
teers' all were animated by lit. conmon devotion and enthllsiaam, and weH 
drawn from and congregated 010.. to the area of operations. The Ru.sian 
&l"IIY em the other hand wall drawn froM allover Russia, and was employed to 
protect hostile f'rontiers, or to repress hostile populations. The Russian 
soldiers were net overly enthusiastic and certainl1 did not compare with th~ 
TUl'ks. 37 
Urquhart est~ted that. the torost.hat the ~losian8 could bring agains 
the Turks in 1853 was not more than one hundred. and ei~ty thouaand men. 38 
35D&v1d fJrquhart, 'i)'ll& fiusgi£b 19.1 ~Ba1n!t (London, 1855), p. 9. 
36.DW\. 
37l!!1sl., p. 10. 
38Ib1d., p. 11. 
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But this was not a. realistic estimate of the forces that Russia could actu-
Idly eng8.?~e against the Tu.rks, hecause proba.bly close to one-half of the 
Russian troops would become sick t"lr die due to the olimate lir0v~~lfnt in the 
sector of operations. 39 For these reasons the Ttlrlr.:S, he predicted, would 
obviously outnumber the Russians. In any event with equality of numbers 
the Turks were oertainly not inferior opponents. Lnoklng the ooercion of a. 
British squadron and the diotation of a British ambasaa40r Turkey could win 
any war with nussia. Not even a single battle \\'&8 neceaaar.J to deter.ine 
the Haults of a ooutest. All the Turks had to do W&8 maintain thel r 
strong position aouth ot the Danube and watch the Rus.ian armie. di.inte-
grate due to sioknes., diseas., and death.40 
Becaus. of :nuesia t s def101enc;r in ml1i ta17 ~l.r in 185), Urquhart was 
certain that she could not attack Turke:r. Since 1828 Turkey'. military 
torc •• had tremef'1dously increased, and Russia's hs(l actually diminished. In 
1828 when T'urk-.y had no regular 8.l"IJIy in the Provinoes a.nd mad.e no !!\Vstemat.ic 
c19:fens. of the P:t'i:noipa.lltiea, Rllssia had. been :forced to retreat. 41 Russia. 
had been preparing for two years for that campai~, &nd employed approxi-
mately two hundred thousand men.42 However, 1853 saw Tu.rkey wi th an amy 
to defend the Prinoipal1 tie., and the abi11 ty to muster on the theater of 
39..!)Jj. 
42 Ib1j., pp. xlVi-xlvi!. 
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"para-tioris twioe the Russia.n fnrce. Even if Turkey only had the irreg'llo-
1a.rs v/ho 1n 1828 defea.ted tw1ce their number of B.ussilk'1 regulars at Kurt~~ 
th.e Prinoipal! ties certainly were still in competent hands. As to their 
quali ty the opinion. that General Aupl0 expressed to the SuI tan earlier in 
1849, tallied wi th that of the Turkish General .Bertll "Your majesty's troops 
are able to give a. good account of any enemies that will be opposed to 
them ... 44 Urquhart further supposed that even it the a:l"ZQ' had to retreat 1 t 
would leave the ProVinces devastated and then intrench itself on the Denube. 
To equal her relative position of 1828 the ~lsslan troops had to have about 
four hundred tbou.sand men. There was in 1853, however, a serious que.tion 
whether she oould support that force even if she ha.d it.45 The RuS8isl'u!I, 
in any event, would encounter a serious problem of logistically supporting 
any foroe. The eonoluRion logically following from these facts was that 
TIusl!ia would I!Lnd 00111d oocupy the Prinoipali ties O'1ly it ahe weH allowed 
to do eo.. On rlO other g'l"OUnd8 oould .he invade them. 46 
On July 7 t 18~)3 the Russian amie. oroa •• d the Pruth into Moldavia. 47 
1'he Principalities were again being occupied by the Cur's fonea atter 
months of negotiations ostenSibly over the issue of t~'lHlra.ntees for the 
privileges of the Portela Christian subjects. Turkey, not declaring war 
43~., PP .. xlvii-xlviii. 
44 :!!zit., p. xlviii. 
45~. 
46Ib1d., p. 1 • 
. ,47ft. Vi. Seton-V'latmm, Bn teJn l.n 11u£221, Jl§.2 Jst.l.2l4 (Cambridge, 
19551. ». )10. 
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mmediatelYt negotiated with Russia throufoSh the Western Powers for some 
Inonths over the Vienna tlote in attempti'1(?,' a oompromise. I.~.Hua than two weeks 
a.fter :'llrkey's ultima.tum to Rueda to evaouate the Prinoipalities, the coun-
.ri6s found themeel ves at war on the Danube. 48 As :Jrq,t,hart expeo tedt the 
l'.1rks were a.ble to take the offensive, and on October 23, (')mer Pasha. dro"e 
pack the Rua.ian troopa49 in two engagements near Isaacea a.nd Oltenita. On 
lovember 30 the Ru.aian fleet attacked a amall 'furklah aql1adron at Sinops 
"hich brought allout the famoua "uaaaoreff which 80 arouaed the S!ngl1ah pub-
!lio f'or war. From thi. time till lfarch 16, 1854 there was a lull in the 
!hostilities with attempt. at peaoe amid. the drift to war. 
Urquhart writing on January 6, 1854 saw that the Turks, l.ml.ss hyper.d 
by the Western Powers, would be able to con'tinn. their offensive when apr1n,.-
arrived. 50 They certainly would have the upper ha.nd, he thoHf'r,ht, because 
101' the ea.r1ier thaw ~nd. their conseQ.uent aM 11 +.y to move troops tnto the 
aren sooner. It was imposs1ble tor Russia to send troops to the Pruth be-
1'ore Hay. In 'R'ebruary or Warch. however, the Tllrke already could have three 
hundred thousand men in ;~ralla.eh1a, a.nd outflank the Russian t'crcea there • 
.'3esides, the peasantry would have been able and willing to rise against the 
Russians. The Russian forces, apPl"Onmating less than forty t,o fifty thou-
sand wi th only hope for reinforcement.s of twenty thciusand meu from Bessa.rabi 
would have been uttel'l,y ovel'\Yhelmed.5l 
48 :.lliJ., p. )12. 
49Woodwal'd, p. 252. 
5°Dand Urquhart, EpCilP!\·'!t.tl J.!1 Turkel'S.!JUJ (London, 1855), pp. 
13-14. 
511ill., p. 14. 
~bat further restrioted the ava11abi1it7 of t~ssian troops in the 
South was that fifty thousand. men were ocoupied in the area of Georgia 
keeping the Clrcass1an tribes in check and attempting to subdue them. 
This native opposition and resistanoe to Ru •• ia made these territories 
vulnerable to Turkish invasion, the consequence. of whioh could only be 
imagined by one 11ke Urquhart who knew the spirit which fermented among 
the Malo-Ruasians. and who had studied the revolt at ~lgatoheff.52 
41 
It Is obvioue that a. war between Russia a.."ld 'J:urkey in the spring with-
out EnRlisb interference would have been disastrous t.o :Russian interesta. 
It would have restored to the Porte all of those territories which h.g,d been 
wrested from it by the CZ&rs of liullJsia. It oertainly 1I10uld have brought 
about the defeat of' Fussie. in the Prine! pa11ties. But a.s the intentions of 
the Western POVlel"S were not t4 change boundariest Urquhart concluded that 
they were not intent on restoring to ':"urkey her :f'ormer territories. In his 
mind the EastGl"l1 cr1sis in Janu8.l"J of 1854 was a .leoisive oontest through 
which either Russia or Turkey would crumble.53 
It was Lord Clarendon's opinion that the nuss1an evacuation of the 
Principal! ties was a.!in! JU1A ll$W pl"8liminary to a settlement of the 
cr1s1s.54 This may have been t:rtle, but alone 1 t would not bring about a 
oomplete settIfment 'Of the basic issues of the oonfliot. Urquhart did not 
52r'pUl. 
53!bid. 
54 Urquh&rt, Px:sgree" p. xv. Lord. Clarenc!c'1 ria:;; P(,>7'eign Secretary 
during the Crimean ','1&1". 
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think that a Bettlament would be forthcoming unleela the evacuation would 'be 
uncol'ldi tional on the part of HUBsia. l''u!'thel'more, some provision had to be 
made for the injury that occurred and against future aggT'ession. ~Jrquhart 
formulated IUlJven requ,1a1 tee for the settl.ent of the criels that threat-
aned the peace of Europe in 1853. In this enumeration can be Been his 
belief that any good settlement meant & comprehensive adjustment of past 
injuetices whioh violated the la.w of naUonB. or the seven points two were 
essential to the immediate settlement: the admiegion ~f EngliSh vessels t~ 
the Black Sen., and the exportation of 'f'urkit!lh r:t'!"a.in. Urquhart saw great 
importa.nce in S1ireseing these terms, because it wa.s precisely on the saIse-
tio.n ef' terms tha.t Russia had affected her oonquests, and no+ "01' the a.d.-
vance of her a.:rnlies.. i11ven if they would have baEm obta.inable, he was eon-
vinced that a.s long as the RUllsian ambassador still resided in J.I()ndon, 
U:ngland would not obtain them. 55 
55 Ibid., PP. ::J:'VI-xvi. 
CHAPTER II! 
TH'E DARDANEI..LES, SIIWPE, AND LORD STRATFORD 
!!"he indepenrlo.noe and well-being of the nations of Rurope in the rlil'l9-
teenth century depended em the freed.cm of the Darda'1ellee and t.he ilosphol"'lUlI 
Urquhart realized, ootlId easily be used by a great, power to gain hegemony 
the Dnieper, to the east abe had been depT! ved of tho Cauoasus. For cen-
tur1es she had passionately desired a warm water port on the Black or Ca ... 
pian Seu. Imperial expansion was a method that she felt wemld satiBf"y her 
needs and feed her glory. In her quest for power Russia. aimed at the oon-
trol of the lla.nube and its cont1n~:nt provinces and the Araxes, and the 
exclusion of ell rival naval power from the Black and Caspian Seas. 1 
Through the tl'ea:ty ot Unkia.r Skaless! 11'1 1833 anrl the Strai ts Conven-
tion of 1841, Bu.ssia had obtained. the exclusion of foreign warships :from th 
Strai ts a.s long as th.e Porte was 1'1t. peace. 1htstda ill the Stral tA Conveni;ior 
had. actually procured as a. pl'l.nei:ple what was in 1833 by the treaty of 
Unkiar Skeleasi no more than a temporary Oonoession +'·c.' Russian armed force. 
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Since the gua~tee o.f her po8i tion expired in 1841; 'Russia. obtained 1". the 
Strai ta Convention a new gua.ranteet a oollect1ve tS'lnX-al'1tee, i" whi.ch the 
five powers a~e(l to maintain the sta+,.us que. Rl.Hudf.:l after this enjoyed a 
special privileged post tion which waf'! ha.llowed and riiSl!uised '.1Y the Conven-
2 t10n'8 appea.1 to anoient custom. 
The treaty of 1B41 really tUd n~t present an obstacle to the en-
trance of an E!ngli8h fleet :into +,be 8t1'8.i te in 1853, in fact, Urquhart 
thought that the cHsis during the spring and SWJmElr of 1853 wa.e an excel-
lent opportunity to abrogate it. The will to do it, however, was wanting.) 
The 'l'urke aotl.ull.ly d.aired the pa.ssage of the English fleet through the 
Dardanelle., for th8,1 felt that the fleet altered the balance of power in 
their favor. 4 tTrqllhart waa not belleve4 when he aSMrted that the Porte 
desired the pasfJa.~ of an :t:nglish squadron. His news, however, were con-
fiMed by the correspondent of The Timl' 'Rho announced that the inhabitants 
of Constantinople "ere so confident that the English and French flags would 
float sid.e b7 nide in f'rom of Ccnatantinople that qua.ys were crowded wi tlt 
spectators eagerly ft.! ting to bail the first appeal"8.nee of the allies i,n 
~lrkiBh water$.5 
Ever;.rone in Turkey attributed the absenee of' the Eneliah fleet 1:0 the 
2m ~~, CI " • 
.Q. 'v. .:)eto'1-,1;'atson, 
pp. 219-220. 
3Ul'Q.uhart, f.:s::W;:IWb p. xx:x:i. 
4 :.!.lUJ., P. :x:xvi 1. 
5Ibtd., p. xxviii. 
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objections of RuS81a.6 Urquhart was firmly convinoed that Lord Palm.reton 
a.bove everyone else wa.s the ~;:n!?;1ieh minister who was preventing 1 to entranoe 
His StlspioloTis of Pe.lmerstonts 1-!'lterests in tbie matt.er d!i.ted back to the 
time when he was secretary of the embassy at COT1etant.inople. At that time 
B document in the Ellibasey' e arohivful prevented the pa.esarre of the fleet. 
Sinoe six foreign m.inisters ha.d excluded the fleet when t.h.ey oould have 
brought about its paseage. Urquhart be11eved that thi8 eeoret dooument was 
still to blame in 1853. H. olearly r __ b8r84 the words that Palmerllton 
spoke to him in 1831 which suggested his intention to exclude the fleet. 
Urq,lUlart &leo was censured 'bY' the government around this t11'1e becau.e h. hael 
offered t& obtain a request tor its passage. He was oertain that the Turks 
wanted the 1'1891:.1 In 1853, Palmeraton, however, was apparent17 not re.pon-
sible for the detention of tbe fleet, beoau •• in & memorandum to Clarendon 
before the oa.'bin.et lIeeting of Ootober 7, 1853 he expres.ed a wi em to wppor1 
the Turk18b. declaration of war by Bending the fleet to the 'l3laok Sea. 8 
On October 22, 1853, the joint li'ranco-Brltiah squa.dron entered the 
Da.rdanelles and anchored off the (".JOlden Horn. j.~d&n~rOU8 lull followed,. 9 
during whioh (in the mind of Urquh&l"t) Lord Stra.tford d.e Radoliffe WfUI to 
play the most prom:i.nent and ol"Uoia1 role on the diplomatic 8ta~. lJOrd 
6 Ibid. 1t pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
7 Ibtd.., Pl'. lCd»-xx.x. 
813• Kingsley ~l:al"t1n, 1h! T,rlU!1M .2! ~ p"lSUU:ltsm (London. 1924) t 
P. 157. 
9~,· 31 
""eton-liatson, p. . 2. 
r;tratford stated that the presence of the Anglo-French squadron in the !los-
phort,s was inoontestable proof of the pro-Turkish interests and sentiment. 
It the 1~ri tish and French govel'nmenta. aut now Urquhart, apparently ohanRed 
~la mind. Before, he had wanted a squadron to enter the Straits. Now he 
laS sure that this interest wa.s neither favorsble to Turkey, nor were tbe 
~enUmente honorable. The support, in his estimation, wa.s only a po11 tical 
10 pove and wa. not intended for military or naval purposes. 
Although Itoet Englishmen reJoiced when the fleet was sent up the Dar-
danelles, Urquhart declared that it was sent to coerce Turkey and over ... 
~on8tantinople. ae believed that this reJoicing was a manifestation of 
~ngli8b imbecility_ Supporting hie interpretation of the sttuation, a 
~@ti;er from a prominent 'Nalla.ohian, whoa he doe. not naG, oontainecl the 
pred:f.etlon that nThe Turka will win the battles, but England will then 
l~terpo.e with a note. The RUBeian generale (at Bucharest) do not oonoeal 
their utter 1nabi11 t7 to meet the Turks, but at the aaae time t.hey make no 
Boruple in avowing their oonfidenoe that the Anglo-?rench aquaa.rcn will oome 
to their aid with another Navarino."ll Urquha.rt olaimed that he oould pro-
~t1ce ma.ny' more statements 11ke th.s. from ':urkish .ubj.ot_F;n~li.hmen, 
Perman., 'Frenchmen, and Chr1atial'ls-whc thou~ tha.t 'l'urkey would win the 
~ar only it ehe stood 810n •• 12 
Urquhart believed that Russia never could have risked her dangerous 
lODaviti Urquhart, Eagled t , lHl JJJ. ?urku;',,!all (London. 1855), p. 4. 
11~., pp. 7-8. 
l2..!W., ,. 8. 
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iPOlicies in the Near East during 1853 if ahe had not bee-a oertain that 
dtratford de Hedclitfe was to be Bngland'e represel":ta.;t;ive at Constantinople. 
!\t the beginning of that year when there was 80me doubt as to his being lIent 
iback again, the Russian l'fIpresentative in London me.de evident his satillfao-
tion with a negative decision. The Russian government tel t that such a 
d1apl83' would oau.e theSnglish government to think that Rtuud.a. did not 
appreciate Stra.tford, a.nd he consaquently would be sent to Constantinople te 
seoure England' 8 interests against Russia.. 'But the English ~vemment even 
went furtherl eV817thing was left to his .1udf1:'!'nent, knowled.ge, and prudenoe. 
Russia. knew de Redoliffe's attitudes and that the Porte would probably fol-
yet tremendous power to atop or start war, the moat serious decisions would 
hinge on the temperaments of the individuals who occupied the key positions. 
As lIrquhart a. it, RUBsia pl8\Yed her game of oonquest through the manipuler 
ticn of theae accidents. But 'lDore than Stratford' s a.ntagoni8lll toward 
Russia was needed by Rusaia to lIle.ke the galDe ea:f'e. It waa eq'lally importan1 
to preventM. Von Prokel!lOh from being there as representative of Austria. 
He had actually been designated to that poet when nuesia interpoB"- 80 
openly that it reached publio notoriety at Vienna and Derlin. Riza Pasha 
also had to be kept out of office. 'Russia was equally fortunate in having 
Palmeraton and Aberd.en in the same oabinet, neither of them ostensibly 
"being foreign minister. In this manner Russia, Urquhart thought, ha.d 
13 
arranged. the eettin~ ror the ""ar a.nd hacl left noi;h:b:'lt;' to Ohan(H~:. She 
.. 
13 Urquhtu't , Pmgresp. p'p. xliii-xlv. ,At this time Urq,uhart believed 
that Strattordts interest in the welrare of Turkey Was "l'.l"lQ.,HuJtionable." 
knew the characters and attitudes of the key figures, arid their reactions 
when confronted with given si tus.tlons. 
Even thou~ l{us81a had undertaken iumHm.a preparations, which were al-
ways wri tten and talked about durln~ 1853, she only ha.d. thirt.een line-of-
battle ships in the -alack Sea. In 1829 she had. the same number. Hslt the 
squadron at the time of 3inope was hardly seaworthy,14 as Laurence Oliphant 
in his trovels i~o 3evastopcl attested. It,; The native Russians in the crews 
had been reoently replaoed by drafted and urmi11iYlI'!;' men from the Baltic. 
pa.raging view of the Russian fleet in the n1a.ck3e:~ was the story oonoern-
ing the \Ilxen affair In 1836 in whiehth.e crew of the Russian ship Ajax • 
proposed, to' the gnglish sailors that if they would lead them out of the 
16 Black Sea they could oarry oft their ship. ~~~rs. urquhart did not think. 
that Marshall marmont in his book on Southern Russia acourately appraised 
the Russian fleet. Russia could only have aoquired Marmont's estimated 
thirty Tessels by un! ting both the 13a1 tic and Black See. fleets, wb.1ch was 
rul obvious impossib11ity.17 
Both t1rquharts knew that RU8S1M naval strenf'\th was 1i ttle more than a 
myth. ~lI,;'hen the Porte declared war against 'Russia, Russia I 9 southern prO?-
14Urquhart, F-q gil!l 9 t s!,W., p. 3. 
15 ( l.taurenoe Oliphant, Russ1!!n ~or28.2! JJa 13~ic!s~, 2nd ed. London, 
1854), PP. 255-259. 
16t1rqUhart I England's Part, p. 4. 
179:a.rr1et Urquhart, Ston.2!.1Ia war (Londofl, 1851),. p. 10. 
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,.noes were thrown into panic, fel\!'in,<; a ':'urkieh na.val at tack f{1l' which they 
rolt t.heir :fleet offered. 11 tUe pro4:ec1::1on. '1'he il"lhal:-i tan"ts of the :port 
Itz-:wne fled inland. Even published "Ill.seian dOetlmenf:e ~ave eVidenoe of the 
re"ruera.l apprehension. 18 
In a fine.l effort for p4!.a.ce the Dri tish oabinet asked Stratford to re-
Rl)Sat a delay of' the Turkish oper!!.tions i.nH1ated by Omar Pasha in the 
F>:r.bc 1 pal1 ties. Stratford sucoessfully persuaded the Porte not to send 1 t8 
Pleat into the Black Sea, but he was llnable to prevent the dispatoh of a 
ight flotilla to Sinope. This flotilla was completely destroyed there on 
'~ovember 30, 1853 by the Russian fleet. 19 
Russia in\ended this vietor,y to oounterbalanoe the defeats that ahe bad 
~uffered a DlOnth ear11er in the Principal1 tie.. This naval action was visu.-
alised in England all proof of the weakness of Tllft«q, therefore for Russia 
t produoed 1 ts intended effect. 20 Even Seton-Watson states tha.t it was 
'"the Turkish fleet" that was sent to reoonnoi tre :i.n the 1Jlaok Ssa. 21 In 
~aliVt the whole Rus.ian fleet had engaged only Beven small ':'urkish fri~ 
~te0. It waB a fight between line-or-battle ships and frigates, bein", 
therefore, an outstanding nava.l enoounter for the Turk'.s.22 The Turks not 
0,1y did not st,rike their f.lap;a before suoh obvious 8upftriori ty, but fonght 
18 Ibid., p. 68. 
19m• L. Woodward, .1lu!.!a..Q! ,Refsa:m (Oxford. 1954), p. 252. 
2O!l!a fre'l, ~ 2. 1860, p. 45. 
218 ~ 3 eton-',,&tson, Plt 20. 
22!1:u !):",. May 2, 1860, P. 45. 
back so effectively that one of the Russian shipe sank before it was able 
to return to Slbaatopol.23 
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'lIhen the tJmae..,re" occurred a oorr •• pondent of an Engliah journal at 
Conatantinople reported' 
The (h."e • .,,,! th their tlwa} malicious f.eling, 8%01&1. that it 
is En~~lal,d '~hat hu 'brought about this little fravarino, in order 
to obtain peace at an,- prioe. It 18, however. really a question 
'What the Rng1il'lh and. Frenoh fleetllt a.rc d.oing hare, the only an-
swer to' Whioh seema to' be, that their 8allors and officers get 
drunk in ~he public streets, insult women, a.nt! violate the sanc-
tuary of private hOllses. I!esides this, the fleets serve the 
amba.esadoro as a means of. threatening 1',he Turks, so to restrain 
them from ma:l'ohlng on 1Juobarest, and forclng them ~~to a.n arrange-
mttnt such 9.A the ~ Powers may pleaee t,o dicta.te. 
of oppoeing Huss:l.a.y,'hat lAd. that rept')rter and many others in Engla.nd to 
t.his 0$t1mate cf t.hf'll 81 tllation was that the Engl1s11lnllU'It A.dmiral Slade, 000* 
Mander of the Turkish fleet, was suspected of purposely leaving the small 
mente between him, Admiral Dundas, and Lord Stratford de Redoliffe the 
crders of the ""ltrk:i .. sh 001..1.'1011 to their fleet to oonvoy the detached ves8els 
to the 13oaphorlls had been disobeyed. The whole th.ing had been 80 unlJlueh-
ingly managed., TIrqtlhart stated, that "three days before the newe arrived. 
it was reported at Constantinople that the aquad.ron had been d.stroyed at 
"'1 "25 
.:J nopfl. 




Admiral Slade BOomea the oharge of which he probably was not guilty. 
~e denied having given anT auch order, flO alBC did Mu . .,tata Pasha. No one 
~ew who gave the order to leave the seven .. all frigates unprotected at 
~lnop.. Later the abasaado!'. theselves made 1 t known that thGIT had. inte::p. 
posed to prevent the Turkish fle·et from proceeding to oonvey the flotilla 
hOlle. It was their Ittear of the p08sibil1t,. of an enoounter with an enem.y 
of auperior foree lt that made them act 1n this manner. Since it was more 
than one hundred and fi~ty miles to Sebastopol from Sinope, the three weekst 
~ap.,e between the arrival of the flotilla and i.t8 destruction oonveniently 
~ve the Russians time, a8 Urquhart eaw 1t, to send tor the rest or the 
ra1.ck Sea fleet. Initially they had only three 1ine-ot-battle ships and 
~our small frigates near Sinope, and .ith theB. th~ did not dare attack 
26 ithe Turkiah aquatbc>n. 
A startling statem81t 1n an article in lll.t !1anj,lUi A<l!'.rU,'11 during 
January, 1854, was read with diab.lisf by the publiC. It alleged that it 
was Stratford de a_dc1iff. who had pr.vented the main bo~ of the Turkish 
f"leet coenanded by A4ralral Slade troa entering the Black Sea. Re did thia 
by threatening the Turldah govel'lIIIent that it it sent 1 t8 fleet into the 
IBlaok Sea. to meet the Ru •• lana, hs would iDllledlate4r order the F..ngliah tl.et 
to l.ave Conat&1\tlnople. Urquhart regretted, but :reI t compelled to "tOuch 
if'or the truth of this allegation, baaed on 80me of hie priVate souroes. 
2(~., pp. 9-10. Sir George Sydenham Clarke in Ru@sia/ P Sma Ppwer 
~n pa.ge~ states that there were only six RU8Siar! IIships-o:f'-the-linel! 
IIlttaoking, and that they were known to be in the area ten da.Ys before the 
laction. The total Bl'.'l.ck Sea squadron he estimates a1; fifteen ttshipa-oi'-
'the-line, II and about the Stl.t"fte number of miscellaneous eh:lps. 
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"tad it not been 1·01' the interferenoe nond threat of de liadolL'fe: the ':'urkiah 
f~11:.·H'?!+ wculd ha.ve met a.nd destroyed the Enssian fleet. And $0 the only senel· 
~}le oonolusion that Urquhart saTI was that the guilt of the ca .. !;a.strophe a.t 
finope rested on the head of F.ngland. 27 
There was one point that passed unohserved wh10h nevertheless oonolu-
ftively pointed out the purpose of 1:he al11es, ()l' at least of Bngland, to 
Ibetray the vessels •. ~3ince the 7urka certa1n11 posse.sed the Quperior J'leet, 
?itratford f S fear of the Turkish fleet e;icolmt.erlng a sup_rior foree was not 
gen.t:dne. On the other hand, if the Russian fleet was superior why, then, 
was not the Sinope squa.dron lmmedia.tely ordered to return, instead of being 
allowed to re .. ln there for approxi.ately three weeks? Sinope afforded no 
28 protection. Sinoe no reasonable explanation was offered for thea. &D-
'tiona, no al terna ti ve explana tion to oollullten was poss! bl. in Urquhart' a 
estimate. Lord Stratford was oertainly not acting in the hest interests ot 
the Turka. Yet in the jlUi8DIent of Seton-l'!atsorl. ~tratfo:rd was acting with 
dupliCity in not car17ing Gut the instrnotions of Clarendon. 29 If Stratford 
na private17 urgin~ the Turks to war for the humiliation of Itussia and 
.mdermining attnpts to maintain peace, the ql.leatiMI why 5trat"'ord re-
strained the Turkiah :t"l.et.1'1"om aiding the Sinope aquadron arid !'rom pursuing 
ths !h8.ia.n fleet 1'IfUat st111 be answered. His actions certa.inly mlet, have 
27Urquhart, !aUlD!] t §~, Pl'. 10-11. 
28 lW., p. 10. 
29 Seton-Wataon, PP. 316-318. 
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appearea quite mysteriou8 to his oontemporariea. 
Tha Ports called. on tha ambas8&40r8 or England and France to decian 
eight daTa, and 80 pftTented the pureu! t and d.struction of the Russian 
squadron. In their answer they admitted that they had exercised their in-
fluance to arrest the operations of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. 
Tbey explained that It was due to defectIVe 'Purk1sh material and crewa, and 
the poselbility of an enCOl.'mter with a superior Huesian force. This was 
astounding, Urquhart thought, since Sinope had clearly shown how much the 
Russians feared the 'lUrks. The Turkish. fiest was s.otually superior. It 
commanded the entrances ot the DanUbe, and bad taken possession of the 
Phases, but what wu that, Urquhart thought. a~a!nst the word of' the amba .. 
8&d01"81 After all. $. t was their Will that Turkey should be weak, and 
. 30 therefore ah.was. 
Betore Sinope the Turks did not rear an enoounter with the Rus81an8. 
When Lord Stratford stopped their ne.t in the beg1nning ot Nov_ber, their 
intention was to aeek out the Russian fleet tor battle. The result of such 
an enpgeent i8 auggested bJ the heroio re.istance the Turk. gave at Sinopt 
wi thout their wara.hlpa. Urquhart was qui ta aura that 1:t the Turkish fleet 
had not been hin.dered. it would have entirely an"'lihilated the Ru •• ian Black 
Sea fleet. A Turkish fl.et then would have been in control of the Dlaok 
~ea. It Stratford had not hindered. the Turks in the Principal! ties, tll.,-
also would have been in control there. In ITrquhal't t e mind the words of 
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Count N •••• lrede to 811" H. Seymour substantiated this beUer. "You know 
very' well that 'the exi.tenoe of Turke7 had never been in dang.r. Had Ruaaie 
and Turkey been left to themselves, the ~uarrel would have ended long ago. n 
The danger here expressed 'by Neel!Je1rod,. was for RuSSia, Urquhart thought, 
and through Sinope she had averted her imminent defeat.31 
In the final analysis Urquhart was probably not far frem ~ong. The 
government, if taken &s a whole, had negotiated and maneuvered appa,rently 
to prevent war, Or to prevent 100al war from becoming a. European oonflagra-
tion. Y.t the Turks apparently d •• ired war--a war in which they .ere oonfi-
dent they could win if limgland did not interia?e. As Clarendon declared, 
England and ll'ranoe were not going to allow the peaoe of Ettl"Ope to d.epend. on 
the national apiri t of Turkey. which had evidently gotten out of the OOD!"" 
trol of the Turkish government. And final17 Lord Clarendon into.ed Turk. 
that ahe wall not to be pemi tte4 to attack Rua.ta. in the Black Se.t until 
atter tha Porte had &«reed to aubait the operation. of the Turkish fleet to 
the oontrol of the Englillh and French &_11"&18. As Mrs. UrqUhart aptly 
",. 
stated in her anal7aia of the pertinent diploaatio oommun1~Ue8t 1t waa the 
Sinope affair b7 which England under the pretene. of securing the peace of 
Europe protected Ruauda from the naval power of 'l'urkeif.32 
31 !tu ~D2" Va,)" 2, 1860, P. 45. 
32I~id., p. 46. 
In his pamphlet, lDs .:2Il ~ !!yaal'!b !£! !a&nlt RysI!a, David Urquha.rt 
seriously questioned the nature of that war en whioh England bad embarked in 
support of' Turkey. Russia a.ndEnrrland were virtually invulnerable from a.t-
tack by each other while each remained wi thin i tIS own territory. Rue.ia did 
not have a large naVYJ England did not have a. la1"f..:':O army. Ea.oh, however, 
expoeed i 1;8 weaknesses when involved in a war wi thin a third at ate. Russia 
had 40ne just thts 'When she invaded the Principalities. She had placed he:r-
aelf at thellero:;y of England's maritime power. ;,:;'b,4In it became evident that 
~ngland tid not intend to exert that power Urquhart saw the iasuea in que .... 
tion being tried on grounds which suooeeatull¥ bluned them. Therefore, 
before the oonflict between Ru •• ia and E:ngland. could be cle.1"17 unclertlwod., 
the apparent cont •• t had to b. overlooked. 1 
fJrquhart did not think that there had been a lawful declaration of war. 
The queen had sent a .. silage to Parliament which did not dare utter the 
word, ·'war. n but which d.1d, however, introduce the vJerd. "peace. tI She stated 
that C:ngland. was "bound to afford active assista.noe to he!" ally. n Of RuSDitl 
the queen dared only s~ tha.t the negotiations to maintain peaoe had been 
I'David Ul'q.uhart, 1h! War .!2.t RtuU!i~h Npt A£l1tlgt RlHU2~' (London, 1855), 
P. 2. 
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terminated, and the power and reSOurces of the nation would be _plo,.ed 
ural' protecting the dominione of the Sultan against the encroachments of 
Bu •• la. 1t In Urquhart's eyes every man that engaged in woh an action with 
the prostituted title of war was III bandit or a. pirate. This was a repeti-
tion of the decla.ration of Simla by which Nnglish troops were sent out in 
~the Affghan War to dethrone a prince who was not subservient to Russia.. 
Some of the documents conoerning that war had been forged to oover up ~ool-
ltl.lve or treasonable a.cts, and Urquhart waS quite c011f1dent that the 
2 Crimean War would be treated in the same Wfq. 
Since the Czar d.1sda.1ned to notice the Incli. ult:1aatWl, En«land o~ 
appeared to declare war. But a m.ssage instead of a declaration 01 war oam4 
from the government. 3 Tu., TiBlI!" whioh Urquhart rel t WilLI. an organ of ausatE 
and the ,English oabin.t, intofted the nation that morning "that a declara.-
tion of the attv •• and objects of th' war, tI it pHsu.ed, would b, pr.pared 
for publioation 1n the +sIdOn 01l'lt •• 4 ~~ was it not .tat.d, Urquhart 
qu.ried, that 8. declaration would b. iawed? lNhat W&8 stat.4 18 that these 
fo rmali tie., a l.gal declaration or War, were not atrict17 necesaar.y to 
oHate a "state of war. ,,5 That wa.. true, but they certainly were nee.seary 
2Ilt• d• t PP. 8-9. 
3David Urquhart, C2p"llstionll Rimed,,! (Sheffield, 185S), p. 44. He 
sta.tes, "Tou a.re not legally a.t war with Russia. The word.in$7, of the Proal&-
mation has been a.ltered. Atter 't.ake up aNa' In.tead of 'for the derence 
of the honour of the nrftlsh Crown,' it rune, 'for the defence of the ~ultat 
of Turkey a.nd his dominions.' There 1s no oommission tc 'kill, sink, 'bum, 
nn.d destroy.' ff 
4Urquhart, 'lIAr, 1>£1. 8-9. 
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to oreate a "state ot war."' That was true, but th~y oertainly were nee ... 
0017 for B. "lmvf'nl war," & type, he thought, which T<ln,~lMd found repugnant. 
~\?ould it not have been much easier for Ent;la.nd to have placed herself withi7l 
the law? What was the reasen that there W&.tl so much care taken to place 
England outside or 1 t? "Enf{la.?'H1 ha.d assumed a.m the basis of war that Turkey 
v.'as in the una.lterable process of decay, a.nd yet she was pl'Oposi!1g to 80 to 
wa.r to support l'u,rkey. Urquhart concluded that England h.a.d not brou~..nt 
(3.bout the Crimean War in a. scramble tor the spoile of a. deoa,.y1ng Turkey, bui 
6 for the destruotion ot Turk.,., and the protection of' 'Russia.. The 1'18.1" W&8 
not conducted for the purpoM8 sta.ted, and 80 that no judi01al action could 
take place, no specifio declaration was made. 
Parliament listened to the message in br.athl.s. silence. Afterward., 
members & •• 4 one another U' 1 t was or was not a d_1aration ot war. ApPlU'-
ent17, no one \Va8 able to an.er thi8 q,ues1:ion, not wen the legal ad"I •• 1'$ 
of the Crown. Urqnhart was certain that it was 1:10t a declaration of war. 
Lord Aberdeen, he l"e11NIIIbei"ed, had sald that to defend the OttOllM .p1re 
was not to attack :aussia, and ne1 the'%' was it to defend 'l'I,tl"ke,.. 7 Irt th1e 
light the message of the Crown certainly d.id net embotfy what tradi t10nally 
might be considered a declaration of wa~. 
5The state of war, Urquhart t.hought, was a judioial sentenoe 83Qinst 
an enemy by wh.ioh on land or sea his person could 1H~ d.estroyed, or his 
properV seized. When war is declared everyone in 'the state making the 
declaration. is bound to do his best "to .kl11, take. Md. destroy the enemy 
until he tmbmi ts. !l:.u PtJso.P'ebruary 1. 1860, p. 17. 
The documents, then, were prepared to render Vial' against RuBsia. impo .... 
""fbI.. ';;a1' was pretended. a.nd yet the fields of' operation and the weapons 
~va11able to defeat Russia were rest.rioted. Suoh n. situation simultaneously 
p('Itleti tuted a state. of war and peaoe. There could "be 1'10 halance in the ef'-
Peets of such a oondi tion, !tussis. was favored, and fl\1l"key harmed.. Further-
~re, it was decided tha.t the state of possession was not to be altered. 
attack, then, was planned against Russia. If an attack later materialised, 
8 ~t would not be tor the purposes ot regaining Turkeyfs lost territory. 
In a letter to the Ciroassian tribes on ~a1' a, 1854. Urquhart told them 
~hat there acwall,y was 00 war between England and nussia. It was on",. a 
preten •• to deceive the English nation and the Ottoman &apire, 1n or4er that 
.. treacherous government might use their lIi11 t&r.Y torce. under the guise of 
~ ally. Thi. diabolical soh __ had. been llUooe.aful in regard. to TuJ'kq, 
I!J,nd Urquhart expected that 1 t would be used on the elrou.1ana allllO. Enm 
Ithou~ IUItTett months had elap.ed s1noe T'Urkey had admitted. the Anglo-French 
l!Q.uadl'On through the Dardanelles, the Russians were .till in the Princ1pali-
~ies, and the Sultan was for all practioal :purposes a prisoner in the 
~eraglio.9 
The squadron that was admitted. was not even In.tended for action against 
~uS8ia, 1. t was far too powerful. Instead it was intended to ooerce Turkey. 
~e English and French controlled Const&ntinople, thr<>ugh their i'leeta, but 
a :.DaJ. , p. 1). 
9Davld tJrq'tl.hart, "Letter to Chiefs and Olans of Circassia., 'fi!ay 8, 1854, ft 
)Pider ~.!:k (London, 18;;), appendix, p. 9. 
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Urquhart foresa.w that Russia would soon obtain this control after she had 
fomented a war between England and Franoe. The plan of serving Russia by 
sending armies to fight her, had not commenoed with Tl~key. The experiment 
10 had alrea~ been made in the Affghan War. 
The English people were actually faced with a dilemma when they ooneid-
ared the relatione between England. and Russia. Either they had to admit 
that the Czar was insane. or that there was treason in the British oabinet. 
For a long time most Englishmen thought Nicholas was insane, and in this 
manner explained aWBJ the mysterious relations between the two oountries. 
But upon olose analysis; Urquhart thought, this explanation was fa,l&oious. 
Only treason in the British cabinet could adequately explain the inoongrui-
ties.II 
It bothered Urquhart that the Russians had not been driven from the 
Prinoipalities. He thought that nothing could have been easier than to out 
off the Russian army in the Principalities. If that had been done the who14 
confliot would have en~ed then and there. That Russia's expulsion was not 
the intention behind the oonfliot was obvious to Urquhart, since a squadron 
was being sent all the way to the Baltic. Such an action would have been 
entirely superfluous had the expulsion been intend.ad. Also, English troops 
were sent to Turkey when the naval squadron actually sufficed to dislodge 
the Russians. And in the end since the Turks aotually sufficed to defeat 
10 
.!J2..!g.., pp. 10-11. 
11 Urquhart, Wax, p. 12. 
the Russians, the presenoe of the squadron also proveo. that the Pr1noipa.l1-
ties were not the main reasons for whioh the war was being tought. Fn~land 
had opened the Prinoipal ! ties to the Russia.ns. <:)he h1),d held back the Turks. 
If F.:~ngla.nd ha.d 80 des1red she oonld have immeliiatel,7r moved the Turkish 
forcos to the rear of t·he RusEl1ans. If, then, instead of using the foroes 
in the Prinoipali ties whioh she a.lready bad a.vailable, EnQ;h,nd mo"ed forces 
and ships of' her OWn to other points, it .followed lom-oally for rJrquhart 
that r&nglMd had no intentione ('If fitr,hting 8.p:ainst Russia., and was only 
12 
masking her purposed inaction by these displacements. 
A. English troops moved into the war apparently on the s1de of Turkey, 
Urquhart beo8.lle sure that the plan of the c .. palgn was not to expel the 
Russiana froftl the PrinCipal! Ues. The l1lnglieh troop. were (a. The '1'118" 
stated) to occupy the Thraoian CherllJOne.e, &ftd the extr_i ty of' Thraoe, on 
whioh Constantinople stood. What else than oooupation could it be oalled 
wben En!J118h and French troops landed 1n toroe on Turk1sh so11, and instead 
of proce.din~ to attack the enemy, entrenched themselves on lin.s ooYering 
and coraanding' Constantinople and tbe Dardanelles. It was, Urquhart thoup:ht 
an insult to the T1ITka to pretend to defend their 8tron~e8t positions, 
against whioh attack was almoat impossible. It wan n~t a defe"ee, it was an 
ocoupation. The 'i:urk:s would soon become di800"ltented witb thie state of 
affairs. IrU.IJunections ,"ould OOOlU'. But the A.l1iee were capable or re-
preSSing suoh local insurrections, and the ailled na.val squadron was always 
~earby in a channel whioh oommanded Con8~ant:1nople and bisected the empire. 
12 :.!.!UA., pp. 4-6. 
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Since the a111es Were in etfect preventing the ';:'urks from fighting the Rue-
sians, he felt that soon the alBae would prebably ha.ve to fight the Turks 
themselves III 
Such, then. 1. my answer to the qnest10n often put, to !De w'hen I 
speak eof dangers of defensive war, ItHow can an addi +'iona1 force 
endanger Turkey'" It will doc eo, beoause Turkey i.s a.lready too 
strong, and such is precisely the ar?:mnent lHU,H! 'by Russia. at 
V1enne.-"Turkey is toc et.ron,o.: therefore take oare of yours$lves." 
And this, be 1 t cbserved, I annmlncen at the very beginning of 
this et~lggle. "Yeu are new alarmed at 'urkey's weakness, the 
day 1s not far distant when you will be terrified at her 
strength. "14 
Lord Pon80noy in 1854 even though he was not a. soldier, did believe 
that he knew the difference between a defensive &ld aggressive war. Th. 
Turks would not be grateful to the &111es for doing what the,. could have 
done them.elves, he thought, or for the EngliSh attacks direoted against 
strong instead of weak Russian positions. Ponsanby thought that 1t:ngl18h 
intervention was aoeu:rd, 1t d.tenae were the end Bought. But tor that .a1:-
tel' he thought the government' s policy was imbecile throughout the whole 
15 progress of the Eastern Question. He did indeed think that the best pol-
i01 was one that ~oo~pa8sed deeisive and extensive action. ~ssia should 
be expelled f'l'OID every- plaoe whioh she had a0Q.uired by force or fraud fl'08'1 
the Turke or the Persia.ns. The,se terri tarteR should be T'f.Hlltored te> their 
eeour1 ty against future a.tta.cks of any sert by Russia. It. alee would, a.ffor~ 
l3~., pp. 11-12. 
14 Ibid •• PP. 1.3. 
1;"Po1'180n'oy to Ur-quhart, Ma.rch 21, 1845." BRigjr ~ FIZ (I...ondon, 
1181)1) ). D.. 11. 
n guard against disputes between -the Buropean powers thu5!I leaving nothing 
to be obtained or demanded" It, was, in fact, the meddlin!~ of the ~llro'pea..u 
powers in the a.ffa.1:rs of Turkey that brcugh:t about the c0t1fl1ot~1n the ;Tea;r 
r~a.st. It they would have left '''.'urkey a.1one, she could have worked out in a 
16 
satista.ctol'1 manner everything that concerned foreigners. 
Some months atter Maroh,1854, Hrquhart asserted that some of the ml1i-
tary authorities did not share the delusion that Turkey Was weak. and in 
danger from RUBeia. Immediately afterwards, l,ord Clarendon stated in the 
!touse of Lords that the n.111 tal"T author! ties" concurred wi th the poll tical 
author! ties, and declared tbat the expedi ticn was sent. out not t(l repel 
17 !b 8Bia, or to aave ~'urkey, but to secure Consta.ntinople. l)nring ~,i!\l"Oh, 
1854. however, nrqubart had oonversed with General Hardinge and Colt'll'lel 
l!fll+.tein. Th8 impression left upon him by the oonversation was that t,hase 
officers entertained o1"in10na similar in char9.0te:r, it no+ in exte""l+, t(" 
his. They a.ccepted the illustrations he offered fT'01il the last Rueso-Turkial: 
war, and from topographic oonaiderati(H1S, anel. they also aeoept,ed the t88+.;1-
many he bore as to the oharacter and feelin~s of the Turkish army. ITrquhar1 
felt that these officers olearly understood the eff'~t that EngliSh troops 
would have on the Turkish amy whioh was fnl1 of' oour8.89 and viger and oo.n-
soious of its power to orush the litu.ssians. fjrquhart thought. that the Turks 
could only .reel then tha.t the English troops were sent to restrain them. 
Ruoh a f •• ling would soon turn the hatred whioh the Turks initiall~ had for 
the Ru.siane against the allies. lIe further fel t that the Turkish nation 
16 8 ~., DotoDer, 1 54, p. 32. 
17Ib...1d., P. 26. 
'la.s much more powerf'ul than 1 ts government thou~t it. was, and that the 
'l"urks would not be SUbdued even by all three powers. Lord Clarendon ob-
served that" the na ti onal s pi ri t c f' Turkey wh 10 h miP.il t have been 90 u eetul 
a,.q-ainst the aggressor, had new become dangerous to its own ~vemment." 'But 
it had become so only because that government, Urquhart oono1uded, had 
18 yielded to foreign oounaels. 
Sometime before November 10, 1855 Urquhart had an extraordinar,r oonver-
sattan wi th tne Turkish ambassador, Nardo Pa.cha. Urquhart maintained that 
Turk~ waa able to d.fend heraelf; the latter maintained that hia countr,rmen 
were no match tor the Rua.iana. He therefore implored the 'Sri t1ah govern-
lDent for aid, and Waa quite annoyed at Urquhart' a estimate of Turk1,sb bra ... 
er,y and power.19 
Rusaia, Urquhart tho~tf would be better able to resist a European in-
stead of a Turld sh f.L1"II7. Therefore, it made sense that wh.en En~land was 
allied to Turke.7. and Fn~li9h troops composed the greater mas. of the a~, 
1ues1a was better able to resist TurkeY'. After all, if Pll\gla.nd had reall.y 
,;anted to support T'Urkey and to curb Russia, all she had. to !i.o waG employ 
the most .f'f'ecttull means whicb was not war, but the reetriotion of RUBsian 
trade. Since England did not use these mea.l'lS she ba.d no intention of be-
befriending Turkey, or of injuring Russia.20 
18 
"Urquhart to Raglan, March 21, 1854,"~., pp. 28-31. 
19r.'ree ?;tils, l'iovember 10, 1855, p. 2. 
20 Ibid. 
Moot of his ideas on defensive war, statements of fact and predictions, 
David Urquhart embodied in a letter t.o Lord Raglan dated tkreh 21, 1854. He 
appealed to Lord Raglan to take nt~ps SB commander-in-chief to rescue Pong-
land and Turkey from a convulsion that also might lead to war with 'rance.21 
iVhat was the nature of the Anglo-French allianoe? Considering; the 
part that Russia had plqed 1n bringing Loui s ~~&poleon to power. Urquhart 
wondered how France could really have been hostile to Russia? In speaking 
of the tuture ma.p of Europe eome months betore he wrote 1b.I Si~4!;t _ ...$ba 
]lz, he said that ttLouis Napoleon muet .ell the Eng11eh squadron or be 
4ri yen 07 an iruliJlu"reo tion fro. Parie. tI Urquhart was qui te astonished at 
what he considered the Imbecillt7 ot the English public in respect to 
France. A thorcugh analTsis of the reasons for the alliance. after all the 
enmitl bet.een England and Franee, would in any 0888 have been reasonable. 
Yett Englishmen dreaded to look .eriously at the alliance. Urquhart was 
constantly reminded of the words of Prince Lieven when he described the DUI 
of Wellington' "Re dreads and even avoids the examination of his position 
and trusts to events the oare of' overooming diffioulties. II Here, in It. 
single phrase. was explained t.ha.t characteristic of 1<::!ngland and. a.ll of 
Europe whioh enabled RUSSia to uee other countries for her advantage.22 
Considerable eVidence moved Urquhart tc be qvite suspicious of Franoe's 
intentione. The planning of a man-of-war harbor at Boulogne and the sup-
press10n ot the Cllari vari for 1 ts enmity to Russia were two reports that 
HU 0 B-3 rquhart, Qiid,r, pp. 2 1. 
22.!UJ., p. 25. 
impressed him qllite deeply. 1AOreever, even if the '>'(rinter oamp a.t Eoulogne 
was directed at overawing Prussia i+. WI1S just as muoh in the servioe of 
Russia.. Leuis Uapoleon had. been allowed to fortlty t.he Tl:rraoian Chersoneset 
thereby giving him Virtual poses89ion of the D&rdanellea. This gave him 
control over the :tate of the English squadron. Bven ~ T1!1' Vias encourag-
ing the government to send the whole fleet into that trap in the Dardanelles 
Such a Situation should have been enougb to .ncoura~ the dulleat olti.en t~ 
reflect for a minute on 8. situation whioh was inttmded to shut up in a aea 
cOUlDlanded by France the whole available foroe ot England. A.nd thia was all 
done w1 th the avowed purpose of forcing tem. tor 8 settlement between 
RUBsia and Turkey, terms which actually violated the aovereignty ot Turkey 
which Flngla."1d had undertaken to defend. 23 
Others a180 dletrueted the intentions behind. the expedition. On the 
authority of' 1h! Tyges UrqUhart knew that wh~'t)ever the expedition was men-
t.ioned, the Turks ~ve "si~lfleant, but inarticulate flJ'~e of their inered-
lllity and contempt." He a.lao knew that the ~1"I~lieb ('Ifficere in oommand 
viewed the expedition to Turkey wi t.h a "profound feelin.~ of diatT".let., hi thel'" 
to unexperienoed in Rdt1sh ~,!'mieB, til oonvicticf'! of treachery.1t The senti-
ment was qui to general among the offioers, al thou~ Lord Raglan was an e»-
ception. 24 
~'ihen oonsidering the reasons for the war Urquha.rt thought that onlT th. 
preteneions of Russia and her strength were ot essential importanoe. It 
23Ib14., pp. 25-26. 
24Ibld., p. 26. 
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Huss1a were the patron of the Christia.ns of Turkey, she would have used that 
patronage, instea.d of expen~in~":'l"eat efforts in 1'\eaking to obtaIn H. Rad 
Russia been flore powerful than r[urkey, EngllaMle!1 would have heard of her 
conquests before learning of bel' intentions. Russia. ha.d actua.lly been beat-
en alreadJr' she had been stopped. Urquha.rt then could not see why England 
should undertake suoh a gigantio and hazardous expedition. 25 
Proponents of the expedition supported it with new argwaents such as 
the nee.Bs! tl' of repressing Ru •• 1a through European guarant •• s. 'ro Urqu-
hart'. waf of thinking this was only ta.lling back en the original fallacy 
that Rusllia waS strong and Tarkey weak. mv.uta oertainly had disproved. 
tbis. If TUl"key was strong, there wa.a no d.a..~ger to Ulurope froID Russia., so 
Iwhy bother with useless treaties as guarantees. Tl'eat:tea had 1'l.l')t restrained 
iTIu8sle. in the put. E1ven ministers thOll,;ht that Ru.sia used treatie. as 
26 
stepping stones to conquest. !"; fact, Rustd,a, only URad 'treaties en the 
grt:,unds tha.t they should be exeouted in so far as thtry served to expand her 
!empire. In 1815 the treaty of Vienna. gavs her Poland., lmt this did. not pre-
lVent her 1n 1846 from dispoeinl?,' of Craoow. The .;;reaty of Adrianople in H~29 
~ve her the mouths of tbe Danube. In 18539 however, Rtuuda blocked the 
~ntrance in Violation of the cond:i.ticns to which ahe had agreed. Tha.t name 
~ea.r she separa1;ely ocoupied the Principalities which violated the treaty of 
lRa1 ta timan of' 1849 that provided only for a. join.t ocoupation. The treaty 
~f London in 1841 had excluded foreign vessels of war from the Eux1ne on 'tiM 
ccmd.1 tic!} the. t Rusaia. l"fUlpeO t the integl"i ty of the (it.t,cman P.mpire, and this 
also did not prevent her 1n 1853 from Violating' that integ'r1ty.27 
After RUBsia had been beaten by the '""ul"k~, tha contest for a,llpra.cti-
eal purposes was over. Russia's a.rmies had been dislcdged, and could not 
return. All Turkey had to do was maintain the state of war, .eal oft trade 
by keeping the Dardanelle. closed, and Ruasia would have be.n placed between 
extinotion and the acoeptance of equitable oonditione of peace. Urquhart 
ooncluded that the allies had relieved Ru.sia. trom euoh a. pr.dJ.camen't by 
deliT.ring overth. Danubian Principalities to Au.tria, by compromising 
their own armies in RU.8ian territory, and b,r keeping the Dardanelle. open 
28 for her trade. 
27David Urquhart, ~rn",u s.!. RU!!iAt,!n J.h! wU~, Nortb, S BORth, 2ru~ 
ed. (lendon, 1853), PP. xxxii-xxxiii. 
28DaTid. Ur-quhal't, ..Da Qu"n .ID.2...l.U Pam!,£ (London, 1857) t Pp. 6-1. 
CHAPTER V 
It. DISHIDIDlTMnlORITY 
David Urqubal"t reI t that the war alread;r in 1854 was one fantastic 
nightmare. The eul,. stages of the oUlpa.ign wi th the slaughters of Alma, 
Balaclava, and Inkerman red this reeling of horror. Yet the war spirit of 
the nation ma.1'Ohed learlessly forward. It was with dreariness and great 
difficulty that he fought against this seemingly indomitable enthusiasm. 
These waves of madness did not extinguish his flame of resistance and criti-
oism. He felt t.hat England VIae cOnmlltting a great national or1mft, this in-
oreased the tenaion in bis mind. He ~~d hin tiano's, Harriet ~orteecue, 
1 therefore dedioated themselves to preaching againgt the war. Volumes of 
~etters were written that J"sar. and !Jrquhart even frequently eommunicatEtd. 
~ith his Turkish friends at Consta.ntinople. 2 In tr'.Iing topubl1sh their 
ideas they found that 1U MOl'I)ing Awn1su and The Mom1ns H!r"d were the 
only newspaper. that would print articles wi th weh a radical fla.vor. 1.t&I 
Timea would not allow their articles in 1 ts columns. 3 ~~lhene .... r he could 
gather a dozen or more workingmen he tried to arouse their interest in 
IMana C. 'Bishop, MR9il' J1S.. ~l' •• u.£9:stlu:t (r..o:1do1'1, 1897 " p. 73. 
~arr1et Angelina Forteacue was the second 4aughter 01 Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ph1ch •• ter Fort.sou. of Dromiak.n, 00. Louth, and sister of Ch1che.ter Sam-
~el Pa.rkinaon FOl"'tefIC:\lt, f1.rst 1;)aron Carlingtord and second ba1'On Clermont. 
2 ~., p.97. 
3.!W. , p. ea. 
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foreign affa1J'a.4 In \b1a way he again undertook tho formation and develop-
ment of h$8 foreign affairs COUlD 1 ttee •• 5 aut Ylnatever the .ean. hi. effort! 
were largel)" di:rectect toward averting further action by English troop. in 
the Mlddle Raat.6 
Urquhart t a 1deu were inten.ely opposed to ounent opinions. 7 'llhe 
rank. of his followera had oontinuous17 g.rown _ller sinoe the thirti.s • 
.A.1"OUnd .M'tq and. June of 1854 on17 a aall number of people adhered to hill 
outaide of a o1rcle of friends. It waa just before his marriage to Mi •• 
Fortell!lOua 1n S.pt_ber that William J. Davidson in wr1 tin« to Francia Man: 
said, "E! ther 81"eat moral oourage 18 required or great attachment to the 
originator of the 'Views held by the tffW. f'I After all, the •• followers bore 
up unaeS' great sOocie1 pressure, or it even might be said that t.hey were per-
secuted. It' it had not been for tbis pressure, Davidson e.tll'1l&ted, rJrquhari 
8 
would have bad. many supporters. On17 a few people, however. were oapable 
of appreciating hi. self-sacrifice, h1e labor, and the hei~t. of' IIOral 
wisdom to whioh he oould attain. As one of theta ea1d, he was "one of the 
moat profound thinkers of 1I04ern time •• ft BeinB "quick at perception, ald11 ... 
tul in the &!'l."ang .. nt of hi. thoughts, ooherent, oonoentrati ve and logioal 
in hia expre •• 101'1," he fervently and en.ergetical17 taught hi. oountl711Utn 
4l!14., p. 13. 
'Gertrude Robinson, Dll1~ UrgMaI£t (Oxford, 1920), p. 120. 
6 Biebop, p. 97. 
7Ib1;d., Jh 113. 
8 lW., PP. 63-84. 
10 
Hia radical Vi ... at first evan prevented his engagement. It was 
probably quite natural that liti •• lorteacne f • t.U.y hesitate" in adrtalng 
her to aarr,r thi8 .... oentric" who oppoaed the opiniorul of almost eve17 u.-
portant pereon in the oount17. :ae tv .. furthemore quite the iccmocla.t 
108t, his tinanoialtuture, uncertain, and. above all he len_ of a .,..terl-
oua world of 880ret agents, letter t-.per1ng, plots, tre.eon, 01"10.17 and 
other sillilar &ottons. Wae this a good. prospective relative in respectable 
English oircles? B. offended her brotheNt and bewildered her aunt Who "&8 
her guardian. Soont however, the family' II resistance b:Nlke down, and they 
were engaged. 10 
Because Mr. U:rq,uhart waa so in"101ved in proraot1ng oppoai tion to the wru: 
he had to travel «Etenslvely. Consequently. ha mId Mi •• Forte8Cue had to 
gl"OW in love and knowledge of each other throu8h correspondenoe. !hi. haa 
b •• n of great value in ua.ssing Ul"Cluhart t • personality. In t.ot, both of 
their oharaotera are oonv., ... with intimate .i.plici~ in thair letter •• ll 
\,ie get the illpreaa10n that he waa not 8. 11M overco.e with a great phobia, 
~U'll .. a he pur,PO •• 1y suppres.ed 1 ts manit.atationa. He toea, however, oorae 
torth .s a man 1ntenseq d.edioated, and one who was affeotionate, underatand .. 
ing, and quite lovable. Yet the~. qualiti •• were ver,r often oonoe.led 
9:aobineon, pp. 139-140. 
10 Bi8hop, p. 66. 
11 :!:e14., P. 65. 
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beneath an impatient and domlneerl~g manner whieh he assum.d to propagate 
12 his dootrines. Througbout the early part of 1854 it appears that Mls. 
Foresteue and Mr. U~hart developed an increasing deaire tor oomplete .oral 
and intellectual identifioation in their patriotio effort to awaken Engliab-
1Il«l to the dangeH that oonfronted thell.13 
lIl.s Forteacue even before she waa engaged to 'M:£o. Urquhart studied his 
wr1 tings and appreiated moat of his ldeas. After the engagement she stud.-
led under his direction wi tb great zeal. 14 When she started to wr1 te tor 
publioation she adopted. the pen name of' nCan taB. ff because the names "lI'ldesfl 
and "Spes" had alreaq been actopted by his associa.tes. l5 tind,ar this name 
sbe wrote many letters tOT tbe press, most of whioh were publisbed in~ 
Vorninbl H.a:t§, and.ll\! .amins AdV't:ti!.:r. l6 
In reorganizing the foreign affaire oomm1 ttees Urquhart began in 58"11-
casUe with a 8l1l&l1 oomittee of Ita blaoksmith. a Oa.l"lxtl'.l'ter and a blind 
beggar. " Out of' these bumble beginnings committe •• spl'Outed up allover 
England 11ke new grass atter a spring rain. From some ot the 41Sou.81on8 
cu •• ion guide for the oo.-itt.e.. Urqubart devoted almost the whole Tear 
to their organ1utlon. For the Most part the,. were tONed ot workingmen, 
12Ibicl.t p. 95. 
13lbi!. t P. 114. 
l~., p. 112. 
l~lBlsboP. P. 75. 
1611188 1I'orteecue to David Urquhart, A.ugust 12, 1854, ~ •• p. 112. 
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~ometime8 merchants and shopkeepers joined and worked side by aide with 
fthem. In each town he gathered a small nucleus of men whom he attraoted by 
appealing to their passionst interest, or curiosity. Then they settled down 
to otud¥ Va.tel, or his own or Anstey's pamphlets on English government, the 
{ear Eut, or even Russia. Along with these they would study the Blue Books 
and p&rl1amentar,y doouments rela.tin~ to recent h18tory.17 The goala with 
~hioh Urquhart inapired the groups ware the reatoration ot the Eng11ab con-
~titution with legal sovern.ent and justice, and r.eatab11~nt ot publio 
~~ among nationa. Oradnal17 he convinoed the •• workins-en that the evila 
th$f BUffered were not going to ba remedied by the franohise, the Rerer. 
~111t and the repeal ot the Corn Law., but only by the restoration of all 
18 law and justice. In a aen.a he substituted his own panacea for othera, aa 
did Ruskin in his socialistic retoms and erten.ion of' education and Carlyle 
with great and heroiC deeds and the leadership of strong men. 
On 'larch 30 a meeting was held in tll.e Muaic Hall on Store Street which 
~e1ped set the pattern of Inquir;r for t.he committees into the conduot of' the 
roreign office, and of the .ending of petitions to Parliament to .et up a 
oommi tte. of inquiry to read and puhllah all papers of th.e foreign offiee, 
and to 1J't1spend all of' its actions till a report was given. A sma.ll deputa-
tlon includ.ing Messrs. N"loholtq, Conlngham, Wilson, Collet, al1d;~11k8 even 
filet with Lord Clarendon telling h.im of the views expressed and oonolusions 
drawn at this ••• ting. TheT were quite ai.l1ar to Urquhart'. conoerning 
17Ro01n80n, PP. 124-125. 
18 l.2.,ij., p. 141. 
1) 
~ngli.h dipl0l'lla07 M4 the progreSS of the CrilllN.tl War. Of oour •• , Clarendon 
was stupefied, an4 is report.4 to hava ..td, PI hesitate to rec.iv. at all 
r.eolutions 80 otflnei.e to the Goy.rna.ntt both in matter and .annal', 80 
offensiftq reflecting "en on the horle.V and SOod .en •• of' the OOy.r,.... 
"19 A_~ 1 Iment. AflU ho d801ined to 8XP ain theae mattere to the deputation aqing 
that be had repeate4ly given such explanation. in Parliament where the Dr! .... 
ish people e.xp-GC"occl to reoei YG them. 20 
From the published resolutions of anoth.r publio meeting 1n St. MfJ.l"ooo 
sion. and oonclusion.. The English nation, most of' them believed, had 
allowed the Oabinet to gain too I!Ift¥)h power whioh l"f.uld.ered ! t irr.sponaible, 
arb! tra17, and despotio. ilot only did tbi. affect such great conoerns as 
the .pire, but also trade and employment, the prioe of food, the auPPl1 of 
ho •• and foreign markets, taxation for deten.e, and the oonduct of war. Th~ 
did no'" feel that the nation was being protected. by the intecri t7 of ParIi .. 
ment aga.1nst the treaohe17 ot the IJOYe1'n1l.ent. The onq workable 801ut10n 
the)" ..... was to &Walten the na.tion to the danger whioh threatened to ove1'-
talte 1t.21 
As the WaDltb. of the lJlJfAIaer a-.v. abeorbea. the dapo... of the 'Inglish 
eountr;yaide l1rquhart intensified his laboH. On June 12 he was urged by 
hie friends to run for Parl i_ent from Lond.on. H. was allowed t..o use the 
19'8. Tueker, 2m!!,.,', PS!li~1etl FlY-Shltle (I/ondont 1855), p. xiv. 
20 ~., pp. xii-xi Y. 
21Ib1d• t p. xv. 
Guildhall tor the all, at which the tlqOl" of Loncllon told hi. there were 
thr •• thousand preeent.Al thouBh this and otber meetings must have been 
14 
22 quite a suocesa, he tid. not win the election. Such defeats were not n&11l, 
Ibut oertain17 hie lndo1ai ta.ble hopefulness had to seize all available sup-
~rt. \(rqbe he depended too muoh on enoouraging voices, but with the 41 ... 
appointments and the resultant feeling that he was fighting the caml)aign 
singlehandedly he relied upon, and sometim"s demanded, the full oonfidence 
of hie friends. 23 Miss ?orteacue oertainq WS8 a eouroe of strength, and 
Ihis frequent letters to her reflect his ~o;r at her oonfidenoe in him. By 
August he appeared exhaustedt 
It baa been the harde.t work I bave eYer had, a.nd I teel it, this 
18 the close of three daJ'1I of la.~suor, whioh bas perhaps inte1'-
o.pted a brnkdown. I II&Wtlaae (atte1'W'arda the Earl of Jfqo. 
V108ro.1 of India) to-night, and he told .e that he had co." to be 
intoNd.. He is acing to Ireland t()040n'C)W eVelina, and has not 
time to oome in the lDOrning, but he haa been reading in the JIorn-
i1'1« A4vertiaer. Q. Baail ton oonpatulated .". I spoke to hill 
l1ke Jeremlah, and he turned. pal.. Xlapier I have not epoken to. 
Oolonel Ta.ylor (_ember for Oount1 Dublin and OonaerYatift Whip) 
Wae here Sa.turdlq, and has proI8ieed, aft"r eQlanatlon, to Wl"i te 
to J. Butler (Lord J .... Butl8l!'t .on ot tbe :Marquis of 01'Ut01'14., 
and a broth.~.of Lady Clermont) to help about the Dublin meeting 
it req:uir(ld. Z4 
rSeverthel ••• , throughout the _er he oontinuou.ly wrote letters that ",e".. 
published in the MRmtu Ad'!,N'ti'll and !owinS i~m:al4, and even talked wi tb 
th e eM tors. 25 
22UrqUha:rt to Fortescue, J'u~"! 12, 1854, 'Bishop, p. 91. 
:nr 
",bid., Pp. 91-92. 
24Urtluha.rt to Fort.acue. August 1), 1854, .!W •• PP. 115-116. 
,25,!W.., PI'. 115-117. 
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What must hay. increa •• d the tension of his life that ~er were bis 
~8piclona that someone was attempting to peiacn him and that his correa-
ponthm.oe ftS being watched. He wrote to ~iet'J ?ortet'JCue about thhl, her 
26 friends thought 'that 1t all was quite illusive and. mysterious. Being 
F-tuite e~r to diapel these doubts he produoed su.ffloient evidence durinA' 
~uly to convince them that be wam not he:ving bAllu~ina:tions. Even her 
bl'Othem then thOUght that "there was evidenoe for a Court of Justioe" in 
!hi. tawr. 27 
Same of the po.tal clerke who opened O':rquhart's mail to14 hi. a.bout it. 
Thi. was no surpri.e to h1m, becau.e investigation. of his matl ",ere not nn 
He olaime4 that it wu done .e tar back as 18)6 and p8l"iodioally the-eaft.,. 
•• ,801&117 in 1848 after be a1:t.,t.,4 to impeach Lord Pal1H1"8ton. That his 
letters had been stopped and opened was known by hundreds ot peraon", or 80 
he olaimed. He wrote to lnttmate friends for their opinions on the matter. 
The tacts trom these l.tter. (_8t of which "'ere written 4urln.r Jul,. of 
1854) were 811_1 ttea to the Manchester CfmlBit tee fIOst probably during June 
ot 1851, and were later publishea in a npplement of ..'!lI P1R1S!!Mtio !lwa 
enti tled, "an the Opening of' tetteH by the Ooverrmtent. ,,28 '1'b~ apparently 
bear out hie mapicions. Som. peepl •• of oourse, :felt that he was putting 
26llWl• , PP. 99-100. 
27~., p. 111. 
28D,»lnISi2 ReyJ11" XV (Deeember, 1867), supplement. On the last pagt 
of this supplement are listed additional publications of Urquhart, Tucker. 
lJ:u PrU' auppltlMnt., oo_i ttee reports, and wri tinge of William Ca.rgill, 
R. Montieth, H. B. Pariah, and G. Stapleton. 
itorward thea. aceulllationa talsely to l1lake himself appear important. Some 
Moused him of monOlDanla. 'But in his evidenoe i t c&~e 01.1t that clerk. w.r. 
dally opening hie lettera, and thoae ot other men 1'1180. Under Lord Litch-
field's administration of the Post Office i1rquhar+"s letters ceased to be 
opened. Lord Litohfield had found noth1n~ against him and this was subs .. 
quently- aade known to Urquha!'t. Howe.".]!', the chief clerk under the next 
administration mentioned to h~ the number of hie letters that he had him-
selt opened. In 1857 while visiting the Houae of Common. Mr. OtwaJ tela 1118 
that he had heard that the letter. ot the Turkish Aaeooiation were openea 
and h. and the chairman of a Bouse Co_itt.e b.gged Urquhart to 1'repue a 
c .... tor the Commons. Ul'Cluhart 4_11nea to 40 80 at that tinle, becauee he 
telt that he 414 110t WL'1t 'to ga't mixed up in the matter, ana becau.e hi. 
lette" were not then being 01'.84. 29 
DaY1cl Urquhart'. m&l"riage to Mi •• "ort .. 118 took place on Sept_bar 5. 
1854.30 The hon~n oenaiated of a ffllfl da.ve at Lord. Clermont'. plaoe in 
Ravensdale Parlt. and a shert toUl:" 11'1 the JUgblanda.31 
At the inat1.tlon of Isaac lrons:1de, an impo:rtant Sheffield 1,,411.tri-
aliet. the mqor of Sheffield convened. a public meetinl." on Sept_bel' 25 
whioh beeame the first real17 big Urquhart1 te demonstration. Austrian 
troops had just ocoupied the Province. without a declaration of war in the 
estimation of thoae present at the meeting. Ironside stated that no hope 
29 :.!liLid:. , PI>' 1-1. 
30 Btahop, p. 118. 
31 Ib1c\., p. 120. 
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oould be expected, 11'OIa Au.tria as an ally 1n View of its ba.d record and the 
fact that the empi" wa. obliging Om'll' Pasha. to BUl'T€mder Hungarian refugees 
of' 1848 to HapeburfJ justice. I t, was obviou.s that Ironside was just aa "Vig-
orous a speaker ae Urquhart, for he declared that such demands by the Hape-
burp made his blood boil and hiu hair stand on end. The crowd cheerea., aa 
it wet have clone numerou. till... Ironside then alluded acousingly to Sr. 
Charl •• Napier'. capture of Jemer.and, and asked w~ he had not proceeded to 
capture Riga. Bomu8Md, after all, was nothing more than a "barrera anel 
abandoned tortna •• II Obvioue17, the •••• eUnp were not subdued aftaire. 
The .. aUng .-Yen ItOved to petition the Queen to eupport their position. ~ 
Yo_ift,. ~Iwjt a TO!7 newspaper, looked with ROh favel!' on this ... tirtg 
that it oalled on other towns to tollow Sheffield •• exaaple.32 
Then in October the two Urquhart. began worldng in the other manutao-
turin. centers. 33 'Ph. lI.etings which they held in tewns tbraugheut InfJ1an4 
that aut~ were attended by between tittJ to sixteen hundred people.34 BV 
Noyaber or December he had •• tabliab.' a tore1,ttn affairs COnllit"" 1n ~ 
tical17 all the chief t-c:nrns. Some of the ohairmen elected by the worldn~ 
ebowed esceptional acuten ••• and readine.s to examine and to dispute nation-
al and international topi08 w1 tb "r. Ul'Q.uha!"t. 35 lie had alw1q8 el1Coura.ged 
32W. H. (I. Al"Q'ta.ge. nSh.ttiel' aD.4 the Crimean. Wa!", Politice and In-
du.try, 1852-67. If !!il!tga 1'.2411' III (London, 1955), p. 476. 
3la18hOP, p. 120. 
34Robinaon, p. 125. 
35Il18hoPt p. 120. 
questions as the best Ih&IlS to arouse attention and to oonfound hiB antago-
nist8. 36 About thi. U.me he seleoted sixty of these exceptional men to 
undergo a three montha' special oourse ot study 11'1 Manohester. They were 
diVided 1nto 8ect1ons each of which was directed by a. person who had alrea4 
worked with tlrquhal't. Their da..Y lasted tro. nine in the IlOrn1ng to late at 
night with on17 ttlae out tor meals. Th .... heard lecture. on the law of n .... 
tions and the aonati\ut1on of England. Then they would stud3' parts of these 
sub3eota, BUoh as the t:reat7 of Ka..Y, 1852, tile Chine •• and .,ipan wars, 
lD&1'i ti.l8. law, the o .. a:roi&1 treat7 with Turkey, England'. oom 8U.pply, the 
HolT Allianoe. and Poland. Urquhart said of the .... n that th.,- .ere 
ngl"ave. cUllgent, enthusiastio, and a aigllt worth ••• ina'. It (It .at bs J:'GMo 
m_bered. that th18 took place in En,lan4 at a ti .. when the majority of the 
people and •• pecialll' the industrial labonna 01aU8S waN not evem ,.t'1116 
the barest essentials of an education.) At the end of this three month 
period, amaeti.e early 1n 1855. a public meeting was held to which prominent 
stateamen, 1&\"1'1'81"8, and ecole.ill-stics were inv1 ted. Some ot them were to 
judge the performanoe of theee men. All of the students were questioned on. 
by one. The best of the sixty were ohosen to torm a deputation to l~dbn to 
d1aoU8. with the members of both house. of Parliament the trea.ty of nenaark 
and the rigb t of 8Rl'Ch. 37 
ao.. of the .... men who had he1pea Urquhart 1n 1839 to organise the 
foreign attaira oODai ttHS from the ranks of the Chartiets helped in the 
36..!!&!., pp .. lao, 133-135. 
37RoblnBOn, liP. 125-126. 
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foraatlon of the •• new oommittees. Some ot the •• men were Ross of Bladen .. 
burg, Monteith of Carstairs,and Charle. Attwood. Others who later joined 
the organisers were lla30r Poore, Major Relland, Frances Marx, and Charles 
Dobaon Collet, who was well known as the 88Cretar,y for "The Association for 
the R.peal of' the 'l'az on N .... papors and the Exc1 •• on Paper." B1' 11.11' helll 
and that of other .,.pa.thizera in various town. 145 oouaitt.es were tol'lUd 
throughout Eng-lana in the next a.ve1'&1 7.a.ra.38 
Urquhart a.n4 his wite had. little rest that autwan. She tollow.a. hill 
wherever he went, and plqed an illpCrtant role by aoothing over eo •• 01' the 
inevitable personalit7ol&8h ••• 39 She also bad to look up quotationa, k.ep 
up a voluminous and lJOUIetilles pub11shed. correspondenoe, and anner the ob-
jections of thon not oonvinoed by her husband'. argumcmta. She certainly-
must have imbibed his w~ of thinking tor ahe al80 oorrected the fal •• ar~ 
menta and illogioal conolusions of their allle.. It i. in the reporta of 
the oo.-itte. me.tinge whioh the~ attended that are found part of the record 
ot hia extenat ve knowledge, hi. readine.a to enter into a disoua.ion of an.v 
topio, hia atartling paradoxe., and his skillful appeal to the iatellect and 
consci.noe ot his liateners. At a meeting 1n Newcas%le on November 21 the 
dieousaion revolved around international oommel'Ce about which h. was able tt:: 
produce an astounding an.., of faot8 and figure •• 40 At another ••• ting on 
NOV_bel' 30 the sub3eot was the conan tu t1cm, and. how the law waa d.signed 
38~., pp. 135-136. 
19fb14 •• p. 120. 
4Oll!! PillS, Nov. 10, 1855, p. 2. 
to control the acta of the government. 41 Both were quite extraordinary 
tIIeetinga and the evidence that he suomi tted at them was later incorporated 
into a oombined paphlet with sections respectively entitled, "L1mit.ation of 
the Supply of (]rain'· and "Conett tution&1 R ... d1ea. n 
1I&n7 of Urquhart' a predictions concerning the war were aleo published 
during A.pril of 1854 in lESt !xJm~!.in.lA!.!AI.:\, a pamphlet which wae a 
collection of lettef>ll that 1n effect toreteld lIOIte 0'£ the eventa wh10h 0c-
curred du.ring the war.42 In London that "ear were aI_ publiahea lhI.!K 
.!2l. IenAmo, d. C9&lu,~on and The Oecu;mU2tl!Jl...ilI Om',. The Duke of 
Cambridge was one of those persons whom Urquhart had warned of the danger 
that lurked in the Crimea. The 'Duke was report.ate have been qui te dis-
turbed when he !!m.VI thoee predioUoruJ realized dttrin.g the expedi tioD. 43 
The last ~ of 1854 i8 illustrative of the extensive oorrespondenee 
\'Ihieh the Urqu...\arts conducted during that and the following year. On that 
dq twenty-one private letters, f'i.ve lette", for t.he press, and twentJ"'"nine 
newspapers and parcels were mailed. Such a daJ W&8 probably exceptional. 
but the usual c.t.q's outgoing Ila1l al",,,,. had from. eight to 'twelve l.tters. 
And they were not on17 .. dAre ••• 4 to friends, but alao to 1"01'&1 ty, £Overoo-
fDent miniaten, politicians. editor., OOll'llOn operatives, and wo.en of all 
age- anA rank.44 One of the letter. mailed that last ~ of December was 
I U lJ 
41B18hOP, pp. 120-122. 
4! E. Tucker, p. vi. 
41~b·.. {lrq'Uart to Miss Curti.s, January 9, 1855, Bishop, p. 124. 
44..!!?Jj. 
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addressed to the SultM warning him of the dangers that were involved in hi. 
continued friendShip with the allie •• 45 
With the roar of the terrible winter wind. and the freezing cold the 
aoldie1"8 and. hora •• wf'f.red and died 1n the Crimea for lack of flUpp11e •• 
The report. of the _18.17 touched man:;y Engli8h heartel they certainly 
stirred the Urquhart. to greater exertions in their ml11 tant campaign 
agains the oonduct of the war. Literally volume. of letters and article. 
were WTl 'lten, and through the continuous reception of foreign and domestic 
newspapers46 the,. tDuet have been two of t,be best-informed :p8 ... ple in England. 
Mr. t1rq,uhart' 8 unrel.ntin~ cr1 tici BIlS a:Tld acousations of oolhudon must haVE 
irritated many important people beyond endurance. nut he also received his 
share of this war of WOMS, for oahmtniee virtually l!\1fI'a.rmed a.bout bis nartle 
p..nd destroyed much of his influence.. The detractors were people of hi~ 
poBition and consequently were ready to believe tha.t Urquhart was actuated 
by Bpi te because of his earlier dismissal from the Foreign Office. Ilaybe. 
some -thought, he was mentall,. deranged. All of this is understandable tor 
he 41d not reed the English pride with the milk and honey of their greatne.a 
H. did the unpopular thing of unsparingly lashing their respectable phrae •• 
and national complaoeno,y.47 
45!I11 Pre", November 10, 1855, p. t. 
46'B1ahop, p. 124. "or insta.nce, on Janua,17 9, 1855 twenty-one letter. 
lWere sent out, two for The R'Wd a.nd.!!l..! Advlrti§lr for the following dqt s 
edition. Two articles were sketohed in preparation for the next ~t. work. 
~ent~f1ve newspapers were mailed. ~ifty newspapers had been ordered, but 
!had not arr:1 ved. 
47.!9JJ., p. 126. 
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Mrs. Urquhartwaa one person who sustained her husband during the •• "r,,-
ing times 0;' her absolute trust in and l07alt1' to his ideas. Her confidenoe 
in the cOl'rectn." of her husba.nd t S poei tic%). was not without support. H. 
was becoming increas1ng17 suocessful among the workingmen to Wh10h his 8\10-
aesaiul oommitt ••• and the large attendanoe at publio me.tings attest. or a 
epeech which h. 1164. at Newoutle on June 8, 1855, a friend reported to her 
that "the Whole bod;y of workingmen were breathless for thre. hours and un.-
derstood every point, jumping down from seats and benches at the end to 
forowd round the tnan they tel t 'WaS the only one to save and rule them. ,,48 
~o8suth, however, claimed that not even Mr. Urquhart could olaim to be more 
sinoerely and resolutely hostile to the ambitions of Russia than he was. H@ 
~.lt that he could say to the 'Englieh people, ItUp, and on, in agitation. 
~ear Mr. Urquhart, profit by his knowledp, learn from him facts, he can 
teach you INch, and you can learn much. fJ.'Om hill, but giTe not your judgraent 
~nto his hands." Mazzini thought quite .. bit le.s of Urquhart. In a lett.r 
",ritten durinc Sept_ber, 1855 to the Sheffield Committee on Foreign Affaire 
~e statea tllat he alwqa thought it un~uat, unwise, and unatateau.nlike of 
~. Urquhart to oppose the rising of nationallti.s in the hope of finding a 
p •• ful ally in the Austrian impire aca1nst Rue.la. 49 
Meanwhile during that winter Ieaao 11'Onai4e had kept in touoh With J. A 
~.buOk who was the lU.ber 11'1 Pa,rli_ent for Sheffield. The viewe ot hie 
ponetltuenta oertainly affected his actions, and with all the meetinge and 
48lR!J., pp. 126-127. 
49rtse Press, December 29. 1855. 
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oommitte.s and the resulting olamor he dec14ed on Januar,y 26, 1855 to place 
a motion before the Hou •• of CotmJlOns lito inquire into the condition of the 
~ before Sevaatopel and the oonduot of those department. of the severn-
!Dent no.e dut,. it haa been to minister to the wants of that arroy." This 
vote of oensure on the government passed in an uproar with a majority of 
157. Lord Aberde.n' 8 govemmeTit fell because of this inqui17' and Lord 
PalmBrston became Prime Minister. 50 A vast mass of evidence concerning the 
oonduct of the war was oollected frotl eye-witnesses, ranging from the Duke 
of Newcastle downwards. The oauses of' the oonfusion, the lack of supplies, 
and the general mismanagement of the war were, however, diff'toul t to dis-
o over. Of this inabili ty to get at the root of things Roebuok Said, I felt 
oorruption round about me, but I oould not lay my hand upon it."Sl tirs. 
Urquhart in anal1z1ng the government report of this investigation in .!t1I 
StO£[ JIt. .Jii!.!:B thought that almost every answer was evaai ve, ulbisuoue, 
or oontradiotor,y. She saw that the oommitte. found it impossible to extrao i 
a a1ngle 4irect answer aa to what was the 80urce of the Crlmean 8.xpedit1on. 
In exuperatlon ahe atated that "we oannot even get the t opinions' of poli 1'1" 
10al author! t1e., re.pecting the 'opinion' of the mill tary authori t1e., Il"01I 
the verr head of the Go'Yernaent itself, or so lIPJoh a. a statement of their 
own. »52 But no matter how muoh historians pass over the mi_anag_ent of' 
the war &f' oondonable because of prevalent condi tiot'l.s in the al"lflY or part1 
50 A:rm.ytap. p. 447. 
51.1. A. Roebuok, Life ~ tett!r!.st.l2lm..it. Rcebuok (London. 1(91), 
P. 260. 
52Mrs• Urquhart, Thr Stoa Jl!.!b.! \,'/91'" (Landcl'lt 1(57), pp. 51-52. 
polltlc8, tbe oritioi._ of these radioal. W8t be eeen a8 W&l"l'anted, right, 
and Just when we ••• tbe war as 1 t was apparently oonducted. 
lroneid.'e Munioipal Aesooiation, or the Sh.ffield Inquir,y Committee .. 
it called it.elt, waa deeply stirred b7 the revelations of the parliamentar,y 
investigating co .. 1ttee. On Zuly 4 another .aas .eeting wae convened to 
oon81der tb. propriety of petitioning Parliament to discus. another motion 
of Mr. Roebuck. '!'his motion W9.S intended to censure 8ve17 member of the 
cabinet who had advleedthe Crimean expedition which led to the militar.r 
disasters. Armo!lnoed by placa.rds inscrlb.d "?len ot Sheffield be Men, n 
several thousands attended to hear ~~ others that eooentrio oharaoter, 
G. S. Phillips, wbo was better known as ltJ'anuary S.arle, It roard.ef':lance at 
Lord Pelmel"fJton. Available evidence does not suggest Urquhart's presenoe. 53 
During August, Harriet Urquhart, little more than a mcnth betore tbe 
birth of her 8On, joined David. at 13imln.gham. Atter Bil'lllinlJh_ theT attend!-
ed ... tinge at Worc •• ter, B.th, Bristol, Olouo •• ter, and Stroud. Iaoh ••• t-
ing was euooeaef'ul, and in each town theT found a oOllllli tte. f'0-.4 atAd. 
woJking. Stroud., however, proved. to be a greater fJUCoe •• than the others. 
The large hall wu d.n.e17 ol"OWded. Wi th men on the main floor and women in 
the aaller,r. All ..... d e&ger, enthusiastic and excited.. EVen a ~up ot 
Rueselli tes were there who at the beginning aneered and acofted at TJrqu-
hart's statementa about Lord 30hn, but later slipped aw~ with apparent em-
ba.rra.ssment. The cbei man ?/fEU' a wo:rkln~an. The people flocked 1n from the 
neit?:llbcl"ing villages, and it was repol""ted tha.t in every hamlet Mr. Urquhart'a 
also a stronghold of' "Urquhartism, fI as the 01'1 tic. tel"ll.d hi. id.s. But 
h.re, ~r. Cowan, their r.presentative in Parliament, was conalderabl1 influ-
enoed by the.e Urquharti tea al!l must have been the oase elsewhere. 55 
Harriet Urquhart bore David's first son on September 11, 1855 in CastlE 
'Brormdeb neu ~i1'lllingb.amt which presently served as his headquarters. It 
was with the birtb of his son that he really began his family' 11:£'.. U." 
opportunities opened to him in whioh he became a builder rather than a re-
former. He 'fIas resolved to rear "a. man" after his own idea, and to set an 
example for all Englishmen. As the head of a family his enthuBiasa for goo( 
hygiene developed. a.nd he evan made up his mind to teach pjngl1shmen the us. 
of' the Turkish bath. 56 
An increas. b\ the price of brea.d was b'JlOUght about by the Wal" whioh 
brougbt untold hardships to the lower 01a8888. Following other monDter 
meetings a meeting was held in Hyde Park en Sun4qt NOT_bel' .4. to~ the pu.r-
pose "of getting the prioe of brud ~lcutd." A.nother publiO meeting was 
announoed for NOT_bel" 1, without Urquhart's permiasion, although 1t .... 
&'ll'lounoed that he would &4,4"111. it. 57 This meeting and another on the fol-
lOWing night were held in the Town Ball.,8 Chargee were .. de against the 
54Hiahcp, p. 133. 
55~., p.. 127. 
56~., pp. 1)6-137. 
57Fae Pn!., November 10, 1855. p. 4. 
S8~., November 4. 18559 p. 4. 
English !u .. v,- which, ! t was said, had recentl)' captured 8.8 prlZtUI Turkiflh 
vessels leav1nrr the Danube a.nd ":for ought: w. know" ooming to J'1ngland. 'Wb.:r 
instead haCt, not Russian ~tdn-8hipfJ been captured? When fJrquha:rt 1'Ose loud 
chf.'lers greeted him. R. told the meeting that the com1 ttees hAd the whole 
e~tlntl"Y' in an uproar beoalllJ. of the hi"~ prices c,t bread. 59 And t. s. 
Phillips asserted that England had, paid. 17,000,000 in gold to Russia to 
help alit the thTOats ,,1' 3Y1 TJ ish heroes at 'aala.clava and Inkermann. More 
tellitlg' still was his allegation that Palmermton ~ad received lliJ.8siM gold, 
amounting to .. 20,000. 'i'his money was supposedly won around. 1826 from a 
Mr. Hart, who had been working under the orders of Prino.ss de Lieven. 
Palmerston was also &Oentsld of embezzling ~ 353,652-6....od of the Greek loan 
in 1836.60 VJhethel' Phillips got this intola!Lt1on from UrClub.a:rt 18 not oleal 
but the general accusations, not the specU'iC8, !11"'quhart did make againat 
Palmerston. 
On Saturd~ ~ovember 17 an article appeared in the LII4iJ which 
oritlci.zed Urquhart's and the oommittee·s view that England was controlled. 
by :Rtumia.. Its anthor claimed that t.ho major! ty of in telligent. persona, no1 
en.l1' In ghe:ff'leld, but in r;i1'l1li*lgham, WevtCastle, and other northern and Mid-
land towns, ha.d long been aware tMt the st.atements were not true, because 
the promised evidence was never f'orthcomiru;r. S'till, the article read, a 
section of men wi tb vulgar appeti t8 for violenoe and mystery,. met 1n the 
Town Hall. The great crowds at these meetings came not because they b.lieve~ 
59p.re. 'al.. November 10, 1855. p. 4. 
60 Army tage , p. 478. 
the 1deas. but on17 out of' curios1 +,y. "1'. Urquhart '0 views were regarded aa 
the Hhallucinat10na of' a half-wi tted myste17-monl~'er", he wu looked upon as 
an "egregioue e6Ot1l1t", and hill followers were viewed as "the actors of' hie 
eompany.,lI .1l.l.t lHm1nglla Jpurnl11 it was declared, had discredited the 
I'vapid, ravings" of Jl!.t Fr.! £):,!!§.. r:'h.e only 1mportaJ"loe of the sheffield 
agi ta ti on oons1st.d in that there was a sign of pol! tical life amol'lp; the 
~orking 01a88.61 
Even while conatently atta.cking t.he conduct of Lord i'u1.· .:1'\)ton and 
~ingl18b foreign policy as trea.aona.b1e. Urq.uhart found time in 1855 to re-
etU. t hi. e •• a;rs on t_11lar wcrds. ?iatlT of' the. had appea.n4 in liI UoPl'l.inll! 
A. ~. ..er nine years earlier. To the.e a second .er1ea wu add.d and then 
published in a au.ll .."lu •• anti tlecl '.1Its W9~. in 1855.62 B. attacked 
in the .. page. the time-honored En~ish phra.eet and ahowed the real mean1n~ 
()f' worete whioh had been mad. ,-b1guou8 by their varie-d UN itl English apeeob ~ 
This 8ea.. to have been the t1ret attempt to. examine popular belier. dear~ 
h.eld by lIOSt of the people. Be choee hie points of hieto17 quite shrewdly 
tc support his political contentions. but it is quite clear that most of hi. 
readers probably had never heard. of them before. Hi. remarks were beth witt' 
Q.lld paradoxioal, and. ncrt ph ilologic:.tl. 6) 
In a letter to Lord Panmttre on t,he emploY'tent .of Turkish troops by the 
Rnglish government, Urquhart referred to Russian mili ttU")" wri tere, especiall, 
61lxs1 '£11" ~ovember 24, 1855. p. 2. 
62s0me of the •• say. in this collection are entitled I'twar and Peace," 
"Religion and Poll tics, II "Standard; of Value, tt and "Public Opinion." 
6)n18bop, p. 123. 
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Valentine, who thought that the abi11 ty of tbe Turks as sold.1ers could not 
be properly asee •• ed by European standard!.. In fact, soldiers prominent 11'1. 
European wars had failed 11'1. their operations 11'1. Turkey. 'But as usual, he 
reminded Parmrure, the Turkish o~ntinp,ent in the war wa.s rated lowly by F4'lg-
lic offioers. Bowever, it had. to be remembered that this was based lugal; 
on one retreat, a retreat trom an atiTa1'lced untenable position near Balakla;Yl 
where they had nO support and little protection. After all, they retreated 
before twenty thousand Russian troops. This was immediately represented a8 
oowal"dice bY' the lIrtg11sh offioers. Only four thousand remained f'rom the 
fourteen thou8and., an" when th ••• last returned Urquhart toresaw thatth. 
would spread their hatred for the Inglish and soon the Turkish ~ would 
64 beli ... that the Inglish government had. planne4 its d.estruction. 
On Decaaber 22 U~uhart ~ve netice of the third edition of hia book, 
new edition Bi1~lnn!8 believed that although he had tor maw :r_:re ben 
atiB,'lDati!&e4 a RullJeophobe, the pre.ent COU1"M of events, which had ma4e hi .... 
tory of his predictions, could. now also make him juetly proud. 0'1 his nick-
n8mt'- no om., it oontinued, who watohed a.ttentively, oould. ignore the 
aggreesive policy of Russia in the weet, rtorth t L~d south ae the stepping 
atones of her oonquest of Englat'ui t • !astern empire. It was 1:1". Urquhart, 
~ ~612~io stated, who had taken the trouble to oollect the evidenoe of 
Russian ora,!t from the diploma.tic history of the last thirf.y y~ars. Ana 
the readers of 1h! Manch)atet AAv!£t1§2E were reminded that David Urquhart 
wa. one of the moat reaarltable Men in the oountry, who had given his 11fe, 
energ, and talents te> the Ea.stern Question. Most professional poli iiaian. 
ha.d avoided the Ia.tern Question ae nru:ch 8.8 possible. Urquhar't, on the 
other hand, had studied it in the European press, and had ta.lked with almos 
eTe17 1mportan't publio person. He had, heen closely associa.ted with every 
phase and oriela of the question. Re had been in Greece, oonfered Wi th the 
ohief's of the Albanians, been secretary at the embassy a.t Constantinople, 
held o<msul'tailous with William IV, and had koown the leaders of the eireu 
sians in 'the Cauoa.8, who called hi. "Darld Pasha. If \1hether hia opin10ns 
were oo:noeot Or not, he wae the onl¥ in~l1ahman who h&4 the detail. of the 
Eaat.,:m Qu .. tion on hi. finpr tipa. And .. at likel,. the future, the autha 
thousht, would diacover that Urquhart's dr_d of Rusei. and admiration of 
Turkey were more 801idly founded on taet than had been In«land's toleration 
ot Ru_ian aggrandie_ent and her cont_pt for th .• character of the Turks. ~ 
In late 1853 or early 1854 a Mr. Tucker began publishing some small 
66 paI'Iphlets known as Tacker', PiU t15UWr Ek=:!Q"t,. Being di agueted, wi t.h 
the unreasoned support many people gave to the ac tiona of Lord Pa.lMraton 
and noticing an article by Dr. Karl Man reprinted from fhe1!.a...!2.rk Tri'bull~ 
in 1U GlUG- SCtin.l, h.e reprinted it as the pamphlet p&WtatsHl..l:IVl 
!Hs~1.67 He relt that it appropriately expressed his own views. Shortly 
aft€'lr'llarda he met lIarx, who wpplled !lore material whioh formed the second 
65ll!! ?tIl" nec~b.r 22, 1855, P. 2. 
66Th• bound oollection i. entitled ~.£t! Pol&11ItlF&z:§iII$f, but 
the paaphlsta w.re read and known under their own titl ••• 
67 ... Carr, p. 124. 
pamphlet, PlJaea:¥2Dt ..!aI! Hes .ful ~. At that time Tucker wu a1eo a.o-
qu.a1nted wi th Urquhart, beinR employed to reprint Urquhart's P:£'£!(its,ut,.£t 
!Mea. Tucker thought that Urquhart better understood oontemporary eventsf 
80 he continued to reprint se1ectio1'1s of his letters, whiohwere appearing 
d&i17 in the pre... With this material he oontinued his f'17-sheets. .::.;R~~ 
&vIS" J.J3 J.U. !H.1 was the first reprint in putph1et t01"lll of hie letters 
printed in 1U !!o:znaVC MutUalr during 1853, and it Wae published in Ap 
1854. It incluAea Ul'lluhart'a letter to the Clmas.ian., and a aeleetion of' 
reaolu'tclons of publio lDeetings whioh weft specimen. of what wu di.cu •• et 1 
.. e tlf'V or sixty meetings throughout England_ Tuoker also print.4li1 
poasib17 even helped compose it. Other publioations bv Tuoker of nrquhart t 
i deu were Egdend' , llu:! .1!! ,:I'm"' I !Ill, 1b.Il!.u to r l'M!.iA, No t .JOiIu!t 
~&I\UI.' 1h.! SE~4Ir.lD!.lb.! FIX' 1llt W9mS Jl! »'lm'J'!~qn,69 !sul, N'l?91!OG, 
C1fOl'!~IU lU Inn!!o):! !4. ~ CD!!'" ti'rg:uhart f'Qr Prai.r, and T 
By l85;pamphlete became one of the prinCipal 
eana that Urquhart ~ployed to pleae his protests on record, and bring his 
knowledge within the reach ot ever.yone. 70 
68E• Tucker, Au0ttr', Pg~atlcil Flx:ShJ,t! (London. 1855), pp. v1i-1x. 
eN Pon80nb7 we. the bl"Oth'Jll-in-law of Lord Or.y and the ambassador of the 
'Retom and VtlUg governm.nt at Bl"tuisela, Napl .. , Constantinople, and Vienna. 
69Ra.rri.t Urquhart i8 the auther of lh! WOr4!!..st Lord Palalatop-
10en pagea f1 ve and 81x o~ 'fhl ST4"~ _ JhJ l).l) Urquhart aa1d iha t 
n acme of the l.tt.rs h. had written at the end of S.ptaab.r of 1854 h. had 
8en eoourat. in hi. prediotion ot event.. After he had wr1 tten the lett.rs 
the jeul"'r.ale th .. t w.r. accustOlHd to publiahing th_ would not longer de 80, 
d h. was forc.d to publish them in hlet torm. 
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A~ter the war an artiole in 1h! ~n9h"tlr 0Yl1'd119 expressed interest 
and praise of the efforts that were made to inspire the middle 01a80es to 
take a.n aotive interest in foreif!1l affairs. The a.uthor regretted that this 
enthusiasm wa.s involved with l)avid Urquhart· a '\dId fanCies a.nd personal 
resentments,," In order that. the movement should have any lasting suooess, 
these organizations had to free themselves from the ta.int of their associ-
ation wi ih Urquhart and pursue lines of independent inquiry with the help 0 
tried, true, and respected representatives of their oause. Eighteen fit~ 
six had not found lIany of the.e organizations pursuing truth and working 
out their own oonclusion., but acting blindly in the s8rv10e of foregone 
oonolusions imposed upon th_ from a person WhOUl moat signifioant per80ne 
had judged 8,8 18&1evolent 01" insane. None of the ideas and notions that 
these organizations entertained would (La;'!'? a.risen independ.~mtl7 in the 
minds of the members. Only a "mcunteha..'1ktl like Da.vid. Urquhart oould have 
inspired them to conoeive of treason in the cabinet and collusion in the 
war, of a paralYB~d Parliament, of a oor~lp~ed press. and of a vast con-
spiracy to hand ~lrope over to t.he Czars. 71 
tARL MARX, DAVID URQUARDT AND 
It .e.a il'loongl'tloua at first aight tha.t two lIlen a.s different 0.8 Iarl 
Marx and David Urquardt should have had any ground for oOllllllon thought or 
action. Sinoe the points of oontrast were raore numerous than the points of' 
a.greement, 1 t 18 paradoxical that )fan should have even temporarily a.nd in a 
11mt ted. field sought the inspiration and guidance of Urquhart. l "Seth de-
tested Pa1merston and the English bourgeoisie. That a na:ti-ve Englishman 
would acouse an English statesman of venality and treason gave Tlarx great 
sa.tisfaction. 2 Both detested Russia. ~lan in a.pparent 8.y"(l'fUHllent with Urqu-
ha.rt thought tha.t ~18li1iats traditional policy of aggression had to be op-
posed, and she definitely had to be kept out of ~~key.3 But on the other 
hand he differed with Urquhart a.s to the state of Turkey. To UrqUhart Tur-
key wou1d.have been able to resist Rusaia if she had only been left alone, 
but Marx thought that the Ottoman Empire had to be reconstructed and the 
lMarx wu not the on17 aerman of importance who acknowledged hie in-
debtedn ••• to Urquhart. Lothair Bucher, a friend ot La8alle and Biemarok, 
thought highl7 of Urquhart and profited by Urquhart'. knowledge of Diplo-
macy. Gertrude Robinson, Dalid U£9Shl£l (Oxford, 1920), pp. 130-133. 
2Fbard II. Carr, !W!la (Loudon, 1934), p. 122. 
3]Jm..!m Tribune, June, July, August, 1853; Karl 'Marx. EI!~Jm..9a1u­
:.u.s.n, a4. 'Eleanor 1Ia:rx Aveling' (Londolt, 1897), pp. 31-91. 
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ernmente were a.lmost as reactionary as Russia and. certa.inly were too impo-
tent and timid to bring into existence a Greek empire or federal republic of 
Slavonic atates.4 
Marx like Urquhart thought that the objects of Ruasia t a foreign po1107 
and her lIanner of pUrS1lfl.t1Ce could be determined from the _pl. teatimol"ll' 
recorded in the page. of history. In relation to the Eastern Question Marx 
felt that there wae uno traneaotioll, no otfiolal note, whioh doe. not bear 
the stamp of quotation from known pages of h1atol"1_"5 H. traced Russian 
polioy back to that of Peter the Great and thought that the undeniable suo-
oese of thia announced and hereditary policy proved tbe weakness of the 
Western powers and Bussin's inherent barbariem.6 As the basic motive for 
Russian expansion southwa.rd he saw bel" economio ann milita.ry need for access 
to the Mediterranean. Therefore the Ozarta pcli.oy toward Turkey was one of 
separating .tone a.fter Mother, the r«notest members of the Ottoman FADpire 
from its main body, till a.t last Constantinople the heart, must cease to 
beat. n But in the years just prior to 1853 these Russian des:1l~s were en-
dangered by the appa.rent 1mprovenlent of Turkish government. So the Czar 
ttcounti.ns on tbe cowardioe and apprehensions of the lIeatern Powers, . .. . 
bulB .•• 'Europe, and pushes hi.s demands as far as possible, in order to ap. 
pear magnanimous afterwa.rds, by contenting himeelf with what he immediat.ll' 
4.!a liD TJiitm" August 5, 1853; Man, pp. 71-75. 
5.!a'!.kti Tnkl.me, August 14,1853, Marx, p. 78. 
tS August 12,1853, Mars, 80. !!!: !.2m. Trtbun" p. 
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wanted."? 
In the 8pr1n« of lS53 Charl •• Dana, the foreign .dl tor of' 1kI !J,w.!sa 
'l'r.ilmn.e, asked Karl Man to wri te DOme article. on the Eutern ~ •• t1on. 
!Man oonf •••• ct to En«els that h. k!'lew little about the problem. 8ince it ..... 
essentially geographical and militar.r. At this t1me he did not think that 
the }!;aatern Qu.stion would ever be the starting point of' a Eluropean war, an 
idea, that he aeon 'Would oha"88. But would not Engels help him produce 
Mcr";ber article for..Th.t '?nlU!1l" En~ls apparently had aleo been concerned 
about the prob1 ... in the 11.ar East, and having r ... d seme of' Urquhart '. 
IWri tinge, hinted that Marx do 11kewise. In studying the voluminous wri tinga 
Iof UrqUhart, J4arx 11001'1 realized that far more could be l1&de of the Eastern 
8 Qne.tion than h. had first perceiTed. Mean.hile Engels, who had reoent17 
perfected his knowledge of Slavl0 language and m11itary sOience,9 prepared 
five article. for Marx, in whioh he reviewed the antecedents of the que .. 
10 tion. Att.pt1ng to be non-oot'llllitta.l Engels oriticized.nua Till.. for 
1Jt1pportin« Ru •• ia. and !hi. big: .!III for • .!pporting Turkey. 11 Marx though t 
that th.y were quite excellent a.nd fo:rwarded the. to .Dl! Tt.i:2nn' .s his 
own. 
12 
7,!!e lm TtikllR'. Augu.t 5, 1853, Man, p. 74. 
8Carr• PP. 120-121. 
9En~ls to Weydeseyer, April 12, 1953, Karl Marx and Friederioh Engels, 
~ !ID.AWl Jl'ri,dtEi0l} Ena".sm 'BJ:ilAin (Me.cow, 1953). 
lOearr, P. 121. 
11la!ui T£illume, April 19, 1853, Van, p. 24. 
12C&1'r,p. 121. Acoording to p. W. 'B1ackstook and !. F. goselitz, the , 
editors of ..!h.t RYI.ito -eniSle i2 Eumll', Marx'. first artiole was published 
" 
From lune, 1853 onwards Marx began to write the articles on tbe Eastern 
Question himself. Throughout the summer '.I'urke;y and Russia f,u-.emed to be in-
en tably atub11ng toward. war. ':'he influence of Urquhart became increasing-
ly' ."pparent a.s Marx sent article after art.iole to The 'h'illlU. 13 He lashed 
cut a.gainst %, 'filii' oowardly advoc8Cy of El'lgland beoo.'1ling a defensive 
ally of Turkey, but let not a belligerent ae'8.inet Russia. He thought 'l.hs-\; 
this was a "tortuous and oowardly qat.sm tt of .!Ja Till!h and nothing l.ss 
tha...'1 nan incredible oombination of all ~e contradictions, wbterfuges, 
fa.lse pretenses, an:deties and 1~"'"'. of Lord Aberdeen t 8 polieT. ,.14 And 
Aberdeents policy was nothing les8 than one of oonnivance, and it was this 
policy that allowed Ru.sia to be 80 bold. IS 
More than once Marx mentioned Urquhart's ruute resP*'U'ully. Re praiseA 
;Jrguhart t. role in lambasting the reputation of Lo,d Palm.raton and ~ 
dieted that Urquhart'. opinion would be confi~.d in the future. But he nevtr 
said that he perf.,tl;y agreed wi th Ul"qUhart f s poet tion on E~gle.nd, nu •• ia 
or the Eastern Question. 16 In faot. in response to a cholera. soare whioh 
in..!AI Ttf.1Wn. on April 7, 1853. The author, howeyer, was not Marx but 
r;"tgel.. ikew1.e, with the arUcle of April 19 ot whioh the editors state 
Man ridiouled Urquhart·. position on Ttlrke,-•• e Must oonclude that s1nce 
~ngel. was the author that it Was 8.,Sen:tia.l17 he who ridiculed rirquhart 'a 
views. Also after the middle of 1853~ Tt1iYnI took the liberty of tAking 
seotions ot Marx's artic1.s and printinf, them anonymously as leaders with 
or w1 thout his permission (Can, P. 130). :Sluk.took and BOsel! tz were 
apparently unaware of this. 
1)Cal"1", p. 12). 
14.!a lW Tl:1ltUSh Ju17 8, 18S), ~rx. pp. 44-45. 
15Na .l.9J:l InlmD •• July 1, 1853, Marx, pp. 40-47. 
16m .lui T.111UU. J'anu&17 10, 1854 f Marx, p. 21). 
brought about the E:pld.arll1o Di eease Act, lfa.ft atated that "1~ I ahared the 
opinions of Mr. Urquhart I ahould It...,. that the Ozar had d •• patched. the 
cholera IlOrbue to England wi th the 'Seer-et mission' to break do'ml the last 
l"tIflln&nt ot what is oalled the Anglo-Saxon spirit. ,.17 And h. oriticized 
Urquhart' 8 atatement that the penal lawa of Rngland had to be aer<d,..ed 80 
that the Engliah traitors (Abel'tieen, Cla.rend.on, Pa1merston, and RuBsell) 
could be prosecuted aft flgood for nothing. ft For who would jud?:1'8 theae Eng-
111th atatEu.en, but "the stockjobberatt and tlpeao .... mongering bourgeoisie, It 
those "intamoue adorers of the .,14.n oalf," .hOll they repre.ented, and Who 
$lao were surrendering Europe to Russia. lS 
!hat autumn Mal'S co.pc.ed hi. &rt101 •• on the oareer ot Lord. Palraeratoll 
whloh were later printea by Tuoter.19 ThaT appeared, at tlret. both in !ht 
Tribune and in 1b.! Pnpl,',1 Pan" and were almoat _.lusiT.J.:v d.rtTe4 frotll 
U"luhart '.. pamphl.,.. In w1"i t1ng to Engel s en Nov_bel' 2. 1853 we tin4 
KarK tellin« h1a that after tollowing the Qareel' of PalMeraton through 
tWhty' 78&1'8 he had 00.. to the ... conclusion a. that "lIlO110maniac Urqu-
hart" that Palmersten had been 801d to iufJfJia tor .everal decad ••• 20 tater, 
h •• act. the 41800.81"1 that the word "honour" 41d not enst in the Rue.ian 
17l!a.!.m TrtbldtUb October 7, 1853, Marx, P. 140 •. 
l8!e.!.irk TUbu3Uh October 4. 1853, Marx, p. 132. 
l'Tuoker was so pleased wi tb his weoe •• tul fly-sheets that. he adver-
tised the publioation of .The Pel! tical ~tQb19it"ptq s.! Lord PIAUt!rtgp b7 
Karl Marx. It was to be printed. only if tiYe hundreri aubsoribers;lt the 
price of a shilling oould. be signed up in advanoe. It proved impossible to 
find this number. 
2O~arx ,te Engels, t;ove:f,t,~r 2, 1853, J2.u 'Stiefw,,,._!l ;'tEam Frl.lU-
..rJ.sll ,)lJlJa~!f" !M1.!BJ, true. A. :Belle1 aa4 E. Bern.tein Stuttgart, 
fji9J, It 443. 
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vooahu.laJ7. and in. thie aame article he acknowledged hie indebtedness to 
TJrquhart' "This is a fitt1n~ occasion to gi..,.. bis due to Mr. DavId Urquhart 
the lndefatigib1e an.tagonist for twenty yeaN of Lord Pa1Ml"Ston, to whom he 
proved a real antagoniat--one not to be intImIdated into silenoe, bribed 
into connivanoe, charmed into ~litor.hip, whilet What with oajoleries, what 
with seductions, ,Pa1merston contrived to change all other foes into 
friends. ,,21 Man never gave another Englishman a finer tribute, and oer-
tain17 to only a fe.", other Europeans. 22 
The tI~at artic1. that JI.arx '#1'Ote en Palmeraton ",u anti tIed ttPalme~ 
stem and. Runta, It and the seoortd, I'Palmeraton, What Haa 11. Done. tt In the.e 
and. other artiel .. on Leri Pal .. raton Marx did not 8C' ae tar aa Urquhart and 
chuge that Pal.eraten .. atI in the pq of Ru •• ta. But probably equally" 
4aaging.&8 ht. atat_ent that PalMl'tlton bad. been the w111in~ tocl of 
rfioholaa I tor twenv years. 'Phia was the on17 tim. in his ca:reel' ilUrlng 
whioh Marx took pa1:'t in a major contl'OTel"tly a:tteeting English 4omestio poli-
tics. During this period only thee. articles of all hi. writings weft read. 
1n oontempcra:r:r 'England. 23 . ~!Jhen lfarx leveled his ~n8 at the '8r1ti8h go ... 
&rnJDent he was not only aFt!'eeing with Urq,uhartt but must also have spoken 
the language that Horace Greeley liked to hear. I,('!rd John BU88ell he d ..... 
scribed &. "that diminutive earthman. lI24 Palmer8ton was that "Qu.i:x:ote of 
21Carr, p. 123. 
2~.b.4. 
23.!!tJ,A., p. 124. 
24l'!ew YO£k Ti£~'bWlfh Sept_ber 2, 1853, Man, p. 103. 
'fT.e institution.· and that Plndar of the -glories' of the oonstitutional 
system. ,,25 ThE!\ Prince Consort had "d.evoted his tim~ partly to fattenl.ng 
piga, to inventing ridioulous hats for the al'11J,Y', to planlling modal lodging-
houses of ~ peculiarly transpa,rent l\tnd unoomfortable kind, 'I a.rHl besides 
hav1n~ a beloy.' a.vera.ge intel1i,rJ,'ence, wa.s alAo He, prolific !'9.ther, and an 
obsequious husba.nd. ,126 
Ir1 tbe beginning ot 1851 Th! Shettield.!.tu Press waR established. 21 
It apparently was Qot until the ,"'inter of 1854 that Urquha.rt actively jo1ne~ 
Is&30 11'on81de28 and the group publishing tbe pa.per to spread his view8. 29 
lronsi4e and Urquhart must haTe worked rather well together, tor in their 
8im11ar interest. they eager17 crusaded aga1nst Palaerston, Clarendon, and 
30 
other prominent CNhlg state amen a.s agents in tbe pq of Ru.aia. The paper 
oalllpa.igned for the reform of looal government, regional government along the 
l1nea advooated by Toulain Sm1th,3l and the abolit10n of the newspaper tax 
or, aa they oalled itt "t.axes on knowledge." '\'he very people who were aOlDe 
of the chief contrlbutcra to the columns of The Free Preaa--Rolyoake, 
25,Iiu..!s:.tk Tribun" OtltcbeT' 19, 1853; !$arx and F.ngelt'l, 'Brit,~n, p. 396. 
2b;ie'illI1 York Tribune, "'ebrunry 11, H~54J )farx, 'llp9Stion, ,.p. 228-229. 
21Free Press, September 6, lo5fi, p. 32. 
28 Il"c.nside was a 3het'fielfl induatl.'lalist who was nvlinly responsible fOl 
the f'l"ganieation of the Central Democratic Part~' i.n that 01 ty. 
29, T.r 0 
". [;1. ,_ Armyta,~e, 
duetry, 1852-~7, n Rister;'{ 
30 Ib,! d. t p. 476. 
"Sheffield and the Crimea,n ~"ar: Poll tics t"..nd In-
TCQAl' III (Londen, 1955), 475. 




Collet, and lronslde--were a1sn the leaders of a Nati~nal Association for 
th Tl 1 f I>'! 1)' .3 ? e ~epea 0 l'~eA on l",nc:)'wle/:!,<:r:e. 
One of the most import.ant (Hmtr1butors to TAl J!~ree Freel was Ka,rl 
Marx. 33 Some of' his articles on Palmers ton were reprinted in it. Urquha.rt 
read, them and was apparently qui'te pl~(18ed. As a tf,ken of' his appreoiation 
Urquhart sent to Marx in Janua.ry of' 1854 one of hie speeches. tilth the 
addition of an introduction and a oonolusion Marx sent it as one of his own 
artiol •• to The Tribuog.34 
In Februar7 of 1854. Marx and Urquhart met for the first time. Urq.u-
hart made the mistake of trying to impre •• Marx wi th the saDIe methods that 
h. us.d on others. The meeting certainly did not have a favorable effeot or 
Marx. In fact, as a result of this meeting Marx loet his enthu.iasm for 
Urquhart. Marx told h118 that the;r agreed only on the aub.1ect of Pall8eI'-
ston. 35 Continuing in this soeptio1_ he later oo .. ented in Tb,§ 'rr1bun, on. 
June 24, 1854 that slnoe "Urquhart 1s striotly opposed to the only party 
prepared to overthrow the rotten Parliamontar,y basis on which the Coalition 
Government of the oligarchy rests, ~ll his speeches are as much to the ~lr-
36 pose &8 if' they were addressed to the cloud.s. II.' 'Ma.rx in writing to LaBsalE 
32Armytage, p. 479': 
33At tbis tilDe rJarx was thirty-six years old, and living in a.ppalling 
poverty on Dean Street, Scho. 
34C 1 arr, p. 24. 
l5Ibid., pp. 125-126. 
36Marx,ggell1on, p. 373. 
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~l'OUl1d February, 1854 desorj. b~~ rrrquhart as a kind C':lf It romantio rea.ction-
~ 37 a_V" • 
The GIgh, launched a vigorous attack against Urquhart in April of 1854, 
sootting at the short fidelity of his adherents. This attack was promptly 
rebutted in Th, Mo£plMAdvlrt~s!r bY' an Urquhart! te who used. Ill'. lIlarx &B an 
ezaaple of a faithful and energetio supporter. But Karl Marx found it dit-
fioul t to public17 di.a.-ow Urquhart, because Urquhart had another tollower 
named li"ranoist.fan who, if' there were 8Uen a di8Claimer, would claim to be 
the one mentioned in Th, Morning Adytrli8lr. Marx kept quiet, but mainlY' 
because he found that it would be fj nanciall1' !nool1venient to Bever hi. con-
neotiona wi th Urquhart. "But tTrquhal't' s finanoial help did prove to be quite 
limited. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the war and Urquhartta ambae-
foreign affaire e~m.m1tteee with the help of pl'(!'m:inent Chart! ats. Marx was 
38 inclined 1;(1, oontinue hi!ll suppert of t1rquhart t s work. 
The!.w Pres. brou~t muoh attention to Urquhart's attacks against 
secret diplomacy and Marx's rs:ther lon~ Md. detailed articles. In fact, 
Ironside, the London e41 tor dllring 1854, thcmgbt that Marx was bury-ing the 
paper beneath mas.es of inf'cl'ID8.tion. Since he was cotlllllotted to the succ ••• 
of' the newspaper, he complained to William Cyp1est the Sheffield editor and 
aecretar,r ot the Sheffield foreign affairs committee. Cyple. undiplomati-
cally oonv81'8d Ironside'. thoughts to Marx. At thia Marx became greatly 
irritated with both Ironside's observations and Cyples' taotlessn.ss, and 
replied to Oyple., s",lng, 111 positively decline to make myself guilty of 
manslaughter by administering another 'do •• ' to .Mr. Isaao Ironside and 
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t entombing' hill in the sheets of his own paper. ,. As the prosp.ot of losing 
the powsrful pen of Karl Marx alumed Urquhart, he sent o. D. Collet to 
paoify Marx b7 pro.1s1ng more regular ,.,.ents for his ~iole. and stating 
that Th,!J:.u !'):tIS would seon become a London publioation. Marx retracted 
his refuaal, but soothed his wounded pride by telling Engels that nMon.,. is 
the only interesting point for me in Dr3 intercourse with these oaliban •• ,,39 
Owing to the repeal of the newspaper stftmp duties on June 15, 1855, 
1Il.t §l:Ultfi!ld.!I.!! PreIs was first issued. as a national publioa.tion on 0c-
tober 13. 1855. From t.his time until 1866 the looal part of the title was 
dropped and it wa.s called Th, .!ut Pt!!,!.40 This did not prevent it :from 
giving a oertain amount of local new., espectally the weekly reportin& of 
Tueadq lIeetings of the Sheffield for.1gn &tfairs cOl1lDlttee.41 The paper 
was now m&inly intended to spread Mr. Urquhart' 8 idea.s. Urquhart and hi. 
wife wrote lUol1Y of the articles. It o erta1n13 was not diffioult to gather 
material for the initial iaaue8, tor there were store. of acoumulated art1-
01 •• r.a~ for printing. Fro. 1855 to 1871 both Urquhart and hi. wife wrot4 
39Ibid., A~tage, p. 476. 
40 . There ia a slight disorepancy between Bishop and Anaytage. Bishop 
states that this national publioation was founded in September of 1855. In 
1866 the title was changed to 1h! DiR1P!ltic RlIiew. 
41 Armytage, p. 475. 
lO~ 
42 the greater part of the leaders and summarie. of events. Other familiar 
figures, such was Vi. Cyple., C. D. Collet, G. J. Holyoake, and Ka.rl alan, 
also wrote for 1 t. columns.:iany times the articles that Engels wrote tor 
!iarx were simply reprinted from Thg!IE~ .~ribuQg. Marx's artioles on 
the tall of lara were reprinted in .'lmmary form and oreated a sena.tion. A. 
special vote of thanks was A'iven to r.!arx by the Sheffield foreign affairs 
oommi ttee for nthe great publio service" he had rendered "by suoh a remark-
able expoee. ,,43 Bishop feels that thepa.per wa.s caviar for the ~neral 
public, and that While influencing a obosen few who read. i t ir1telli~ently 
and wi t.bout prejudice, tt probably was too serious to ha.ve bad an extensive 
ciroulation. But it is an intereetin,~ fact that the pape!' bad. ma.ny renders 
a.broad.44 
On December 22, 1855lli, !....ret;J Pr!?!1! annonnoed tha. t. it was going to d .... 
vote a considerable portion of 1 ts pa~a to subjects of permanent interest. 
These articles, it stated would later he reprinted in serials DO a8 to torm 
in time a diplomatio librar,y tor publio instruotion. 1be paper was obvi-
ously not intended as merely a new •• heet. On the contrary, it was to pro-
vide explanations of the causes of' events and an exposition of the princi-
pIes that guided the actions of' the partieipants. Some of the ser1als or 
supplements that wsre ready for publication and others that were in prepa-
ration were tiThe Nation Cheated Cut of Its I"ood, n "The Prinoipal! tie. of th 
At 
42~ria C. 'Bishop, M,!o:lr s! ura, ~r;£9\lhl:rt (Lendon. 1897). p. 73. 
43 A r=ytage , p. 476. 
441Hshop, pp. 13P,..139. 
103 
'Danube. 't 't'l'he fitor.,r of' the Life cf Lord Pal •• raton, n "Mr. Urquhart' II Vis! t 
to lutayah, tt "Prince Albert and the ~,f.onarch3'," nTh.e Curren.cy, tI "(",u.stavus III 
on the Danger of' Europe, U "Secret Russian Despatohes," "The Ottoman Empire 
Disorganized by illngland on the P.vldence of ner Diplomatists," NThe Proprl-
etorship of Oldenburg, tt and ttThe Contradictions Clf the Earl of Clarendon in 
Referenoe to the People's fl'ood.,,45 
The publioation of T("he "1'§e Presl was co_encE'lu in London on August 16, 
135(. This move was made to racilit~te circulation and diatribution, and 
also to lower the pril'J@ so th'J,t the WClrkers for who\'!! it was d.esiP,"ned could. 
better affom 1 t. 4(; !t seems that wi 1::h 1;he l!love to tondon IronSide ha.d (')on-
sldera.bly less, if any, influence over the paper. It was by this fl,ne 
essentially under the direotion of' fJrquhart. !h!fI'X:6! Press now olaimed to 
favor no politicians, c.lass, or interest. It intended to judge public aots 
acoording to the law o.f the land and of nature, a.nd wi th a perfect knowledgE 
of the oiroumstanoes. It was to address a nation that had forgotten it. 
laws. I t did not propose to teach anything new, but only what had been tor-
gotten by the nation. Publio opinion was to be 1~ored, the paper intended 
to appeal to private judgment, so as ,to restore the ri~t use of reason, 
whioh would be 1'equ1 red to remeue ~ngland from immediate crises and to save 
her decaying institutions. It was +'herefore dedioated to the restoration 
of' the ~:roWI1'. prero~a.t1vell in appnintinp: the 1mporta"t officers of atate; 
the rsstoration to the Privy Ccml'lcil of tbe f'unctione {If government; the 
4'5~ Pril" Deee.'ftner 22, 1855,p. 1. 
46Ibid.t Au~st 16, lA55, p. 4. 
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restoration of solemnity to international intercourse by the abolition of 
permanent embassies; the restoration of impeachment; and the restoration ot 
the power ot' the purae to the people in their separat(l!l c{'Iunties and bol"-
C'lugha.47 It was also with the first J.ond,on i89Ue th$J.t the senea of art1-
eles oomprieing tarl Marx' 'S "'fiavelations nt the 'Of !)It:''matic HiBt.ory of the 
On September 27, 1856, t.her€> be'r&"l in thE'! eupplem<!'l!nt.s of The Ftee Pr~LE)lJi1 
:(rs. UrtJuhart' s analysi l'J of the inV'est:4~e,t:ion oondr;ctsd by Roehuck t 9 commi,t-
tee 11'1 1855 arld of passages :from thl!t corres.pendents e,!' .!.ll! T:1A!!S and Tn; 
r;lorn~ns a,rlJ.d. It was anti tIed The Stgll" .sf.! .1b..f;War by Carita-e.48 Later 
in lS'}7 it was published in pamphlet form. 8asentially, it su.ms up the 
ohief facts and mysteries ot the Cl"1m~~ expedition. Mrs. Jrqubart claimed 
that the mass of detail. shrouding the testimony gathered by the Roebuck 
OODi ttee, clouded the publIc t s underst,anding. '.fost people probablY' read. 
the oomm! ttee t s findings a.s news and d18O\18884 them as gossip. Few shortly 
a:ttel"\ll1'ards recollected what had happened, or were able tn perceive the ends 
which were intended. 49 
Mrs. Urquhart protested tc C. D. Collet, the edi tel" of .:!l:m 1i'l'ee PnS!. 
when he teok upon himself thE' liberty of making soma cha.nlS'ee in her first 
inete.llment of "The St<:-Y'Y of the War. ft !Jhe waSIl rl,fra,1d the.t his unci ted 
47Ib1d • 
48'!l;> p s n t'. ~ rem!b ept;em1:H!n' 27. 18):), t:I~)p1?lement. 
49Ral"rlet Urquhart, The 3t91'Y £:1. ~ ~ (1.on<1('n, 1857), p. 1. 
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additions would destroy the reader's confidenoe in her. In dealing with 
such a subject, ahe thou8ht it was of supreme importarlce that the reader 
have complete confidence 11'1 the calmness, deliberation, and accuracy of the 
author. She even threatened to stop future installments if he would not 
print her protest, and stop interrJ()laUl"lg a.nd arran~ng her material into 
chapters. 5O 
C1'le month later David. Urquhart wrote e. lett.!!}!' tc the editor expressing 
En~~lisb people could. be made coneciotts of wba t ht'Lppened in the Crimfllml ~~art 
so that they could avoid its conssquences. 51 
After the spring of 1857 the signature of Karl r4arx never again ap-
peared on the pa.gea of .:!l1!!l:!.! I'D'S. ':'hough he kept up intemi ttent r ... 
lations with Urquhart, the end of the war I:Lnd the resultant hollow ring ot" 
their attacks on Palm.raton for all practical purposes put an end to their 
aaaooiation. 52 Although twenty T8ars later when any relationbetween. them 
had ouoed Marx still oould be tound denouncing the supineness of EngliSh 
policy toward Russia in the tradition he had learned from Urquhart. 53 
5Ofl't!e Prl's, October 11, 1856, P. (,8. Gertrude Robinson in !lvid 
7rsUbst on page 319 states that Collet 'Dobson Collet was the edt tor of 
..2lu! '!VI'" Pre$§ from 1856 to 1866. 
51pree PIeilt Nov~mber St lA56, P. 100. 
p. 127. 
53rb1r1 ., p. 123. 
As the war ga.thered momentum and. 1l.\sl Time!,!! olamored for the siege of! 
SeballJtopol, Urquha.rt thought that neither a campai.", in -the Crimea. nor the 
destruction of the Russian fleet would have a.ny real effect np<m the result 
of the war. ~'he ocurlJe of t.he Wfl.l' had actually spared the Russians lnthe 
Danube and the ?haeie from any hostile action by the allies. Urquhart 
thought that by bringing the forces of the allie8 to bear on the Cr1me~ 
Russia would be relieved of their employment against her in the Prinoipali-
ties. A. 800n as the English troops entered and secured possession ot that 
exposed province, the.r would be plaoed on the defensive, because th~ must 
hold the g.round against Russia. The fifty thousand men of the al11.d arm1. 
would then be absolutely iaolated; cut of'f' by the marshes of the Asof and 
the steppes of the Black Sea from the Ciroaseians to their left, the CO~ 
sacks in the rear, and the Poles and HlJn~ria.ns to their right. England's 
diffioulties wonld just begin once she had captured the Crimea.1 
Urquhart had never claimed the ira! ts of the practical gog-lien pcli ti-
eian in being able t,o secure votes in Parliament. He d.1d, howevl:r, cla1~ ~ 
know t.he countries in whioh the ~n,,:1iah were fi<r:htinrr mucb "be~ter than most 
0,( the men in the ?,Cvernment Yl11('1 had never v9!ltured ~rrom Rn[,da.x'1d f l"lI shores. 
lDavld Urquhart, Spid.er _ J.h.!!li£ (London. 1855), pp. 22-23. 
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~ot only' had Urquhart travelled through these areas, but he felt that he 
aloo had mastered the same process throu~ whioh the servants of theF.mperor 
~f Russia acquired their knowled~. ffin~lish mini~+'ers mi~t perceive +'heir 
errors of judgment after the event had occurred, but Urquhart felt that enly 
~ person 1n his poa! ticn could tell 1n advance what t.he servants of Rusda. 
~ntended to do. And in t~is context he olaimed that. it was the servants of 
~uss1a who had planned the invasion of the Crimea, over which Rus.ia was 
~u!te 3u.bl1ant.2 
Urquhart had complained since th.e beginning of the war that the oondi-
tions laid down by the al11e. for its oonduct were utterly absurd, .8pecial~ 
the oond.1 tion that prohibited any oonquest. Why then, he asked, should the%'4 
~e a Crimean expedition at all? That it was for the defense of Constanti-
Inople or '1'urkey was absurd, because the Turks had already defeated the Rue-
Isians in the Prinoipal! ties, which left the 'Russians unable to attack Con-
IStantinople by land. "~'hy should not tho expedi tion to the Crimea. be justi-
~ied with the object of diminishing,' Ruesia' B aggress1vepower, h0r Blaok Sea 
~leett which she might use a~inst Turkey at l'ome future date? Asf'ar a8 
prquhart was ooncerned such I!l view of the Russian fleet was quite erroneous, 
ibecause the fleet he knew to be decrep1 tor nut the n8. tioo and "{yurope had 
wadna,lly been brought to believe tha.'t Constantinople we,s in dan~er from 
~eba.stopol in that ita fortress protected the fleet. The government even 
~88ued a statesent explaining 1 ts reaeone for the expedition, and therein 
ponv~ed to the nation only the naval implications of tho operations. Tht. 
2 Ibid., PP. 6, 1. 
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f1rst ministerial announcement of the expedition l'Jr\S made by I.eI'd. Oranville, 
PreBid.ent of the Coun.eil. a.t a Staffordt!lhire yeom~nry clinner v(here he ex-
pressed. himself in these terms: 
ffhe Government does not oonceal from th.uJlelvse the great respen-
810111 ty of their urging on th';; .:>"'mmanders of both servioes tbe 
a.ttack on Seba.stopol. They a.re Oi)t ignorant of the opinion enter-
tained by many distinguiahed officars of every country of Burope, 
that, it not i.practicable, the atteapt ia of a very diffioult 
nature. But they feel that the integrity and independence of 
Turkey 18 a tllere joke so long u that fortress 18 deemed imprer 
nable s1 tuated as :1 t itt in the ver.y centre of the Black Sea (! 
as the only point frOll whioh vesaels oan come in and go out 1Vi th 
ea£' etl ( :) they felt. it was the very key of the position. 3 
nut if it waD the intention of the 13r1 tieh Government 1:,0 diminish the e.g-
greBs!ve mean. of RUSSia, Urquhart thought, it never 'Would have eonRidered 
the venels lying in ~ebastopol, because they were l'1ot a source of danger. 
If' the govElrnmel1.t did not intend. to destroy th., aggressive mOMS of Russia, 
then the instruoticns to Lc:.rd, Ra,~la.n arJi:1 the articles of The Tlme! weT"', he 
4 concluded, only pretexts to ~t the Zn&.liBh a~' into the Crimea. In an 
honest war the invasion would have been sheer folly, and only senei, 10 in 1:1 
collusive wa.r, because it was not a peed ticn from which ':;!1i~,:land could opel"-
ate against the interlor of miseia.. He :pointed out that while invading the 
Crimea England neglected attacks on more vulnera.ble points as Odessa where 
~., pp. 65-61. The supplement of August 25, 1855 expreesed 80me ot 
the same views that were later expressed in the StolZ..2! tpt "~tar. Mr. Urqu-
hart allude. to the :report ot the Sebastopol Committee, and knMV that infor-
mation ourrent in the newspapers. :Recause of this it is assumed that the 
opinions expressed. by his wite in the Stsu were already in existence in 
1855. Beoause he undoubtedly- helped her prepare this pamphlet, bel" views 
will be oonsid.ered &s reflections of his. 
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line oould hal'a fatall)" injured Ih.JF.lSi.A.. 5 Since the exped1 tion was undertaken 
f1ei ther for the purpose of breaking np JluJf51a I II power a. t home nor of reduo-
ing her to a political nullity in international altairs, but rather was 
:'lr'Uiertaken wi th a Vi_ to negotiation., Urquhart thought it wa.s launched 
V:1.der pretense. Not only did these military &.Otions manifest oollusion, 
but 0('1 dld the reason8 &sl!IU.J'Iled tor the operation, namely, that the ':tturks 
flere unable to cope with the Russians at hODle, and that the Cri.aa was or 
Gonta-inea the oenter of' Rus8ian power. Urquhart considered theN to be 
("al.e preai8e.. And 80 he conoluded that sinoe the expedi tiOll was launch.d 
6 [on fal •• praisell, it therefore wu incapable of being sucoessful. The 
~nvas1on tested the einoerit)" of the government's prosecution of the war, 
~nd the government was theref'ore found, in his judgment, to be g'dlty of 
p<'Jl1usion. 
In the pamphlet, ,sRaA!t.1n.4 .lhll:l¥, he predicted that the war would be 
proved a. collusive O.ne, if what wael gained in the Crime& was aftsrNarde BUr-
7 
:t'sndered, and no 1nd8mn1 ty wan required of Russia. This Bu.rrender iron1-
pa.lly took plaoe. because shortly after the war the torts d.estroyed by the 
iaJ,lles were repaired and soon oocupied by the Russ1a."lAI. :ti'urthermo re, no 
~ndemni ty was required from Russia.'?'i thout d.oubt thin proved to UrqUhart 
tha.t the English govornlHnt was insin.09re in its prosecution of the CriMean 
;~a.r. The invasion of the Crimea was net dangerou.s to Quss1a" a.n.d oertainly 
5Urqubart, Spider, pP. 4, 5. 
t:. ')l~b:t.d., p. 3. 
1 ~., pp. 4, 5. 
8 
was detrimental to Turkey. 
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If, ... popular opinion believed, the Crimea meMaced the Ottoman .Empire 
th .. t menace he thought ended when the allied fleets entered into the Euxine. 
This eliminated anT pos.ible danger to Turk87, and also enabled the allies 
to attack the Russian amies trom the rear. Ode._ was the mont important 
port, becauae it .... tl'OtII thie port and not fJ'Oll Sebastopol tha.t the Ru •• lan 
toroelll in all fomer warlll had been delilpatohed. England should thfJretore 
have attacked Ode.8" to capture the RUfHJ1an armiee, Urquhart believed, and 
then impo.ed penaltiee on Rus.ia. Once Odessa was taleen, the trade of 1IlUoh 
of Russia would have been stra:ngled, an.d through the oonsequnt preS8tl'1'e 
which would have been imposed upon Russian landlords, merehants, a.nd finally 
the Csar the war 'WOuld have ended quiokly and inexpensively. 9 
'.Phe fact of the matter was that i\l8Sian commerce was not bein'5 d .... 
stroyed by the war, and walil aotutt.lly pro teo ted. by the Order-1n-Council of' 
Maroh, 1854. The Russian ports of the 'Alack nea and the Sea of' Aeef as late 
as August of 1855 were net blookaded, while the Bosphorus and the Danube 
were 0108ed by this legal lIeane. In this wq, Urquhart reaIK'H'1ed, the EnS"" 
lish govermasnt was furnishing Rusai& with the pttOunia17 raeana to oar17 on 
the war. The blockade of the Danube was therefore intended to impoverish 
the Principali tie. and to re.trict E.ngland· s supply of grain trom them while 
the porta in the Black Sea and the Sea of Aeot were left free to furnish 
reinforcements, a.unitlon, and pro~.1ons to the Rus.ian troops 1n the 
8.!lt14. 




Ablocltad.e of the Black SM, however, had a.otuall7 beEm ordered, 
but poli tical oirowaatano.e were g1 ven by the Duke of Newoaetle as the prin-
ci]jHlLl reason.. wh;r it was not being enforeed. TA. government and !'lot the 
adDliral. was oh1eflT r •• ponsible for the order not being fulfilled. The 
Duke ot li8'llfCastle te.tified that ttd1ff'icu1 tie. arose at the seat of the war 
of a politioal oharacter, not connected With &n7 disobedience on the part of 
the admiral of our fleet. ,,12 Al though Admiral Dundas was ordered to block.-
ad. the Russian porta, they were st!ll open to merchantmen. E~n small 
groups of the Russ1an fl.et went in a.,>;d out of Sebastopol. Admiral Dundas 
waft "surprised that more did not comee it they had been an enterprising 
en_v they would have come out. ,,13 
Shortly after the allies ell.!De t.o Varna, a blockade, or rather the a1>-
pea.rance of a blockade, was raised. But beyond han ng a war-stea.mer pass 
Sebastopol once a week or so, the English lett the Russians to th"8elves.1~ 
lO}l~t.!e !Z.a!" Auguat 25. 1855, Supplement, p. 2. 
llIn oommenting on the testimony of Sir J.m.s Graham and Aa.iral Dun~ 
betore the Sebastopol Comml tt .. IIarriet UrqUhart thought it possible that 
A_ira]. 'Dundas waa never reall1' ordered to blockade, and in the coDll'lli ttee 
hear:i:ng8 was made the "scap .... goat" of the miniutr;y. 31;2r:.ffl.l£! WIl' PP. 
35-:17 • 
12Barriet Urquhart, p. 31. 
Ij~., p. 32. 
14Ibid. The !groin, Hlrgld's correspondsnt reported that three trana-
ports .ent from Sebastopol to Niohola!.rf tor timber arrived safely. The 
Vladamir made .even voyages in the Black Sea atter the declaration of war, 
and oaptured _all 'l'urk1eh veasels on the ooast of Asia Minor. He continuec, 
"11"\ the beginning of July four sa.il of the line, with two or three fri.l'1!s:tea 
~."ld steamers, quitted the ha.rDor, and cruised tor two or three days oft 
Sebastopol, out of sight clf land." One of these floated undisturbed in the 
8ight of an allied .hip. 
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At Odessa no aigr18 of a blockade were visible. Some ve ••• la were loading 
thera, and IBan7 IDOl'. Were ezpected to arrive .inoe the 13rl tish em'bass,. at 
Ooneta-"'Itinople had ywred the masters of tra41n~.h1p. that the,. might 
visit any of the Ru.aian port. on the alack Sea or the Sea of Azot without 
being moleated. 15 
For the explanation of suoh strange actions Jrquhart looked to the soc-
nomio motive. that Russia had for sta.rting the war. As he saw it. the main 
reason t.hat Russia invaded the Principalities and brou~ht about. tbe war waa 
1(' 
to stop the decline of her own trade." Before the war he bad shown that 
the Russian grain trade was bein~ l'ep&ed by the ':'u:t'kish. Tlut, he alec 
realised that there was an increase in the ~u8eian t?ade after 1851. The 
eXj.)Ort of wheat from Odessa and the Black Sea in 1851 was 800.000 quartersl 
in 1852, the trouble then beginning, 1,400,000 quarters, in 1853, the Ru ... 
aian8 having 01'088 the Pruth, 3,160,507 quartera. But the"e figure., atter 
all, do not give a oomplete idea of the total inore .. e that occurred. To 
that nUllber lIIUst be addea 1,500,000 quart en of grain in the Prinoipalities 
l'Whioh were l"eaq for shipment to England. Even though this was only a po:r-
tion of the grain export, the Ruseian arrde. coneumeel that amount turing 
their ocoupation. ~!\l1ile this grain was preventea from reacb.i.ng England. 
Ruuia had the opportunity of .elling England 2,300,000 quarters more than 
lIhe had done in 1851. The total amount oon8W1led by lae1" amies in the 
'15.!J:u PnU!e, August 25. 1855. ~tlpplement, p. 2. 
16 lW., p. 3. Inf'omation is in a Quoie from the Al!&E!!iIHi ;Zei tun" 
11) 
provinc •• amounted to approximately 2,500,000 which. made the 1n"f'&8ion quite 
a profitable venture. On the other hand the cost of this invas10n to Englan~ 
due to the rise 1n the price of bread waa about .. 25,000,000 whioh netted 
Russia another'" 6,000,000. The amount of lin •• ed. 011 exported from Ru.sia 
actually" increased dur1n« the war' during the financial year ending May 
0·£ 18'.)3 it was 6,500 q,uartersJ during the year ending fay of 1854 1t was 
10,906 qua.rtera, and durinR the year ending May of 1955 it wa$ 41,440 qual"-
tero. 17 Aotually, the total imports from Russia dUring the war far exceeded 
the exports to her. Il'be main signif1ca"1ce of the blookade then was in its 
failure to restriot the trade of Ruesia. 
In September of 1854 Urq,uhart saw Englishmen ooni"rcnted by 1;hr~e major 
qu.stions' was it necessary to send an expedl t10n to the Orimea to humble 
Ru •• ia? would the taking of the Crimea humble Russia? and what was Russia's 
obSect in lIalting England attack her in the Crimea? It was unneoees&rJ't he 
thought, to .end an e%pedl Uo.n to the Crimea to humble :au.llia, because she 
had. alree.dT b.en humbled b7 Turke:r in the Principalities. In tact, an inv ... 
alon waa not even worth disou.eion, becauB. England had not threatened 
Ru •• 1a before ahe had. 11'2"adecl the Principalities, nor had she restated 
Ruaa1a when aunia ocoupied tho.e province.. In tact, England had avoided 
eve1!7 act that savored of war. To humhle Russia was indeed a very ailtple 
o~l'a.tion for an English .intetar. beoauae Ruasia had b.en lIade b,. England 
in the past two centuries. If' ~~land once withd:pp her Sllstruning hand 
l11'b!d •• PP. ), 4. Urquhart 01 ted t.he oirculars of '\fessl's. Charles and 
&~ith as his GOurces for this information. 
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Russia would iaed1atel.;y orumble. Urquhart thought that Daall7 .eana were at 
the aispo .. l of an Inglish minister. Among others he could have baoked Tur-
ikey from the beginning. ae could have let war i tael£' 4 •• t1"07 Russian OOlD-
!meree. These IDeatmree, Urquhart maintained, had to be adopted by a govern-
iment really at war wi th Rue.!a. And .inc. th~ .ere not, he conoluded, 
there was no intention of defeating Ru.ssia. It the English govemaent was 
not using its power to orush RuSSia, then it was u8in~ it to protect Russia, 
&nil an ezped1 tion to the Crimea could only have been lmderte.ken wi th the 
18 
view of humbling Turkey. 
The state of militar,y preparednes9 at Sebastopol up to 1852 was nothing 
for tbe allies to fea.r. The fortifioations were till that time generally 
neglected. In 1852 in contemplation of the war the fortif."icatiofls were reo-
paired and extended. t~uhart realised that this would take many years to 
oomplete, and it not oompleted the fortifications would be utter~v useless. 
To prepare Sebastopol to withstand a siege would have required a line ot' 
oomplicated fortifioations running along the heights surrou.nding the ba7 
with detached forts tor the culminating point. beyond. t!hi. would ha .... in-
volved great expend! tures, and an army of sorae twe hundred. tbmUlAnd .en fo"1f 
an adequate defftse. The truth or the matter was that the work wae not oom-
pleted, and that few defenders were there. 19 
Laurenee Oliphant, Who reported in 1853 on the oondition of Sebastopol, 
oorroborated Urquhart's View of the poor oondition of that fortress. 
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Oliphant admitted that Sebastopol appeared formidable when Viewed from the 
sea, and any fleet would have been commanded 'by its twelve hundred piece. 
of artillery. But these were not, however, formidahle obstacles to. or pro-
teotion for Seba.stopol, because upon ftrinp; the batteries 'the l'Ctten and 
poorly constructed placements orumbled. Oliphant was informed that the 
rooms in whioh the guns were fired 'Were so na:rrcw and ill-vent.ilated that 
the artillerymen would have inevitably l}een stifled had they a:ttempted. to 
fire their pieces. The BUB.iane were i"u:rthe:r7Jl()re orippled by the apparent1;y 
wholesale oorruption that so unde:rmi.ned the navy. The mortali ".;;:, rate of thE 
Rus.sian army in the Cauoasus Oliph&nt, estimllted at twent,y thousand annually. 
All of this led him to conolude that the Russian army was really moet 1nef-
t1ci~lt and aoarcely worthy ot that exaggerated estimate which the British 
publio had tOl'llled of its capabtll Ues. 20 
A Poliah offioer. a Captain IiodaseVitoh, who had deserted to the Brit-
ish, a1ao sheds 80me interesting light on the oonil tiona inside the fort-
reaa. He statsd that Fort Severnaya was usele.s, and that Major-General 
Pavlo'V1.lk;r, who had oharge of the fortifications of aebutopolt propo •• d to 
d •• tro~ Severn.,... ~he Citadel of this north tcrt was in a state of negleo 
and not a single gun was mounted. In the whole of the north fort there weI'. 
no more than ei~t guns, and these W9re in a very dilapidated oondition. 
The on~v remarkable thing about the for"!; was that it had a. fmu:-thousand-
foot subterraneanp&8sa~e from the 01 tadol -t;o the Soukhaya 13a11:a. He 
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further stated that up to AUAUst 27 (probably 1854) some addt t10ns were made 
to the fortifieationa of the town I the full number of' glltlA boo been pla.oed 
on the lower first tier of Port St. ~Uoholas, at every seoond., third, or 
fourth embrasure on the aecond tier depending em 1;he dde, a..'"'1d on the third 
third. ~ln was fired for practice the whole fort sheek, stoner. fell, and em-
brasures were ruined. Coneiderin,r;- that the walle were only facedwith stone, 
21 
and the space between them was filled with rubbish, th.1s wa.s qui ie ".la:tural. 
Even if the tovln Was fortii! ed, what reaaon Was there, Urquha.rt thought 
to a.ttack Sebastopol when it was the fleet, the contents of the harbor, that 
Engla.'1d was oateneibly after. No one, apparently, had observed that the 
Russian. fleet waa not protected by Sebastopol. To destroy th.e vessels there 
wu no rea.aon to take the 01 ty. All that was needed, he thO'l.gnt, to acC01I-
plish this mission was six mortars, or six Paixhana guna for horizontal 
ahella and red-hot shot. Onoe a position on one of the western hilla wall 
8lOured, the ships oould be m1nk right in the harbor. !f they left the 
harbor the allied fleet could oatch them. The Russian fleet simply could 
not eecape destruot1on. 22 
Contrary to prevalent opinion tho ihu!lsian fleet bad done VS~ H. ttle 
1n the Crimean We.r up to the time of the invae10n (\1' the Crimea. lluBsia 
wished Englishmen to believe that hal' fleet was important, and. because she 
took pains to influence Enr;l1sh minds to +'hink so, lJrqubl1:rt felt. the opposit, 
21Harrlet Urquhart, P. 79. 
~tTrqtthart, SRaderl p. 22. 
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~ae true. "!'be S1nep. affair had not been so ~at an erplott as many Eng'-
lishmen were disposed to belteve. Hut Sine:pe hllla achieved it. intended re-
wlteu the entrance of the English squa.drons tntc the B1aok Sea. and Russia's 
lentranoe into. the war. Jack in 1833 the Blaok Sea sQ.ll&dron fiJU,ddenly appeared 
~:t Constantinople with an &1"Ift7, bttt that, Urquhart tel t, waa only through 
~olluaion with an English minister. U~jiar Skelles.i soon tollowe' and was 
o<meid.ered the death blow ot Turke,.. But out of the ashe. of that funeral 
P7re, ant notwi thatanding the 4&111' menace of the Rua.1an fleet, Turk:q re-
.tored her a.2'1t7 and. her fleet. She had lie HOo •• red her power that abe ",... 
iOn twoooouiona able woc •• stul17 1k> d.ety a joint .enace (\f Auatria and 
IPzoueaia, and at a. later period to compel Ru.aia to withdraw her torc •• fro. 
the eaae Danubian Provinc •• whlch the3" ocolrp1ed in 1854. 30 it was not 
true tha.t the Blaok Sea fleet menaced T1lrkeYt beoause for twenty years that 
fleet had never been employed. On the other hand it did bri~g about the 
restoration of Turk!.h power by its ve1.7 pre •• ?loet becau.e 1 t di.turbed the 
lethargy of the Turkish )mP1re. 23 
llut what of the plqaical oondition of that supposed bu~bear of Turkey? 
~lrenc. Oliphant deeoribed moat of the thirteen ship. of the line he aaw 
anchored in the harbor u 1n poor conti 1 tion, beeause after ten ;,years their 
t1Jaber.s of' iJaproper4' .easoned fir or pinewood were perfectly rotten. !'here 
also abound." in the •• wddy waters a worm that oonstantly' d.ee~ed the 
lWood. oost ihe Rusaian government thou.sal'lda of r;~':,:es, and was one of tbe 
moat serious ob8taol •• to the fol"lltation of an efficient na...,. em the Black 
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tJea. 24 aesides, the RUssian na'Vy was plaguad by a.n elaborate system o£ 
pltmder of' its tunds, beoauae of the low pa.y.25 Mauy of the shipa were not 
.,.awo r thy , and probably onJ.y two of all 'the ships ?lere in oond1 tion to 
lndsrtake a strenuous voyage around 1;he Gape. 26 
The ll.u.81a.n fle.t had. therefore long ceased to be a _&nO of overawing 
r',rkey. Turke,. was alrea.cb' far be;ycmd th .. reach of RUl!uda' Ii ph3'sieal 
blows.27 But it also W&8 well knOWTl when the r~g118h fleet left the shores 
Df' l'hgland aa wall aa when it oruised in the '8laek Sea that the nussian 
!ships would take refuge in the harbor where they were protected from a ..... 
~&rd attack. U,4er the •• oil'Oumatanoes the displa;y o£ the allied fleet, 
l,Jrquhart thought, was absolutely uselesa" :10t only ..... s the Rluudan fleet a 
pretext to get the English fl •• t intc the Black Sea, but also~ bring the 
28 
armies to the shore. of the Crimea. 
It Bu •• ia had intended to use the .ne.t fer aggressive pt;;.rposes, it 
would have been the fleet that ahe would have strengthened and not the for-
tifioations of Sebastopol. oetween 1828 and 1853, however, not a single 
line-of-battle ship was added to the squadron of Russia in the Black Sea. 
It Constantinople wa.s the intended prey lOt a Russian expedition, then Russia 
would have .%pen4ed her resources on new ves.els. But Ruaaia apparentq 
2401i})h&1'lt, ,. 255. 
25llUJ.t p. 256. 
26 :.!J.ljJ .. , p. 257. 
27 trrquha:rt, ,5D'~lt. P. 24. 
28ILarriet TJrq'lhart, p. 74. 
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had defenaive tg~tics in mind in preparing tor the defense of Sebastopol • 
It certainly was not being protected against the Turks, for if Russia had 
apprehended an attaok from Turkey she would have fortified Odessa. If Bu. .... 
aia. feared a I'H.l attack tl"Oll England and Ii'ranoe, ahe also would have lort1-
tied that oi t7' but aince, as Urquhart 8&W it, Russia knew that the7 would 
not, she fortified Seba.stopol.29 
The d8Oislon to invade the Crime .. oan be de8Or10e4 as an "atter-
'thought." When 1kt Twa announoed it on A.ugust 5, 1854., moat people did 
80 industriousl)" indootrinated that Russia was invulnerable ar.d Sebastopol 
tmpregna.ble, that ~an7 considered the difficulties of the expedition in~lr-
mountable. By these tIleans, Urquhart thought, the belief W&8 gradually e .... 
tablished that to invade the Crimea was to strike a. serious blow against 
ntu.u~ia. The nation finally acoepted the Crimean expedi tion 0.8 e. grand mlli-
tar,r exploit, and &8 evidenoe of ministerial 1nt.~1ty in the light of the 
long friendship between the English and Russian governments. The season in 
IWhich the expedition was undertaken also supports the 1dea that the expedi-
tion waa an "after-thoupt. fI It was ini tial17 proposed and dif!lOtuuled w1 th 
the mil1t&r,1 authorities during the month of March, and then set a8ide on 
the grounds that it was of no value &8 a military operation. 30 During the 
summer it was decided to invade the Crimea. But the same negative condi-
tions and prospect. existed in August as well as in l4arch of 1854 to preyent 
29Dav1d Urquhart, !Millar WSW (London, 1855), pp. 294, 295. 
3OUrquhart, ~RiA,r, P. 19. 
the .:xpeM tion. But why then was it decided upon in August? The 01'117 19 .... 
son that Urquhart aa.w ponible was that _me new IIOtlve or com:bination had 
arillel" So.ething had to b. don. to eatlaf;y 'the ann.v of the public, and 
the dltdut.tistaction of the Queen. There had to be a ct.e1aT to malte Europe 
bel1eve that the Cri.ea really was the center of strength, and eo the alIi •• 
oou14 tate the ne@OUations tel' peaoe out of the handa of the Turk •• 31 
Urquhart believed that another fao'!; wh1eh proved the expMJ ticn an 
"a.fte .... thought" was the government t s statement that 1 t was the original d .... 
sign r.4 the '\Vsr. Bere Urquhart fomed the aovernment ts statements into 8. 
law of pt"Ooed:uH for he say8 "It would be unworthy ot the post tlo» of' the 
Go~rnment to state what was true. Its only object in speech is false-
hood. u32 To his readers ihis statement must have seem~d preposterous. It 
was one thln#r, to point out instances of' falee tl!:'Overnment statements or even 
act. of oolll1s1cn, but such a oondemnation W8J!I apparently irrepc:maib1e. 
Count Po.so di Borge33 ha.d pronhesied as early a8 1828 that if England 
and Ruanda were ever at war, &,.gland \vould direct her attaok against Sen a ..... 
topo1.l4 When an advanoe oOPY or Laurenoe Oliphant' s book, .:!hI RuI.ilD 
SM£:U St! .1U Blaok.!tl, was .ent to Thl 'a" offioe for review in 1S5l 
311b14., p. 20. 
l2}pj,d., p. 19. 
33Count J>O$ZO 41 Borgo was a Corsioan who en'tered the Rna.tan diplomat. 
io servioe, &nd was ambassador to Paris from 1814 to 1635. 
34A• I. Dasent, J. T. DII.n, (1.0'1'1401'1, 19(8), I, 166. Daeent not •• 
Kinglake'. mention ot Posse 41 »ergo's prophe..,. It ia lftt.restin~ that 
Seton-'i'lataon in ~!'!t1n JD. !Yl'9U on page 147 states tha.t Pos.o propheSied 
with amazing accuraoy the events inll'ranoe riu:ring 1830. 
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Delane W&8 80 struok wi th the book that he gaTe ita vef:7 favorable notice, 
and even hired Oli.phant &8 a regular f'o:reign correspondent. Thia book, 
Da.aent atate., waa the fiNt to oall attention to the mill tar,y and. naval 
strength of Sebaatopo1, .. name with wMch moat En~liahmen "'ere unfamiliar in 
1853. It a •• _ that he was the first Englishman to predict that it war 
Mould come it was through that fort that ~ng1a.nd would haTe to strike at 
the heart of Russ1a. 35 His book was first published in October of' 1853, and 
it became eo popular that by Ua:rch of 1854 a fourth eM tion was bl the book-
snopa. 36 So it was through the writings of Oliphant, in accordance with 
popular sentiment. 37 a.nd wi til the enooura.gemer!t of Lord Pa1merBton,38 that 
Delaru» took the lead in advooating the immediate invasion ('If the Crimea.39 
Palmers ton was the first member of the oabinet to urge the conquest of 
Sebastopol. 40 ~ .. n a.s m1nister of the Home Office he 800n was producing 
p!'oposals of' a Turkish 10&11, maps of the Crimea, a Prussian plan tor fortl-
f;yin.g Constantinople. 41 and all tn!S of 41p1011atic expedients tor Olaren-
35Ib1A, 
36H• W. Schneider, and G. Lawton, A !!DRAI' IDA , Pilgrim (New York, 
1942), p. 71. 
37Dasent, I, 175. 
)8Dlp12latl0 R,vi!!. February, 1866, pp. 16, 17. 
39Da•ent, I, 175. 
4Ol.la!. 
41PalJDerston in vrri 1;1n~ to the 'I!:i.n1ster C'f\~r on June H;, 
that there was no dang"llr of. a Russian attack t:m CCl'lstantinople. 




don'. guidanoe. H. had been impressed in March with "the advantage ot a 
great attaok on the Crimea:4a and by J'Wle he was an eager ad'YOOate ot sueh 
an. expedi Uon. In Ju17 he pre.sed hia colleague. to stiok to their purpo .. 
and plan to I!P to the Criraea.43 Probably without the ad:vooao7 of Palaeraton 
the Crimean expe4it1on never would have taken place. ~hla role waa approved 
even by Mr. Gladatone, who thanked him for his work in helping direct the 
stroke. nf ',"gland against "the heart and centre o.f the war at Sebutopol"~ 
Although Dasent. states that Oliphant's book was the fiHt to call at-
tenticn t.c the mill tary and ns.val atrenP:'1;h of the no .... f8JIed Russian f'ortreuu 
it ie apparent in read1n~ his descriptions of the plaoe that it oertainly 
waa not a oenter of' Russian power. Bu.t Oliphant. althou.srh he minimized the 
strength of the :fortress and the fleet, did. maintain that Russia, 1tself, 
was a meaace. B. Kingsley ?!ltal'tin in.1l1i TtlumLlh !lJ. l.o;d Palm!mto.n supportl 
this evaluation of Oliphant.45 
It i8 impossible to understand. how the leaders of the go'V'ernllent and 
Delane hillself', who had read and promoted the bock, oould have expressed tb1 
attitudes whioh they did in the light ot the evidence that Oliphant pre-
s.nted. It was notorious that rew IngliBhtaen had been in the Crtmea, or to 
that matter in the Near East, oonsequent17 ff/IW knew &n7thing about the area 
• 1 




45:9. Kingsley Martin, '1.Ji..! Tr1um2h s!. ~ ,Ps\lmeraton (~ndon. 1924'. 
1'1'. 188, 189. 
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From Oliphant t. deacription 1 t oerta.1n17 .. obvious that Turite;r. Constan-
tinople, or England had 11ttle or nothing to tear tro~ Sebastopol. Ollphani 
0'" to essentially the same oonclusion as Urquha.rt: that the Russ1an fleet 
was incollpetent and deerepi t, and cerhd.nly not prepared to 08.l'17 Ru.sian 
troop. on an inv.aion of Turkey. Sebastopol wu !"lot the center ot' nu •• 1an 
power. 
Perhaps Palmerston agreed, but in expressing his thoughts on the wbjec~ 
he placed bimself diametrically oppos1to UrqUhart. Palmerston felt that the 
ca.pture of Sebastopol and of the fleet would be a lastin,~ and important a.d-
vantage to England. He thought that it would be a more decisive place to 
fight than in the Danube area. I1clding the Crimea and Sebastopol, England 
could dictate the condl tio1'18 of peace in regard to the na.val pes! t101'1 of 
iuasia in the Black Sea. 46 
Urquhart thought t.hat Pal.merston and Delane had combined to bring about 
the invasion of the C ri •• a. Early 1n the war 1 t had been propoeed b7 the 
government to s.nd al"ll1 •• in.to the Crimea, but the proposal failed to get 
approval because of the re.istance ot the ml1it&r,J authOrities, though this 
"as k.pt quite secret from the rest ot the nation. Lord PalM.raton, who w .. 
at that t1 •• Home S8Oret&l'1', sent tor Delane. U. 1D'Uat have told hill, so 
Urqtthart thousht, that Sebastopol was the oenter of Russian ~'()r and that 
it al8t) was the source of' exped1 U.,ns ar~in8t Turke;r_ Per81a_ and India. 
Since the nation did not believe these things and since bis o~llea~tes 11'1 
the oa.binet were stupId and headst'l'Cn~t Palmers+,on leaked to Delane thl"Ougb 
46 Ashle;" II, 297. 
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I1!lI 'rW! to tr:r to lJake the people tlnde1'1ltand the importanoe of Sebastopol. 
Moreover, the government should be or! ticl.ed tor not recognizing this i ... 
portanoe.41 
The more 1l!.! Tim!, thundered in i t8 pages the more it rendered the 
Crimean expedition practieal in the minds of the people. Ita agitation on 
this sub3ect was without parallel 1n the history of publio disouss1on. It 
stated that "Sebastopc'll is the centre of Russlanpower!,1t and until S.ba .... 
topel was destroyed there would he "ne safety tor Turkey. no sEJOtlri ty for 
the world," and "no peace w1 th RuSSia. II In this marmer, Urquhart belleyed. 
Rus.ia dragged the English a~1es to her shores. Forty thousand Englishmen 
pertahed there. ~~e deteats that Russia had suttered at the hands of the 
alli.8, and the war that Rua.ia could not have won again.t Turke1 alone, 
ah. now was able to continue with the a.:1d of the alIi... Flu.,. had .et a 
trap in Sebastopol, Urquhart thought, and 1l1I Tin! had decoyed the al11e. 
into it.48 
Rven th ••• thod ot arguMent that that journal employed was e'Videnc. 
which attest.d tc her intentione. Her columna displayed no proof that S .... 
baatcpol was what she said it W9.8. Only statements were made. Eyen it the 
wrtte:ra were mialed, tJl"q.uhart thought, there Btill wae no eXCUS8 for the 
47D1Plollt1c ~!v1", February, 186(', pp. 15-17. Daeent says that Pal-
marston was the first member of the Ca1:dnet to ut'.'re the conquest oJ' Seba.s-
topol (Delan" I, 175, 176). Delane's letters shaw us the degree to whioh 
he was 1nvolyod in the jea.lousies and the 'bshirHl-the-scenes in1::r:1{!:UG in t.he 
oonduct of the war (p. 223). 
48Urquhart. Wern,. p. 299. Pa.ge 299 i8 actua.lly numbered as 2972• 
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legal and historical falsifications whioh they employed.49 
As Roebuok's co_itt.e of inQ.ui17 delved into the conduct of the wart 
it became apparent that it was impossible to extract a single u.irect answer 
from the witnesses as to what was t.he source of the Crimean expe(l1tion. Not 
only was this the oase, but 1. t even was impossible to P;!'8t opinions on the 
subject, expressed or entertained by the persons holding milit~ and naval 
lOo_ands. '11}te lnq\lir~rs could not even ~t the uopi.nions" of' the poll tical 
authorities, respecting the "opinionslt of the military a.uthorities, troll the 
hilDe Mlnister hiuelf. Most of the testimony, Mrs. Urquhart balieved. wall 
evasive, ambiguous, or oontradiotory. tt'be utracts from the oommitte.'. 
record given in 1D! 31!2lZ.2,;[ jy .$ W8re epeeimens of the incessant subter-
fuge and prevarioatlon that took place at the investigation. It was well 
known tbat the mili ta17 author! tie. we .... not conaul ted about the expecU tion. 
The t •• timony of the Duke ot Newcastl. g,ave the impre.sion that no .illta~ 
opinions had eYer been tendered to the ~vernmsnt against the expedition, 
and that if the cOJDlander-in-ohiet had remonstrated and it llad fail.d., he 
.ould have resigned. This proved fals., because the cODl'lland~n.· .... in-(Jhiet hi .... 
self, ViSCO'llnt Ha.rding, stated that he would not bave 1"e81'=;1"1IId. But then 
the oommittee fa.iled to a.sk Hardlnge if he had approved the ex:ped.it1on. S11' 
John Bur~yne who wae sent to the Crimea to examine and report on prevalent 
oonditions Vie.e not even oonsulted. before the deoislon wae made. Lord Aber-
deen was not ever'! able to give the committee a. direct answer to the slmple 
question of whether ttin hie opinion, so muoh informa+.ion W1;t.S obtained a.s was 
,,50 
necessary to justify the expedition. 
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'But on the other hand the Duke of ifewcastle. the Minister of ivaI', rel t 
at the beginning of the war that he should make ever,y pos8ible inquir.y into 
the oondition of Sebastopol. He testified that Lord Raglan was unable to 
obtain thie information. The best inforaation, however, that the Duk. re-
eel ved was from a Colonel Du Plat, nOlI ha saw dq after ·dq, and who ae-
eiated him in investigating all the other intonaation he had gathered. In 
large part, therefore, the man who bears the re.ponsibilit7 for the expedi-
tion was Colonel Du Plat. This Colonel had been previously appointed to tnt 
consulship at ~~iarsaw, a.nd Urquhart apParently considered him to be working 
for Russia. The Crimean expeci ti('ln was undertaken against the advioe of 
Lord. Raglan and other important people. 51 
Admiral Dundas had made ~eat exertions to get information about the 
Crimea. During 1853 he obtained ver,y little ~r the information he thought 
necessary to accomplish his mission, and none about Sebastopel and the Rue-
sian fleet. He admitted that he was hindered from obtaining it b~ backward-
ness of &oma of the English authon ties. It was not that he was impeded, 
but that they were exceedingly slow. He was hindered from obtaining infor-
mation by the &etion ot Lord Stratford, who was responsible for not sending 
his interpreter ahea~ to Odessa and Sebastopol. Tbe. diffioulty. 80 Captain 
DrUlDIlondthought, Viae due to hie pa.ssport, and 80 Admiral DtlT.daa' potential 
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source of infoI'lU.i1on was sent ba.ck to Besika.52 Admiral Dundas attributed 
hie inability to obtain information while he was in Constantinople during 
November and December of 1853 to the "~8tem&tio vigilance and precaution 
of the Russian governaent and the hostility of the Greeks. H53 The inabll1tl 
ot responsible government offiCials to 81ve olear an ... r. to the oommittee'e 
que.tiona. oouvled with the evidenoe oonoerning the .teps taken_by the 
politioal authorities to prevent the m1l1tar,y and naval authoritiee from 
obtaining inforaation respecting the amount and disposition of the Ru •• ian 
forces in the Crilleat lett no doubt in ?In. Urquhart's mind that the CrimeaJ 
.%pad! tion was launohed in obedienoe to the Emperor of Russia. 54 
tt'he Crimean expedi tion was ordered oj" the governments of F'ranoe and 
F,ngland. and not by any of the oommanders in Ute 'Black Sea. 55 The Duke of 
rjewoastle sent a despatoh to Lord Ra~lan56 dated April 10. 1854. tellin,g 
him that he wa.s not precluded from exercising his diAoretion, but also told 
him that there wac nothing else for hIm to do exoept begin the Siege of 
S.0&8topo1. Here, aa before, when he was expressly forbidden to dislodge 
tbe Rusaian aNy trom the Principalities even after the Turks had defeated 
them as Sili.tria, the opportunity to exerois. diaoret1on wae not afforded 
5~., pp. 4)-46. Captain Druaaond was 1n t'he _ploy of Admiral 
~lnda. at Constantinople. 
5) 
:.!.!aj. , p. 45 
541h14., p. 55. 
55.!lUJ.. t p. 54. 
5f) 
'Lord Raglan was commander-in-ohiei of the English torcss. 
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him. l~ow when the troO?S had ecaI>cely arrived in r£Urkey he waG directed to 
attack Sebastopol, and t,hia at the very MOment when Lord Cla'rtlndon was s",-
ing that the DlOst the government expeoted i teelf tc do was to re80ue Con-
stantinople. This despatch ended. b7 declaring that "before the siege of a 
fortress reported. to be so strong oan be attempted, it 1s neoessary that 
infol"lllation that oan be relied upon ahall be obtained ... 57 I..oJ'ti Raglan t s 
answer to the Duke of ~jewcaBtle was dated August 19, 1854 from Varna. a. 
told the duke that he had not been able to obtain any of the information 
whioh was required in that d.spatoh. Lord Raglan furthermore protested 
against the winter1np,:- of the al'lDY in Crimea. because 1 t was ill provided 
tOl: slloh an ocoup~tiont and it would decidedly proyefatal. The contents 
cf' Raglan'8 answer elimina.tes the posafbility of hie having und,ertkan tbe 
expedition in ccmformitywith his own jllugment, and there.fore he undertook 
. 8 
it in eonlgequenoe of orders." 
On September 14, 1854 the allied forces landed in the Crimea. Marshall 
St. Arnaud at Varna. on the 26th of August h1!i.1led this by eta-tin,g' that til t 
was sho (Providenoe) also who calle us to the Crimea, a countr,y salubrious 
as our O'Wn, and to Sevaatopol, sea.t of the Ruasian power, wi thin vthose wall 
'we shall seek the pledge of peace and of our return to our native shore.:,59 
But, UrqUhart thought, it was this providenoe that prevented there being 
coal for the steamera, hay for the horses, huts for the .en, oOJDlllunicatio!'ls 
11 
51Hvriet Urquhart. p. 40. 
;8 Io1A., PP. 39, 40. 
59IbJ.d., p. ;5. 
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~or supplies, medicines for the sick, and clothing and food for all. This 
~roY1dence deprived the 801dierlll of abundant supplies whicb were 100ated 
within a few mi1ea of the oamps. H led the allies to the least vulnerable 
IOf Russian fortifioations, and spared the liu •• ians where they were most 'VUl-
~er&ble and where &ttack would have been most destruotive. Thie providenoe 
saw f'i t to spare the al11es in the Prinoipal1 ties where they oould have d .... 
If.ated the RUSSians, and oalled them to t.be Gr1mea. That oall Was, however, 
delSTed 80 as to give the RUBsian troOPB from the Principalitie. time to 
Ireach the Crimea, andror the allied t1"OOpS to a.rrive j'tIBt in tim.e to be 
~O iCa.u.~t by the winter. ,-
60~.t PP. 55-57. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE PEAC'E AND DIOLARATIOH OF PARIS 
In August of l854,with the diplomatio support of Austria, the all18s 
drew up proposals of peace which oame t.o be known a8 the Four Points. 'I'hey 
proVid.ed for a oollecUve European p.:uarantee cf the Prinoipali ties instead 
of a Rnssian protectorate, the improvement. ('1f cond.l tiona of navigation on 
the Danube; a. revision of the 81;l"a1 ts Convention of 18.41 whioh would limit 
Russian naval poW8'r in ~;he Bla.ck ~ea, a.nd the abandonment by Russia of her 
claims as the of:f'icilll protector of the Chril!!tian subjects of the Rultan. 
After the battle of ! 'lk.e!'!!lan !Heholae accepted the FeuI' Pointe 1n principle 
but refused to 11mi t the siZe of his Black Sea fleet, or t.o surrender terri-
tory between the Danube and the Fruth. Opinicn in western mtlrope, and pal"-
t1oular~ 1n Great Britain, which rega.rded the war as directed against the 
policy of Nicholas, hoped for a change under Alexander II after taohel.s 
d1ed on larch 2, 1855. But sinoe the allies had not wen anT striking mi1i-
tar,y auooe.s, Alexander II was not strong enough to resist Russian patri-
otic feeling. So when the Powers again met at Vienna on March 15, they 
agreed on the firat two pointa, but negotiations broke down on the third. 
point. Discussion had ra~ged between the two alternatives of restrioting 
Russian naval foroes on the Black Sea, cr maintaining their allied e~uiva-
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1 lent, nei ther of ."hi ch, however, was acceptable to tbe other. An AU8trian 
compromise solution was re3eoted by England. and f.'ranee, and the war con tin-
2 
ned. 
Urquhart saw 11 ttl. differenoe between the peace proposals in the Foul' 
Pointe and the Vienna Note. From the vantage point of the Vienna Note the 
Meneobikoff dema.nds were milder and the Four Pointe worse. The only differ-
ence be saw between the Vienna Note and the Four Points was that the foraer 
tra.yud'erred Turkish sovereignt;r to Russia. alone, and the petACe proposa.ls 
transf'el"red Turkish sovereignty tC' RUBsia and the allies. 3 
The object of' the Crimean oampal~ then, as the world. saw it, wae to 
secure RUBsia' s a.ccepta.nce of the essentials of the?our Points. There was 
to be no indemnity and no alteration of frontiers required, the all1es de-
clued themselves not enemies or. Russia, but only defenders ot Turk.,. But 
!Jrquhart thought that the great attack at the Itcentre of Russian powertf was 
not to foroe the submission of Russia. but to enforce the sumaiasion of 
T1lrkey.4 
Vlhen the Vienna conferenoe ruptured on April a8. 1855 Urqlibart felt 
that Ruesia had only used the OOHi'ere :LH~ to stall for time, and had actuall), 
gained thereby three months. The ccnferenoe, .. s he saw it, was opened on 
the grounds that ~l.sia 7181ded to ev.~thlng which 10gioal17 should have 
l R• W. Seton-Watson, Brat,in .in ~u:sJlI' 1789=1214 (Cambridge, 1955), 
P. 336. 
2E. L. Woodward,The!i.t s.t Refem, 1815:1870 (Oxford, 1938), p. 279. 
3Da.Vid Urquhart, SRids;:.w. ~ ~ (London, 1855), 1'. 15. 
4 ~., p. 16. 
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made the discu88ions superfluous. But then the conference olosed. oa t ens1blJ 
on the third point without Russia making a oounte:r-propoaal. Ueapparent17 
thought that this was planned, and that the allies needed more time to brin. 
mrke7 into suomis.ion.' 
The rupture of the Vienna. oonference on the third point ha.d the etfect 
U1"Q.uhart thought, of making RtlBtda appear l1nsubdued. "Aut the truth of the 
matter, a8 he conoeived it, was that Turkey remained unsubdued. To most 
readere of the protocols, the oonf'ereno0e at Vienna appeared. as a. verbal 
oontest between Buss1a ana the allies.. This Was So (lelusion whioh oould not 
have been p..rolcltlged, he felt. if the fourth point ha.d been d1 SQl.lsee(l. Urqu-
hart thought tha.t the net result of the Sultan's aoceptance of the first 
point wa.s the surrender of the De.nubia.Jl Prinei~~li ties. This t.he SuI tan wa II 
prepared to sacrifice. Handing them over to Eu.rope bere at least the appea~ 
ance of' taking them away from Russia. But 1 t was otherwise w1 th the fourth 
point. The Sultan was not about to agree to stipulations rega.r4ing hie con,," 
duct toward his Ch.ristian 8ub.1ects, which, as Urquhart saw 1 t, would baTe 
bad the effect of surrendering his sov.reign~ and therefore the empire .. 
The conferences at Vienna therefore ceased. Later the al11es presented in 
oonference at Constantinople plans for Turkish reform. ~~en at la.t an 
agreement Vias reached with the Turks the 11.1t;11 RtpvoWft was publi8hed. Ther 
the oonterences with Russia were resumed at Paria, from whioh the treaty 
emanated. PubliC attention was focused. on this, 8..Vld the papers rep,ard.ing 
the 1l91llt'Otiations wi tll Turkey were published unnotioed und~r the ti tle 
1)3 
"Oorre8pcmdenoe a •• pecting Chri.tian PrlT11ege. in 'Turkey ... 6 
The Vienna ditlOuss1ona continued throughout April, 1855. As kuatria 
was oppo.ed to the complete neutralisation of the Black Sea, the alli •• .a-
vooated & limitation of the naval forces of the riverine atatee. But Prince 
Oorohakov rejected thi., ~~d suggested that the Straits Convention of 1841 
should be abolished and tree passage aS8ured to the ships of all nations at 
peace with the Porte. ~ut France and Bngland refused to acoept this propos-
al as it would have accorded to Bussta free acoees to the ¥editerranean.7 
The fall of Sebastopol, however, soon o han ged. the 81 tuatlon. 8 Na.poleon 
due to preaaures at home desired to end the war through Austrian mediation, 
to reduee 1 t to a blookade of Ruasia, or to enlarge it by an appeal to 
natio.nal sentiment in Poland, Italy, and Hungary. Palmeraton reluctantly 
had. w give wrq, and. on Januar.r 16, 1856, after an ul t1matum fro. Auat1'1a, 
au .. ia acoepted the tour point. whioh included the surrender of territor" 
at the JIlOuth ot the Danube and the neutrall .. ation of the 'Black 3 ... 9 .But 
Ruaaia, in the ey •• of \JrQ,uhart. wa. merely aooepting the old tem. and reo-
jeoting the new. She now agreed to the neutralization of the Black Sea, 
but then not to that of the Aland I.lands. She wall willing to reetore Karat 
but certain17 not to 08de anY' part of Beasarabia. Just three day. atter 
Russia'. acoeptance of the Weur Point., Urquhart d8I!Jcribed thts continual 
6D1Rl9RltiC ~t!iJ!, September 4, 1867. p. 138. 
7Seten-~atsont p. 338. 
8"'1 ~ -.I ""'9 nOOUWa.nl,p. c, • 
9 :.!h&.!l. , p. 280 • 
diplomatio f.no1n~ aa nothing more than a game, and felt that conditiona 
10 
were ripe for revolution in many parts of mtU'ope. 
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The Con~e88 of Paris oonvened on ~ebruary 25, 1856, and lasted little 
more t.han a month. Tbe problems of 1'urkish integrity. Turkish rel'om, 
na.val power 1n the 'Black Sea and the Stra1 tSt and the status of the Prin01-
1'0.11 ties had. to be resolved. Compared. to the negotiations at Vienna. the 
Congress did not last long. ~ March 30. the ~reaty of Paris was signed. 
A1l oonquered terri tcry was to be l'estored with the exception of the reoti-
fioaticn of the frontiers of Be8sarabia. Turkey was now to be inoluded in 
the Concert of Europe with ita independenoe and terri torial 1ntegri ty in-
8U~ Th. Straits Convention of 1841 was revised in that the Sultan had 
to proh1bi t the entr.y of war ve •• ela into the Dardanelles and the :ao.phoru.~ 
The Black: Se .. waa neutralise4, aHoal. were prohibited. on it •• 0I"e., and. 
freedom or trade waa eatablished in 1 ta waters. Two co_i.,aione were to 
oont'1"Ol the naVigation of' the Dann'h..,. :aue.ia'a anCient proectorate OYer 
Wallachia. Molda:rla.. and Serbia was abolished, and a collective guarant •• 
by the great power. waa eubet1tutod for the pJ'Oteotion of theee state., no 
one or whom oould intel"Tene without previously consulting the others. A 
11 
oonvention waR la.ter to be drawn up conoerning the 'Roumanian s1 tuation. 
If' the Crimean ',far had been collueive, then Urquhart was quite logica.l 
when he conclud.ed. that the peaoe treaty and the ne~t1aticn9 preceding' 1. t 
had also been collUSive. As he pondered the interminable diplomatic 
lOlXll Ptll!. January 19, 1856, P. 3. 
11Setoo-Wataon. PP. 351, 352. 
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haggling he must bave reI t that his view at the intent of the war was pro ..... 
tug itself' correct. He later Waa to S8\Y that the Congress of Paris .erely 
possetluted the show of a legal transaction, and was just a oloak tor oth.er 
operations. lIe thought it quite strange that the meeting was not merely one 
between the belligerent powers, but also ineluded non-bel1ir:-erente sueh a.. 
Prussia. and Austria.. Th. treaty that reaul tad wa .. not one of concessions 01 
the granting of privileges, but almost exclusively conoerned itself with tht 
internal conditions of one ot the allle8, namely, Turkey. And this happenee 
to b. the power tor who.e "independence" and "integrity" th. war had been 
tought. Obviousl1, no side was beaten, and no .1de was wrong. Interest-
ingl;r enough, the honor ot both side. was F •• e"ed. TheN waa no ind.ani ~ 
no renunoiations, and ful"thel'lllore, no • .curl tie. were taken. It was obviotd 
to Urquhart that from the •• stipUlations and oondition. that the only thing 
the treatl' pttrporte4 to do .. as to regulate how Turkel". alli •• and her e~ 
would 1.ntertere in her internal affairs. 12 
The treaty had neutrali.ed the Blnok Sea, anA ita watera were thrown 
open to the .erchant. of ever:r nation with o"ly tlanita.!'y and custom. regu-
lation. that "ere ta'VOrable to oommerce. 13 "Beth Itus.,da and Turkey were 1"8-
qulred to retain only a stipulated number of shipe on the Black Sea. nut 
this was hardly acoepted before the ~18eians violated it. Whereas Russia 
armed her mel'Ohantmen, Turke,. striotly obeerved the treaty.14 nuesia 
12ll3! Prll.. Janu&r.1 4, 1860, p. 4. 
13J..2.14., Ootober 5. 1864. p. 82. 
l4DiI12!Al&Q R,v1i~' September 4, 1867, p. 138. 
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Violated it both in spirit and letter b1 re.trioting all coa4ereial inter-
oour •• w1 th the CircaallJlana to Runiall ports. Tb,la nolation wa. reoosnlzec: 
and oonnived at b1 the 'British 8Overnraent, IIJO that all attfllR»t. _de 01 
Urquhart and others to induce 13r! tiah .. !'Ohant. to open a trade with Oi1'-
casela were inerteotual.15 
n.tore the Oengres8 adjourned!l'rance propoa.d pema.n.ently to ohange tll ~ 
rip,bt of search. Thus the ensting law of the Ilea W88 reviMd. on April 16, 
1856 by the "Declaration of Paris. II Pri.vateering was abolIshed. With the 
exception of oontraband a. neutral flag would now oover an enf!l!ll,y' II goode. 
A~in with the exception of oontrabar~d a nentl"al' 8 good. were not liable 
to capture under an en • .,. '. flag. And blookades had to be eff.eotive batore 
they could 08 binding. 16 lJrctuh&rt thought that Russia had. been allowed to 
con tinue in the wa.s 80 that she could appear at the Congres$ as a conquered 
power. Thie was neo8ssar.r. In his esttmation, so that ahe could nbring 
a.bout the effeee.ent of maritime power." This would not have been poaa1ble 
had ahe appeared a8 a conQueror.17 The third and fourth propositions of the 
Declaration of Paris w.re not new, aa Were the first and .eooncl. All that 
t!:Ut7 .ere intended to aoooapliah, or 80 he thought, waa to .U'-SUi •• the 
innovation or the first two. But then Urquhart stat •• that the !u •• ian 
plenipotentiaries were entirelJ unprepared in treating of the •• points, and 
ao lad to refer 10 •• for inatmctuiol'Ul. Apparently, only the li'hlglish and 
15.!w !J:!II, October 4, 1864, p. 82. 
16Seton-Watson, P. 335. 
17Da:rid Urquhart, Nav" Psm'l" ~liBtlUd .l?x .lb.I kv~i. Siat •• (London, 1874), p. 6. 
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Frenoh representatives w'ere wi11inp.to SO beyond their instruotlona to make 
a peace treaty. Nevertheless, 1 t, is not ('Ileal" whether Urquhart thought the 
Russian action wa.s simple unprepn,redness, or a.n attempt to ce.mottfle.ge their 
real intentions. The French minister in any event was the one who proposed 
the declaration, and, Lord Clarendon ha.iled it as !la triumph of civilizat.ion 
and. humani 1;y ... 18 
But the atagefor tht tl dramatio surrender of England's most destructivE 
maritime weapon bad long been under oonstruction. The nDeclaration of 
Par1.tI made p.raanent the waiver of' the right of .earch which had. been de-
cl.red in March of 1854. During the war Urquhart and the foreign affaire 
00l811;t ••• oampaigned again.t the waiver which theY' aaw as most d.trimental 
to England'. defens.. For decade. two maxima had reigned with unquestioned 
authoritY' in the IIlinds of'8ritish atatesmenl the one, the inviolability of 
fuH.8!a in her own terri tory to the foroes of England J the other, the abso-
lute contrel which England po.sessed OVer Russian trade. 19 If England would 
therefore have attacked Russian tra.de, it aou1d have bloodlessly and ine»-
pensivel:r defeated her. It was, Urquhart thought, Enr,land' 9 aooeptance of 
the pri.noiple, ttfree bott;('It!ls, free goods, n by which she a.oted in the inter-
beaten by England despite the despatches and private letters ('If the ~1rat 
Lord. of the Admiral t;r, the Secretary of lia.r, the fi'oreign Secretary, and the 
18~ Ptll', M~ 2, 1860, p. 42. 
19Urquhart'" source for these was Sir John :Me' :1.111' 8, P~U81..f!HlS! 
Ft.Ral FOB t~<m.9i. Rt\Ie1a J.n JJl! Jul. 
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Prime l«iniater. Unless Rusaia had poesened the 1'OOat abaolute and oertain 
eer$, he felt that ahe could not have vE!!l1tured even into e simulated a1;rug .. 
gle. It was, then, Russiats objeot to see that the marlti~e laws of England 
were superseded, just I!tS it wa.s her obj(+ot to dt"al'f the forees of 11!ul"f}pe to 
her B01l, and all in order to transform a potentlttl defeat by Turkey into a. 
victory ('lver Europe. 20 
It was the right or seizure and oon.,~8cation that came into question 
during the Crimean 1tfar, and not the rigtlt of search which meant no more thaI 
the practice of visiting vessels. Tbe right of seizure, ITrqlUlart was con-
vinced, wa. a right inherent in sovereignty, and as old as war '1 t •• lf. In 
this respect it wa.. antecedent to all enactments 8..l'lti all written law, and 
oould not be waived. 2l 
The day that war was declared against Russia the English gove~ment 
ls.ted an Order-in-Couneil waiving the right of 8el~lre tor the duration of 
the war. The order was dated the twenty-eighth of 'Ma.rch, 1854. and stated 
that l"4'lgland had relinquished the right. of 8elflin~ an enerrt;1'e goods on boar< 
neutral veaeels. It wae, UrQUhart thollght, quite difterent from former 
2O"t,. Pr'!Uh September 6, 1851;, 'Pl'. 26, '-7. 
21 Ibid., August 25, 1855. Supplement, P. 1. Urquhart eta.ted, nThe 
right of seizure consti tutes the state of wa:l". War is t:l judicial sentence 
against an enemy, to be exeouted by a oompulsion whioh applies to hie pel"-
son and his goods. The poode are a,lwl?,ys dietrained hetore tho person; and 
therefore the rigb.t of' aeiz1n~ the enemyts<'!\'Oods 1s eonteil1ed within the 
right of' killing hie person, which is t.he :practice of <ar." TIe concluded 
that to qu •• tion the right of its exercise, and net the justice of the 
grounds upon which 1 t wae to be used, wn,.s to weaken the Mlvereignty {"\f the 
state. 
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treati •• or relaEationa of treaties. Vmen tormer relaxations took place it 
twas not in fa.vor of an enemy, but as a. ooncession to a friend. These uBual-
l.y Were made in a formal manner, and were entered into. wi th smaller powers. 
England had defend.ed that right against the whole world, and a~; the hazard 
of her very existenoe. And 11; was by this means that she was able ttl break 
than seeing England go off' to war wi thaut the ri,(~t of search as a Vleapon 
against her en~, and espeoially in respect to Russia, 8.eainst whioh it was 
her only real means of coercion. 22 
In order to prevent the seizure of ftuBsia's commerce under a neutral. 
flag a solemn act drawn up by the Privy Council sitting in the presence of 
the Queen was needed, and not .erely a decision ot the oabinet. Beoauae 
Lord Palmer.ton was unable to procure suoh a eolemn sot, he acted without 
it. Urquhart explained that a document appeared in the Qaa!ttl which re-
sembled an Order-in-Council, but the name of the Queen wa.s not at "he head 
of it. She did not sign 1 t, but her name waa used in the text as it •• h&cl 
sanctioned it. The dooument could only have emanated from the Oabinet Coun-
cil, because there had not been 8Jl3T s1 tUng of the Privy Couno1.1 "sinoe the 
9th offtlru-ch previous, tt and the supposed ord.e:r bore the de.. te of' the twenty-
eighth of March, a day on whioh there had only been a meeting of the C~binet 
Council at the Foreign o-trice. The deoision had therefore been t.a.ken in the 
Ca.binet. Counoil, and not in the Privy COUfUli1.. But a. deoisiol"l of tbe Ca1>i-
net Council had no legal or jud.icial vah:t.e, since that, body WCi.S not reeog-
22 ]W., p. 2. 
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nised by law. Arid it was nothing lass if! his eyes than "a usttrpation of tbt 
powere of' the Privy Council. ,~23 
As late as the twenty-fifth ~f ~roh, as little an three days before 
the "f"l'audulent ll Ordet-in-Counc1l was ig~:med, it is evident that the secret 
had not yet been confided to Lord Clarendon. A F'rench SOUTee thcught that 
on the tWenty-eighth the whele cabinet \'las ig'norant or the Order, for Lord 
Cowley on the morning af tha.t d.,BY had announced t('l the }<'1Tenoh government 
that the English cabinet had arrived at the unanimotls and definitive deci-
sion "to maintain the prohibition of' neutral oommerce between ports belong-
ing to the en4lllllY. . . .. 
Urquhart had predioted that as a result of the waiver Runian trade 
would not 'be bapaired, and that England·s mariti •• power would not be of 
any importanoe in the war. Russia. furthomore, he thought, would make a 
detemined eftort to obtain the permanency of that waiver. 'I'hese predio-
tiona were realized. Tra.de between Ru_ia and England never eM_d. »Van 
the admiralty advertised for and bought tallow from ~188ia. The government 
was finally driven into a. oomer by' ma'lii' 1nd:1~ant olasses of the c01l!mln1'tJJ 
and tried to excuse :1ts aotions by pretending that. it ha.d acted in the in-
terests efEnglieh tl'ade. 25 
The Congress at Paris in 1856 had ,10t. assembled i:'C!'r the pnrpose of 
making the waiver pemanent., but for oonoluding a peace 1;reaty. The declar-
&t:l.on wa.s not slipped. into the treaty, and as Urquha:rt sa.w it, it was an 
23Urquhart, Ntval Power, pp. 10, 11. 
2~., pp. 11, 12. 
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ttabnoftlal aot OS whioh wae '!l9r81y a.nnexed to the t,reaty.N'one of th.e plenipo-
tentiRries had been furnished with the a;utncri ty i(') rUseu88 the questlf.'!n. 26 
The persons who signerl it did "lot have the right to de so, and their l"e-
8pective 8(')vereigns IUd not rat! fy It. 27 As f;'l.r 118 'mngla.nd was concerned, 
the Birmingham Foreign Affairs Committee thou~ht that the declaration was 
illegal, because it was contrary to the COIaOn law of England. Even it the 
Crown 8upported it, the declaration could not have the fONe of law without 
28 the autheri V of ParU .... nt. And Lord Clarendon _dlai tte4 in the Hou •• at 
Lor48 on .1&7 22, 1856 that if the declaration would have been snbm1 tted to 
Parl1&1D4mt with the ~'J'.aty, tile Treat)" would 180st p1'Obably not have b •• n 
8icned. 29 The resolutions of the declaration not only went oounter to the 
la •• of England, but also the jnd~nt. ot English court. and the spirit o~ 
re.i.tance that 'ElIKla'11d bad tradl tionally .apreased ttwlard. tlle prino!,l •• 
30 inoorporated in the deolaration.· In fact, neyer before in recent U •• a, 
in the opinion 01 Urquhart, had auch pro po si tion8 'been lIubmi tted to. a d.elib-
\lrativ. assembly. The d.ei Bion to ehan~ sri time lltw came a.bout !lui till 
sud.denly, and i te suooess was ('lbvioualy due +'0 the abllle Int e eool"ecy with 
which it had been $lA:rded. 31 tl('lth Urquhart, !'ind the 131~ninf!{bl'lm Foreipn 
26 Urquhart , IZ"v!1 Pe,w,r, p. 5 .. 
27"0' PiIM, ~ 2. 1860, p. 44. 
28Jb1tl ., December 2:7, 1856, p. 150. 
29l1:rquhart-, ~a\rlio: rvw~!', n. 5. 
... ... • • .. .,;.:.. ¥ 
30ll:!! Pr!!8, December 27, 1856,p. 150. 
31Urquhart, Nayal Pgw,er, p. 5. 
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qui t6 il1e~1. Art~r ~1.11 Clarendon had no autl:1(;T'i +.y to chan~e the law cf 
England, a.nd aince he declared that he had done S(I, he had grievou81y clf-
fended the Crown, a."l Be tiC'Jl'l tel" whioh he could be b~ught to trit\1.32 The 
Viennese .Paper, 1:! Pre,se, Urquhart quoted as having stated on December 25, 
1861 that "Lord Clarendon, in signing at the Congress of Paria the extinc-
tlon of'England t. mar! time right., acted 'Wi thoui the knowledge of the Queen 
or the mandate of t.he Crown. Ria powers emana.ted from a private letter ot 
Lord Pal.eraton. ,,33 
The abandonment of the right of' search was in Urquhart' 8 ey.s the 
equivalent of allowing h.lli~rentR the right to trad .• in l'l811t:r&1 vessels, 
and could have no other effect than elttin~1.b1ng tb. F.l'lg1ish ca.r17i ng tradE 
durin~ wartime. Re felt that C~bden agreed wit.h him on this pnint, and 
quoted him as havi1"lfr, wl':i.tten th.at tfl1"he practical ~ff.'eot then, of the a.lters-
ther, would be, in case of 'ltar w'1 t,h ?!. naval PCWf'!ll', t<o transfer t.he carrying 
trade, even of ('J'ur ('wn ports, tc nentral bcttcms. !t34 
32~ Pr,!s, n~~embe:r 27, 1856, pp. 15f, 157. 
33UrqUhart, !~avil Power, p. 5. 
~ Pr,se, December 1), 1856, p. 139. 
cmmLusrcm 
Urquhart can be more rea.dily understood in the context of hie times if 
"'e view him as a. oontempora.ry observer who saw the continual expansion ot 
Rusa1a as an historical tact; and who observed England's fumbling actions 
toward the Turkish Fapire by members of the aristocraoy who probably more 
otten than not obtained their posi tiona in government by birth and wealth 
rather than by oharaoter, intel11gence, statesman.hip, and a good knowledge 
of' aftairs in the ~Jearlf'.ast. :Bven though Urquhart'. oharges of collusion 
may be proven erroneou. 1 t !Bust be a&Ai t ted. that the ~vernmen t 's in epti tude 
in proseonting the war make .. It qni te understanda.ble for him to have oOllle to 
such oonclusions. Ris post tion mueul sense in the light of the pl'inoiplee 
whioh he thought should permeate Roctety an~ inter.natiC'nal a.rrairs. His 
knowledge of the history of RUBsia. s.nd his acce'Pta.nce of the "P(?l:1ticnl 
'T'estament of Peter the Greatll gave a f'irm f'c'und!':l.tiol1 to .t;he struoture of' his 
View tbat Russia intended. to t~in hegemony over Europe. THe experiences in 
the East c·onfirlDed in his mind that Turk~y wse 'l'}ot in need. of ~'lestern help, 
and that 1 t would just prevent her from defeating RU8Sia.. His distrust of 
Lord Pal.eraton was substantiated. by the w83 he thought Palmp1"ston had han-
dled foreign affairs for the two decades pdor to the war. And public opin-
ion whioh Palmeraton made 80 Muoh of, he knew was only the re:i'lection of the 
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persona and partisan groups which owned the newspapers. 
Matthew Arnold" a contentporar,y of U!'Q.uhart" ~ivea U8 tIJ~ [.\!Oed lnsl~ta 
into the rea80ns why Urquhart WIlS so poorly- aocepted by hi f!I oontflllpora.l"iee. 
I,. the f1rst of hi. essays on critioism Arnold oonveys the impl"ees1cm that 
anyone who attelllpted. to cr1 tiCl ze the I!:ngl1 sh oonsti tll tion, gcvernment, or 
popular opinion could not help but be misunderstood. For oritic!" was at 
that tt .. 1n England too immereed 1n tactional strife whether political, 
religious or ac01al. Arnold also thOtlgbt that an Englishman valued What was 
politioal and practioal so UlUoh 80 that he e.eily oame ,ttl' di.like 14e.s and 
thinkeH, beoause they 1Il8d41e4 in pracUeal poll tica. JIo.t prcbably any of 
hie oont .. porar1e. saw Urquhart 1n this li~t and their view ot h1m • ., not 
be ac muoh a reflection of what ba waat •• what they were. 
!ut Ur~uhart oan be critl01zed for over-intellectualizing history. 
J'80qU •• Bar.un attribute. to Marx on page 155 in the Houe,.9! Int,11!2t, 
twa int.llectualist errors whioh also aptl~ deBCribe thoee of Urquhart. 
Both u •• d their mind. to bring order to Ide.s, and then having done 80 be-
11 • .,." that the order was d.isct.)Yeret'i in the facts themeel.,.elil. Urquhart I'>"oe 
having discovered this order, tbis plan (If Ftueei8.n oonquest, he made it iM-
perati'Ve truth for hi. followers. Both Marx and. iJrquhart also shared the 
Clonspiracy thee'!"',. of history. for :;q,rx 1 t is 1:he 'lJourp,eoi aie that conapi re 
to ~in their en".s and fer Urqubart it 10 Russia ,'Which does eo, both making 
oontemporary e.,.ents mask the real but hidden moV'ements of life. 
It 18 no simple task to evaluate the valid! ty ot Urquhart's vitwl8. 
There 1. great dIfficulty 1n aooepting in ita entirety his a •• ertion that 
there wall collusion between the British ministers and the Czar. Although 
the actions of the ministers were otten pro-llils8ian, it ia possible that 
they were done inadvertently or as a result of a misllnderstandi>\g of the 
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si tuation. This seems t.o be t.he '!lore reason.able a.nd ea8~.ly acoeptable e1'-
planation. If' collusion is ecnsidered ~.nl:po$8ibl~, the tJrqJlbart; will be seen 
as a qui te il'lcaneed an.:! raving ra11cal fool. Hi S o()l'lclue'i.ons are not,. how-
ever, 80 ha.rd tc belisvct iZ' 0011usion is c~nsid6red poasi hIe. Much ot Urqu-
hart's evidenoe (the author pre~mes and cannot Rut,hor! tatively say) 1s 
ditficult tn evaluate, because it ll'lvolves those thoughts and a.otions that 
would not be recorded in the diaries or papers of those involved, or 1n 
atate papers. We have 110 .iout.a of cabinet lIleetings, and as a pel"llanent 
and legal inst1tution in the goyern~ntal maohine~ 1t was quite new. Urqu-
hart could have been juetified in ee.ing 1 t as an illegal u8Urpe.tion by the 
aristocracy of the powers of the Crown and Privy Counoil. All thes. thinga 
being true it 1. diffioult to aq that the truth w111 ever b. known. If one 
view. the te.tiMOnT before Roebuok·. oommitte. aa by intention not probing 
too aeeply into the poor conduot of the war, one can only suspect that the 
witn.s.es were also tr,ring to cover up the governmentts incompetence. or aa 
t1rq1.lhart thought. oollusion. His caae 18 most often well ar'sued, a"ld he __ 
ploys a maas of evidence. To evaluate his position it mu~t fi~8t be dete~ 
!.lined it theae facts are accura.te. and 'i.hen U' his logioal analysiS (',f them 
18 in acoordance with the events as they h.a.ppened. Eut again we are back to 
the ori,ginal dlffioult;y cf wh:1eh wltneases t(' the events ean be truAted. 
And the truth of' t.hings 1s of~en n~t in whst is written, but in these words 
and deeds ot which we have no reoord. This 1s essentially the djlemma. 
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